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ABSTRACT 
This book examines recent developments in the evolution of crime at the 
domestic and transnational level, the pressures that these have exerted on 
domestic law and policy and national sovereignty, and the effectiveness of the 
United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice as a 
collective response to those pressures. At the time of writing (April - December 
of 2011) the Commission, which was established in 1992, is in its 20th year, 
and a re-assessment is in order. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Commission, it is necessary to first assess the various functions it performs, 
whether by design or not, and the value of these functions to the Member 
States individually and the international community as a whole. This is more 
complex than it may seem, because effectiveness is largely in the eye of the 
beholder and must inevitably be assessed as against the expectations of the 
many different constituencies it serves, which are defined not only by national 
or regional economic, political or other substantive interests but also in terms 
of the diplomatic, criminological, security, development and inter-
governmental, governmental or non-governmental lenses through which 
various participants perceive the Commission and its work.  
In this context, the book then considers developments of the past two decades 
and the perspectives of various constituencies on what has worked and what 
has not. It concludes that the benefits of the Commission and the work it 
mandates are, while often abstract, long-term and difficult to quantify, 
substantial when compared with the relatively small investment it demands 
from the Member States. At the 20th session, held in April 2011, the 
frustrations of many delegations appeared to crystallise in a new will to adopt 
procedural reforms, which bodes well for the future, but the Commission was 
also advised of major resource limits that will reduce the documentation by the 
Commission of its work, which bodes ill. These and other recent developments 
will be considered with a view to developing ideas and proposals for the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation and the technological and other developments which support it 
have made possible enormous changes in social, economic and political 
activities at the local, national, regional and global levels. Some of these are 
beneficial and others are less so. One major adverse effect has been the 
globalisation of crime, which has become a major challenge to individual 
States at all stages of development and to the ability of the international 
community as a whole to develop and implement coordinated and coherent 
responses. The measures needed include legal measures such as criminal 
offences, criminal procedure laws and human rights protections, and non-legal 
measures such as crime-prevention and law enforcement and other training. 
The accelerating pace at which crime itself is evolving make the need for 
more-or-less constant capacity to monitor crime and update anti-crime 
measures a further challenge. Most of the direct anti-crime actions are taken at 
the national level, but the criminal activities themselves are increasingly 
transnational in nature. This has placed ever-greater emphasis on the need for 
coordinated international actions, to ensure that every State has more or less 
the same laws, and that effective international cooperation laws and practices 
are in place.  
At all stages of the process, capacity is a further challenge. Within each State 
there are constant priority-setting and resource-allocation debates, as between 
crime-control and other policy areas, and between various crime issues. At the 
international level, even the most developed countries are challenged to keep 
pace with the evolution of crime, especially in technology-driven areas such as 
cybercrime. The problems are most acute in developing countries, where the 
lack of expertise and much greater competition for much scarcer economic 
resources make it much more difficult to identify and assess crime problems, 
develop responsive policies and laws, and implement and enforce whatever 
measures are developed.  
As with many of the other adverse effects of globalisation, many of the 
problems generated by globalised crime and the challenges it presents are 
asymmetrical. Crime is generally a more serious problem in developing 
countries both in absolute and proportional terms, and globalisation has greatly 
reduced the insulation of each from the other. All else being equal, smaller and 
less-developed countries lack economies of scale and are less efficient, and 
such countries and their populations suffer greater harm from any given level 
of organised crime or corruption activities and the same is true for many 
specific forms of crime. Paradoxically, as countries increase in size and wealth, 
their abilities to develop and maintain rule of law and criminal justice 
capacities increase, but so does social cohesion and order, which reduces the 
demands placed on those same capacities.  
Transnational or globalised crime exacerbates this problem because its size, 
presence and the magnitude of its effects are determined by global factors, 
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whereas both the proactive and reactive capacities of law enforcement and 
other criminal justice and rule of law elements tend to be determined and 
limited by domestic factors. Smaller and less-developed countries with limited 
expertise and human and financial resources for crime prevention and criminal 
justice can be seriously challenged and even overwhelmed by transnational 
organised criminal groups who can draw on greater expertise and more 
resources from without. The most obvious examples are drug-trafficking 
economies, but many of the same problems can be seen in other forms of 
transnational crime. Where narcotic drugs are produced and trafficked, 
different incentives and consequences tend to arise in producing, transit and 
destination or market countries, generating asymmetrical effects. This is not 
just because the drugs and their adverse social effects travel in one direction 
and the proceeds travel in the other, but also because the proceeds tend to flow 
from large, affluent States to smaller less-affluent ones. Absolute amounts or 
proceeds that are insignificant to the larger economies of the wealthy countries 
of North America and Europe from which they originate can completely 
corrupt and de-stabilise the smaller source and transit countries. This then 
creates domestic opportunities and incentives to grow or manufacture the drugs 
in places where prevention and criminal justice capacities are weak, the 
incentive and resources to keep them that way, or if this cannot be 
accomplished, to change the locations of production and trafficking routes in 
search of the lowest risk and the least resistance.  
When transnational organized crime exploits the lack of capacity in developing 
countries as a point of origin or safe haven for its activities, the same factors 
that put it out of the reach of criminal justice there also place it beyond the 
reach of countries where victimisation and other harms occur and proceeds 
originate, creating new and stronger shared regional and global incentives to 
act in a coordinated and strategic manner to prevent and suppress it. In general, 
high rates of crime, corruption and some specific forms of crime are a major 
obstacle to social and economic development, whether efforts come from 
within a State or in the form of international assistance. The disproportionate 
effects of criminal expertise and proceeds drawn from large States or regional 
or global sources in less-developed States or regions causes instability to the 
point where the prevention and suppression of at least some forms of crime has 
now evolved from being dealt with as a social issue to being treated as a 
security issue. The globalisation of legitimate economic and commercial 
activities has created major commercial interests which can be threatened by 
crime, and when they are so threatened provide powerful incentives to prevent 
and suppress it as a prosperity issue. In the context of drug trafficking, the 
social consequences of trafficking in destination States also provide incentives 
for the destination countries to intervene in source and transit States by funding 
and building law enforcement and criminal justice capacity there. In reactive 
terms, when the countries which have the capacity to investigate and prosecute 
transnational crime do so, they often cannot obtain the investigative and 
judicial cooperation they need because other States lack the capacity to deliver 
it. Anti-crime processes that have traditionally been based on rule of law, 
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human rights and law enforcement paradigms at the domestic level now 
increasingly come into contact, and sometimes into conflict, with national 
security, diplomatic paradigms which have different processes perspectives and 
goals, and individual officials are often faced with scenarios and challenges 
outside of the scope of their training and experience. 
While States and officials react to crime, crime itself is also reactive. 
Understanding the gaps in resources, expert capacity, political will and legal 
jurisdiction, the more sophisticated offenders and organised criminal groups 
have adjusted their own activities to reduce risks and take the best advantage of 
circumstances. Organised criminal groups and information technologies are 
particularly problematic in this regard because they provide an infrastructure 
where successful strategies for crime are enhanced and propagated, and 
unsuccessful ones are either discarded or modified until they become 
successful. Physical elements of criminal activities are conducted in places 
where law enforcement capacity is weak, and offences are committed across 
borders so that there are jurisdictional barriers between victims and 
prosecutors, evidence, and the offenders themselves. Trafficking routes and 
methods evolve constantly to avoid physical jurisdictions where enforcement is 
strongest and to elude sophisticated means of surveillance and detection. 
Cybercrime schemes and criminal communications are routed through States 
which are not able to intercept or trace them, and electronic evidence and 
proceeds of crime avoid detection, tracing and seizure through complex 
transfers, constant movement, and where possible, the use of “safe havens”. 
These fundamentals are often masked by the complexities of national or 
regional conflict, under-development, natural or humanitarian crises, and/or the 
ebb and flow of political and ideological debates, but they are relentless and 
consistent, and they have made the prevention and suppression of crime a 
global issue whether individual States, governments and officials like it or not. 
The end result is that, while many governments would often prefer to deal with 
crime as a more or less purely domestic matter, they are increasingly forced to 
deal with it at the bilateral, regional and global levels, with other States which 
may share few other interests than the general desire to control crime and with 
divergent views about what crime actually is. 
That said, while the pressures to deal with crime as a global issue are 
substantial and constantly-increasing, the counter-pressures of sovereignty and 
political autonomy are by no means insignificant. The prevention, and 
especially the suppression of crime, is a jealously-guarded attribute of domestic 
national sovereignty, and is never far from the centre of partisan political 
discourse in any country where there is such discourse. In customary 
international law, the right to enforce laws and punish wrongdoing is based on 
the fundamental concept of territorial jurisdiction as an attribute of national 
sovereignty. As one text describes it:1  
                                                 
1 Shaw, 1997, pp. 458-59. Concerning the territorial basis for jurisdiction, exceptions to the 
principle and comity as they apply in the context of the criminal law, see: Aust, 2005, chapter 
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That a country should be able to prosecute for offences committed upon its 
soil is a logical manifestation of a world order of independent States and is 
entirely reasonable since the authorities of a State are responsible for the 
conduct of law and the maintenance of good order within that State. It is 
also highly convenient since in practice the witnesses to the crime will be 
situated in the country and more often than not the offender will be there 
too. 
States are gradually being pressed into compromises with respect to areas such 
as the extradition of offenders and legal instruments which oblige them to 
establish crimes and provide cooperation with one another, and within Europe 
developments have progressed to the adoption of a scheme for extraterritorial 
arrest warrants,2 but these may still be executed or enforced only by the 
competent authorities of the State where the arrest takes place.3 Europe has the 
advantage of relatively similar standards and the common basis of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Elsewhere, countries can and do urge 
one another in the direction of common legislative and policy approaches, but 
are still very reluctant to enter into the development of legally binding or 
prescriptive standards, and any sort of extraterritorial enforcement, without the 
consent of the State where it takes place and appropriate judicial approvals, is 
still fiercely resisted.  
From a legal perspective, a number of reasons have been advanced for this, 
many of them based on rule of law and human rights precepts. For example, 
the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), the principle that ignorance 
of the law does not excuse (ignorantia legis neminem excusat) and key 
functions such as the role of judicial precedent (stare decisis) all become 
unstable if laws made in one jurisdiction are enforced in another and require 
that great care be taken in transferring legal measures from one place to 
another or formulating international legal instruments intended to be 
                                                                                                                                 
4; Brownlie, 5th ed., 1998, chapter XV.3.; Harris, 4th ed. 1991, chapter 6; and Shaw, 1997 at p. 
458 et seq. See also: Council of Europe Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 1990 (1992) 3 
Crim. Law Forum 441-480; Gilbert, 1992, Lew, 1978, and Williams, 1965.  
2 Council of Europe Framework Decision 2002/589/JHA of 13 June 2002, amended by 
2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009. 
3 The arrest warrant replaces elements of the judicial process previously associated with 
extradition, but not powers of arrest, which remain with the State in which the arrest warrant is 
actually executed. Warrants are applied for and issued in the requesting State and then 
transmitted to the executing judicial authority in the State where the arrest is to be effected, 
whose authorities are then charged with the responsibility of making a final decision on the 
arrest, notifying the requesting authority, and assuming they approve the warrant, actually 
arresting the suspect, ensuring procedural rights are observed, and sending him or her to the 
requesting State. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/ 
judicial_cooperation_in_ criminal_matters/l33167_en.htm 
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implemented in diverse legal systems.4 In practical and diplomatic terms, 
extraterritorial enforcement without the consent of the host State is regarded as 
hostile and provocative, if not as an act of war, which has generally led 
domestic judicial and legislative bodies to take a conservative line and ensure 
that their barks do not extend far, if at all, beyond the range of their bites.  
While large and powerful States have sometimes tended to stretch this 
conservative approach, for the most part the reluctance to accept foreign 
interference in what they regard as domestic criminal justice matters has led 
most States to a posture of reciprocal reluctance to impose their legal or 
criminal justice measures or principles on others. The need to avoid conflict 
over such issues has led to the principle of comity, in which each State respects 
the sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of others, and to substantial 
pressures to negotiate acceptable principles for dealing with circumstances 
such as aviation, international waters, Antarctica and outer space, where no 
clear basis for territorial jurisdiction exists, and to develop appropriate legal, 
diplomatic and practical measures to ensure effective cooperation and the 
avoidance of conflict in places and circumstances where national legislative, 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdictions overlap or interact. However, the 
fundamental legal framework for dealing with crime remains one in which the 
pressures of globalisation have led in the direction of coordinated international 
efforts acting through the agency – and under the constraints – of separate 
territorially-based national criminal law and justice systems, and not to any 
significant tendency to supersede or circumvent them by means of the direct 
application of international law or law enforcement measures. The expansion 
and codification of international crimes in the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court represents a limited exception,5 but even here the 
substantive scope is limited to the gravest of crimes, and the primary emphasis 
is on the use of domestic criminal justice and judicial institutions wherever 
possible and the international basis of the Rome Statute, the ICC and its 
prosecutorial functions only where national measures are not viable.  
                                                 
4 See Lew, 1978 and Williams, 1965. The discussion here is drawn from a paper produced by 
the author for the 2011 joint Annual Proceedings of the International Centre for Criminal Law 
Reform (ICCLR) and the International Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law (ISRCL). 
See Ram., C., “The Globalisation of crime as a jurisdictional challenge”, ICCLR/ISRCL, 
Ottawa, 2011. 
5 U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 2187, p. 3, in force 1 July 2002, No. 38544, based on A/CONF.183/9 
of 17 July 1998, as amended, Articles 13-19 and in particular Article 17, paragraph 1 (case 
inadmissible where domestic jurisdiction is viable unless the State with jurisdiction unwilling 
or unable to prosecute), official text available at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/ 
RecentTexts/rome-en.htm. Referred to hereinafter as the “Rome Statute”. 
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In terms of partisan political discourse,6 the nature of crime, the fear of crime 
and popular and media fascination with crime make it a lucrative partisan 
political issue, but the effects are very different at the domestic and 
international levels. Within each State, voters are faced with arguments from 
the left that portray crime as a social problem best dealt with by prevention 
through social-welfare measures and which depict the right as being wasteful 
and overly-retributive. The right, for its part, plays to popular fears about crime 
and the popular belief that retributive measures will deter it, and tends to argue 
that the left is “soft on crime” and places the interests of offenders (who unlike 
other population groups can be safely demonised) ahead of those of victims or 
law-abiding citizens. Partisan advocates on both sides capitalise on “moral 
panics” whenever the fear of crime – which is usually greater than any actual 
risk of crime – peaks, and may themselves exaggerate the seriousness or risk of 
crime, effectively creating fears that would not otherwise exist.7  
Popular input is a hallmark of law-making and public administration in 
democratic States, but the relationship between partisan politics and crime 
prevention and criminal justice is imperfect at best and often problematic, 
ranging from profound disagreements over the fundamental purpose and 
legitimacy of the criminal law and justice system as a means of social control, 
to disagreements about the balance between proactive and reactive policies and 
the details of specific policies and how they should be implemented. Many of 
the legal, social, and psychological relationships between crime and other 
aspects of society and among offenders, victims, the police and other key 
                                                 
6 References such as “partisan politics”, “political oversight” and the nature of the Commission 
and other bodies and of some of the documents it produces as “political” bodies or texts are 
used in many places in the present article. For clarity, references to “partisan politics” as in this 
segment, are used to discuss the ideological and political dynamics – generally in right/left-
wing terms – that ebb and flow in various Member States and that individually and collectively 
influence the Commission and other such bodies. Within the United Nations itself, references 
to “political” matters in terms of oversight and documents are generally used to distinguish 
between the internal management and governance of the organization itself under the authority 
of the Secretary General, and the “political” oversight and governance of the organization at 
the higher level by the Member States themselves. Thus, for example, a Bulletin of the 
Secretary General dealing with staffing policies is an internal governance text, whereas a 
resolution of the Commission, the ECOSOC, the General Assembly or the Security Council 
which allocates resources and directs the Secretariat to act on the decisions made is a product 
of the deliberations of a “political” body and is a “political” text. This is distinct from matters 
or texts referred to as “technical” in nature, which in the case of crime are generally based on 
substantive research and consideration of issues by legal, criminological or other substantive 
experts in processes which are not intergovernmental in nature and have some degree of 
independence from the Member States and their governmental or official interests or positions. 
Resolutions of the Commission, ECOSOC and General Assembly which make policy decisions 
are sometimes described as “legislative” texts, but the term has been avoided in the present 
article to avoid confusion with the international legal instruments on crime, corruption, 
terrorism and other subject matter and to legislative or law-making activities of the Member 
States themselves in response to crime problems. 
7 The term originates with criminologists Jock Young and Stan Cohen in the 1980s. See Cohen, 
3rd. ed., 2002, and Cowell, Jones, and Young, J., 1981.  
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participants are counter-intuitive, which often confronts politicians with 
difficult choices between what the voters who elected them believe and want 
and what criminal justice experts tell them is actually occurring and will (or 
will not) be effective. Examples of this abound. Imprisonment is far less 
effective in deterring crime and far more costly than most voters believe, for 
example, and the incarceration rates of many democratic countries rise and fall 
like the tides as political government shifts back and forth between right and 
left. While social scientists sometimes become implicated in partisan debates, 
more commonly they find themselves somewhere in the middle, unpopular 
with both sides because social science evidence often tends to cast doubt (or 
worse) on the claims of both sides.8  
National political influences on crime also operate at multiple levels in 
determining how crime is defined, characterized and how each State responds 
to it. Popular will and partisan pressures influence not only the making of laws 
establishing criminal offences and governing criminal procedures, but also the 
election or appointment of senior legislative, executive and even judicial 
officials and the setting of general priorities for crime prevention, law 
enforcement, the balance between custodial and non-custodial sentencing and 
diversionary or other programmes for juvenile offenders, and other such 
matters. Less evident is the fact that political influences also regulate the 
relative allocation of political and official attention and financial resources 
between domestic and international efforts, a fact which has had a major 
influence on the Crime Commission and its work. While dramatic events such 
as terrorist attacks occasionally make global action a domestic political 
priority, the general pattern for crime has been that politicians and voters focus 
almost exclusively on local and national crime problems and on types of crime 
– usually violent crime – that are less likely to be transnational in nature. The 
mass-media follow a similar pattern, partly responding to consumer demand, 
and partly because reporting local news is much faster, cheaper and less-
demanding than international news. As discussed below, globalisation has had 
profound effects on crime, and State responses have begun to reflect this, but 
the general pattern remains that of national governments focusing most of their 
attention and crime prevention and criminal justice resources on solutions 
within their own borders, even in circumstances where the nature of the crime 
problem suggests that collective international responses would be preferable or 
                                                 
8 The uncomfortable relationship between partisan politics and social science is a dominant and 
enduring theme of modern criminology and I will resist the temptation to revisit the issue in 
any detail here or to give any preference to the views of the left or right in the debate. The issue 
dealt with here is how the recurrence of these debates in many different Member States over 
time plays out in the multilateral environment of the United Nations. For those interested in a 
more detailed overview of the partisan issues and their relationship with political debates, the 
use of crime statistics, and social and media depictions and constructions of crime, reference 
may be had to The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2007, 
chapter 2 “The Social Construction of Crime and Crime Control”. See also the discussion of 
critical theories of criminology in Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, chapters 7-8. 
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even essential, or where purely domestic responses could be better informed by 
looking at what has been tried in other countries. 
Partisan debates over crime prevention and criminal justice have always been a 
significant factor at the international level, but here there are some important 
differences in effect. Within each State, the same issues tend to be raised 
repeatedly over time as the political pendulum swings from right to left and 
back. Generally one side is dominant and the criminal justice agenda is shaped 
accordingly at any given point in time, although the effects of this are often 
concealed by the fact that the effects of changes in social policies on crime are 
manifested over much longer time-lines than most political or electoral cycles 
and influenced and concealed by other factors. At the international level, 
however, there will usually be different States at different places in this process 
at any given time, and most sessions of the Commission therefore feature a mix 
of right and left ideological perspectives on the issues at hand and alliances 
between delegations that change from issue to issue and session to session. 
Member States whose governance and political systems do not shift over time 
may take strong ideological positions, but the effect of the ones which do shift 
is generally to reduce the influence of the more extreme positions and focus 
discussions on the political and criminological centre, where proposals may 
find consensus. As will be seen below, the tendency of criminologists and other 
social scientists to challenge partisan depictions of crime within each State is 
largely a thing of the past in the Crime Commission, if it ever existed. While 
the early history shows much greater engagement by independent crime experts 
– and no shortage of conflict as political and diplomatic views were challenged 
– the six decades since the U.N. itself was founded have seen a steady and 
relentless trend to dominance of the deliberations by governmental experts and 
diplomatic representatives. 
The same political issues also tend to propagate from State to State. The 
globalisation of the mass-media and other information and communications has 
encouraged partisan politicians of the left and right to share experiences of 
successful and unsuccessful appeals to public opinion and support, and social 
scientists to exchange knowledge through professional, academic and 
governmental channels and publications. But politicians and criminologists 
only react to crime. Of greater significance in global crime patterns is the fact 
that the offenders themselves also share information and expertise across 
borders. The offenders have the initiative in forming transnational 
organizations, spreading criminal expertise and committing cross-border 
offences, and for this reason new criminal techniques propagate much more 
quickly than State responses to them. The fact that crime itself is able to evolve 
and propagate much more rapidly than in previous generations, in both 
geographic and substantive terms makes the combination of criminological and 
political discourse in the Commission even more important, both as a means of 
identifying new problems and trends and developing consensus on how to 
respond as quickly as possible. It is true that few who have participated in the 
work of the Commission over the years would regard it as a rapid-response 
mechanism in comparison with various sorts of direct action in specific cases. 
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But to the extent that international consensus is needed for many responses to 
crime, true consensus can be reached in the Commission more quickly than by 
any other means. 
While the practice of consensus-building among like-minded and divergent 
States is as old as diplomacy itself, the non-random propagation of crime is 
new. It has significantly increased with recent globalisation developments, 
which support both the rapid transfer of knowledge and information (by 
politicians, law-makers, law enforcers and offenders alike), the rapid 
movement of people and goods, and the globalisation of the underlying 
economic and social environments in which most transnational crime occurs. 
This does not fundamentally alter the need for global consensus-building, but it 
is in the process of transforming the ways in which consensus is developed 
with respect to crime just as it is in other subject areas. Until the mid-twentieth 
century, States could afford to seek consensus on reactions to crime in time-
honoured ways, and if none was to be had, to go their own ways. The advent 
and rapid evolution of problems such as trafficking in narcotic drugs, weapons 
and other illicit commodities (including human beings), transnational organised 
crime in general, terrorism, cybercrime and a range of new and traditional 
forms of economic and financial crime mean that international consensus-
building is no longer a luxury, it has become a necessity.  
This book will consider two essential propositions that arise from these facts. 
First, it will argue that both partisan political discourse and social science 
expertise are essential to the development of domestic crime prevention and 
criminal justice policies. Second, using the United Nations Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (hereinafter referred to as the “Crime 
Commission”), it will argue that this is also true, mutatis mutandis, for the 
development and implementation of similar policies at the international level. 
Political discourse in domestic policy-development and law-making performs 
two critical functions. Within each State, elected legislatures serve as 
consultative bodies, broadly ensuring that issues are identified and that laws 
and policies developed are responsive to popular concerns, and they help to 
ensure that these responses are seen as legitimate, supporting the rule of law 
and popular compliance. Social science and other technical experts provide a 
balance to this, ensuring that factual evidence about the problems is available 
and accurate, providing long-term continuity of knowledge and expertise, and 
continually monitoring the effectiveness of past measures as a means of 
advising future ones.  
Within the U.N. and other international bodies, the political will of the various 
Member States is primarily represented by their diplomats. Technical expertise 
is provided by a combination of experts provided by the Member States and by 
the Secretariat. Without substantive expertise in law, criminology, human 
rights and other key areas, international policy-making would lack long-term 
consistency. Consensus among States with diverging political views would be 
difficult to achieve, and policies which did find consensus would not be 
evidence-based or very likely to be effective against crime. Without a political 
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and diplomatic element, on the other hand, experts would have difficulty 
developing policies which were responsive to the actual needs of the Member 
States and which would not have the legitimacy and support needed for States 
to actually implement them. It will be argued that within the U.N. system as a 
whole, it is at the level of the Crime Commission that diplomatic and 
criminological elements are brought together and that reconciling these is both 
a major function of the Commission and a reason why neither diplomats nor 
criminologists recognize its true value.  
The book will then consider the present functioning of the Crime Commission 
and suggest possible changes to address problems and enhance its 
effectiveness. In this context, the question of expectations is important. While 
it is here argued that there are important substantive parallels between the 
Commission and domestic policy and law-making organs, there are also 
fundamental differences in process, and the United Nations and its various 
constituent elements are commonly criticised by those who compare them to 
national government bodies or even private-sector entities. At the domestic 
level, decisions tend to be made on a majority-rule basis, both in elections and 
within legislative bodies once they are elected, and based on the rule of law 
and the pragmatic realities of law enforcement, these decisions are generally 
binding on everyone, whether they support a particular policy or the 
government which developed it, or not. At the international level, no practical 
means of enforcing the will of the majority, short of military force, exists. This 
means that the rule of law, to the extent that it exists at all, takes a very 
different form, and that decisions tend to be based on consensus among 
Member States, who must then also choose how best to ensure conformity at 
both the national and individual level with whatever has been agreed. This is 
nowhere more apparent than in the Crime Commission. Penal law and policy 
involve the harshest of consequences, which by their nature must be applied to 
individuals, and this has made criminal justice a jealously guarded matter of 
national sovereignty.  
All of this makes the development and implementation of global policy and 
legal measures against crime a very difficult and time-consuming process when 
compared with its national counterparts, but it is argued that this is not the 
comparison that should be made in assessing the Crime Commission. Its 
primary function is not to make law, or even necessarily to make policy, 
although it has done both when the necessary consensus was present, and 
maintaining capacity to do so when needed is important. The primary function 
of the Commission is to serve as a forum in which Member States can share 
information about the evolution of crime, and what they are doing and what 
they believe should be done, to prevent and suppress it. It serves as a forum in 
which political and scientific input is reconciled, and one in which individual 
States with widely divergent realities in terms of governance, rule of law, 
social and economic development, and national and human security 
environments can articulate their views and needs and hear those of other 
States. It juxtaposes the perspectives of diplomats, who understand 
international differences and represent political interests but come and go with 
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the governments who appoint them, with the longer term substantive 
perspectives of criminologists and other experts, who provide evidence and 
continuity, and understand their own social environments, but who may not 
understand or appreciate the realities which exist in other States or the need to 
develop responses to crime which meet global needs as well as national ones.  
The question of whether the Commission should also have a role in developing 
new policy is also discussed below. This is a question which has dogged the 
Commission, its predecessors, and many other functional bodies for as long the 
United Nations itself has existed. The Commission has considerable value even 
if it serves only as a “clearing house” for information, but I and many former 
colleagues who have been involved in the work over the years, believe that a 
policy-making function is necessary, and perhaps also inevitable. This is not to 
suggest that the primary source of policy and law-making should always be, 
first and foremost, each of the sovereign Member States, but to some degree 
global crime problems require global deliberations and global responses. 
Policies which are responsive to global issues and effective in responding to 
transnational and global crime problems require a new level of policy-making, 
but policy at the global level must be more than the sum of its parts in each 
State, and it is unlikely that the legal, criminological or other experts of even 
the most developed, sophisticated and best-resourced Member State could 
develop global policies that would be substantively viable, let alone politically 
acceptable, at the international level or within another State. The gradual but 
inexorable shift from independent experts to government experts on crime, and 
more recently in the direction of diplomatic representatives supports a vision of 
the Commission as a conduit or “clearing house” for information and bringing 
together the supply and demand for technical assistance, but it is not consistent 
with any sort of genuine policy-making function. The function of diplomatic 
experts in articulating the needs and concerns of their governments, and as a 
conduit for factual information is necessary for such policy-making, but it is 
not sufficient for it. The development of the sort of creative and innovative 
policy responses to crime at the global level that are becoming increasingly 
urgent can only come from dynamic and interactive substantive discussions 
among crime experts who can integrate the diverse political and substantive 
inputs with an objective and substantive understanding of the many aspects and 
varieties of crime itself. Paradoxically, this capacity has been steadily eroded 
during (and before) the first two decades of the Commission in the same period 
of time when the demand for global strategic responses to crime has steadily 
increased. 
The United Nations is a vertical organization in which subject matter is first 
examined by substantive experts and then transmitted upward to the more 
political deliberations of bodies such as the ECOSOC and General Assembly. 
It will be argued below that in this context, the greater use of substantive 
experts on crime, including experts who are independent of the Member States, 
the allocation of the time and resources needed to support information 
gathering and substantive expert deliberations, and the development of 
innovative policy ideas which are more independent of the political views and 
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positions of the Member States, are also critical to the future success of the 
Commission and to the collective interests of the Member States. Once 
substantive policy ideas have been developed, it remains for the Member 
States, first collectively and then individually, to make political decisions about 
whether to implement them, and if so how. To be valid, however, it is argued 
that such a process must take the form of a dialogue between politics and 
criminology in which each speaks with an independent voice and in which 
political authorities consider crime as it actually is, based on the best possible 
factual evidence and scientific assessments. If the formulation of 
criminological policy is itself becomes politicised – as to some degree it has – 
then the dialogue becomes a sterile exercise of politics talking to itself in an 
atmosphere devoid of substance.9 It is in the nature of political governments to 
be risk-averse, and they are understandably nervous in providing both 
autonomy and resources to international bodies which will, from time to time, 
produce policy proposals which are politically inconvenient, but in doing so, 
they run the risk of ignoring much greater risks, as recent experiences with 
global economic interdependence clearly illustrate. Crime is what it is, and 
effective measures to prevent and suppress it can only be developed by 
gathering accurate evidence and confronting the problems at a substantive 
level, and at the global level, the Commission is not just the most appropriate 
forum for this, it is the only available one.  
As a person who has worked within the Commission Secretariat as a national 
delegate and as an expert on a number of subordinate bodies established by the 
Commission, I believe that, while there is clearly room for improvement, it has 
substantial value and plays an essential role in the global fight against crime. 
While international deliberations commonly take much longer than domestic 
ones, there are compelling reasons why this is, and should be so. In bringing 
together all of the U.N. Member States, the Commission also performs the 
function of reconciling divergent national policy and legal measures into a 
coherent amalgam that is viable for most or all States regardless of the nature 
of each State’s legal system, and then supports a reverse process in which this 
amalgam can then be adapted and implemented in each individual States, 
focusing on those who lack the means to do this for themselves. In the case of 
new and emerging crime issues, it also assists many States in acquiring 
knowledge and expert advice on how to respond. This can take time, but it is 
essential that States representing different degrees of legal, social, political and 
economic development, all understand the nature and extent of a new global 
crime problem before any useful global consensus about what to do about it 
can emerge. 
                                                 
9 Lest this seem rather one-sided, it is equally unlikely that criminology talking to itself would 
produce viable global responses to crime. My argument is that each side needs the other. The 
differences are that dominance of the Commission by criminologists has never been a problem 
and seems unlikely to become one in the future, and that while politicians can and do make 
laws and implement social policies without regard to criminological expertise and evidence, 
criminologists cannot. 
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The Commission has also become an essential element of global anti-crime 
work precisely because of its global nature. While some exceptions remain, 
many forms of crime have now expanded to the point where only strategic 
responses which include global elements and take into consideration global 
causes and effects are viable. Specific elements of responses, especially the 
popular consensus and political will to enact criminal offences and other laws 
and the law enforcement will and capacity needed to make them work, remain 
national or local matters. But strategic global consideration is needed as the 
basis of a complete picture of the nature, extent and seriousness of the problem, 
to provide a global technical analysis of challenges and possible responses, and 
as a forum in which political consensus to act can emerge. Perhaps the best 
example of this is transnational organized crime, about which political 
consensus gradually emerged after a decade of technical study and 
deliberation, and in which the Palermo Convention focuses on establishing 
domestic offences and powers that are similar in all States Parties, and on 
providing an international framework to ensure that States Parties who need 
implementation assistance and international cooperation receive it from other 
States Parties in a position to provide it.  
This and other emerging global crime problems have elicited a series of 
national and regional actions in accordance with needs and the political will to 
respond, but ultimately they will require global consensus and responses, and 
the Commission is the logical forum for the necessary deliberations.10 With 
respect to crimes propagated by or committed using modern transportation and 
communications technologies, the interests and objectives of individual 
Member States have shifted from purely domestic responses to crime to 
ensuring that their own nationals and residents do not commit crimes against 
victims in other countries and pressuring and encouraging other countries to 
reciprocate. More generally, even when crime in one Member State may not 
explicitly engage the interests of other States, it is now recognised that in a 
global environment, almost any form of crime, and especially forms such as 
organized crime and corruption, affect such interests indirectly as matters of 
global or regional security, stability and prosperity. Purely domestic organised 
crime, corruption, economic frauds, trafficking in narcotic drugs, firearms and 
other weapons, and trafficking in persons have all been cited as factors in 
destabilising individual States and interfering with travel, trade and commerce 
and other global interests. 
I also maintain that, as a standing body, the Commission and its Secretariat 
represent an important opportunity and excellent value in an era of scarce 
                                                 
10 Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 65/230 of 21 December 2010, an open ended 
intergovernmental expert group established to study the subject-matter of cybercrime 
commenced its work in January of 2011. I serve as the Rapporteur of that group, which reports 
to the Crime Commission. In this book, I take no position on any of the issues before the 
group. It is merely suggested here that the Crime Commission and subordinate bodies such as 
the open-ended intergovernmental expert group in this case are the logical fora in which to 
discuss the issue as a matter of evident global concern. 
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resources. While progress at the international level may be slower than at the 
national level, States at all levels of development and with most if not all 
approaches to law and governance share a fundamental interest in preventing 
and suppressing crime. This often makes consensus possible on crime issues 
that may not be possible in other areas. This not only makes the Crime 
Commission a useful forum in which to seek solutions to crime problems, it 
also provides a convenient forum from which the beginnings of consensus on 
broader issues such as good governance, the rule of law and human rights may 
sometimes emerge. The very breadth of the crime prevention and criminal 
justice policy agenda also ensures that there will always be areas in which 
work is needed and in which consensus is possible, and in areas where criminal 
law is used in furtherance of other policy objectives, limited consensus may be 
possible on criminalisation elements even if it is out of reach on broader 
strategies.  
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THE MEANINGS OF “CRIME”, 
“TRANSNATIONAL CRIME” AND 
“INTERNATIONAL CRIME”: USAGE IN THIS 
BOOK AND WHY IT MATTERS TO THE 
COMMISSION 
Apart from “international crime”, which has acquired a meaning in 
international law, these terms are largely political or criminological constructs 
and not juridical ones. As will be seen below, what constitutes “crime” is 
sometimes a legal concept within a State (e.g., where it is used to allocate 
legislative and executive powers within a federal constitutional structure), but 
the underlying concept is a chaotic debate between partisan politicians, 
criminologists and other players, and there is no consistency among the various 
States. There has, however, been much confusion, both in domestic 
governments and among Commission delegates over the years. Whether an 
issue is labelled as “crime” or not often depends more on the internal 
institutional dynamics of the U.N. and whether a State feels it has better 
prospects of achieving its goals in Vienna, New York, Geneva or elsewhere 
and whether labelling it as “crime” will make action more palatable for other 
delegations, or less so. “International crime” has been slow to evolve since the 
closing of the Nuremburg Tribunals of 1945-46 and 1946-49, but as it re-
emerges as a viable concept in the wake of the atrocities of Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leone and Rwanda and increasing pressure for supra-national accountability 
when domestic accountability fails, there has also been confusion with the 
more pragmatic – and less controversial – work of the Crime Commission. 
(i) What is “crime”? 
In any discussion of this nature, some clarity with respect to the terms “crime”, 
“transnational crime” and “international crime” is needed. Even within States, 
there is often no consensus on these terms or the underlying concepts, which 
are fundamental to the mandates of the Commission, its raisons d’être, and the 
nature and scope of its work in general and as it unfolds from one session to the 
next. 
Regarding “crime”, most experts and Member States would agree on a 
functional definition or description based on the key factors that crime must be 
some form of conduct which can be defined by law and labelled as “crime” and 
which the State using the label chooses to deter and punish through the 
application of judicial penal sanctions. Beyond this, however, many of the 
abstract academic and philosophical debates about whether the purpose of 
criminal offences and criminal law should be based on religious, cultural or 
other constructions of morality; on more functional concepts such as the 
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causation of harm or preservation of social order; on political considerations; 
or on the protection or preservation of specific interests, 11 assume a very real 
and pragmatic significance in the multilateral Commission, because many of 
the assumptions that underlie these debates within a State or culture are by no 
means common to all of the participating delegations.  
What may at first impression appear to be merely practical differences of 
approach to legislative drafting, law enforcement or criminal procedure are 
sometimes in reality manifestations of much more fundamental differences 
concerning what criminal law is and why it exists, and can be rooted in ancient, 
recent or ongoing historical developments of the State concerned. Elements of 
common law, civil law and Islamic law which first arose as long as 2,000 years 
ago remain influential, as do many of the religious, cultural and political 
developments that have taken place over centuries and decades, ranging from 
the English Magna Carta of 1215 and the gradual emergence of modern 
concepts of constitutionalism, the rule of law and human rights during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to differences over nineteenth century 
colonialism and the rise and fall of German national socialism and the Soviet 
concept of “socialist legalism” in the twentieth century.12 
Many examples of such differences and how they manifest themselves at the 
Commission have arisen over the past two decades.13 Some of these are major, 
enduring issues, but many are not as readily apparent, and while delegates are 
aware of their superficial differences, the underlying gaps often escape notice. 
For example, the debate over whether terrorism should be included as a form of 
“crime” or not has arisen many times in the Commission, the negotiation of the 
Palermo Convention and in many other fora in which the subject-matter of 
terrorism itself has been discussed.14 Some of the issues arise from the ongoing 
                                                 
11 Sources on the philosophical and other underpinnings of criminal law and punishment are 
legion and beyond the scope of this book. A useful summary may be found in Ashworth, 5th 
ed., 2006.  
12 Reviews of the twentieth century events and their effects on the rule of law and approaches 
to criminal law and procedure can be found in Tolley, 1994, chapter 4, and Müller, 1987, 
English translation (D.L. Schneider), 1991. 
13 For a description of early debates between WEOG and Eastern European States on the basis 
of crime and criminal justice and the implications on where it would be dealt with in the U.N. , 
if at all, see Prof. Clark’s description of debates at the seventh (August 1949) ECOSOC 
session, Clarke, 1994, chapter 1 at pp. 10-15. Generally, Soviet States regarded crime as much 
more of a political matter, and aware of western dismissal of this idea, defended it as a purely 
domestic issue not appropriate for the U.N. 
14 Whether to include terrorism as a form of transnational crime in the Palermo Convention, 
and if not, how best to use the Convention against terrorism and how it fit within the context of 
other anti-terrorism initiatives was a major issue during the negotiation of the Convention. See 
Article 2, paragraph (a), which excludes groups not seeking any “financial or other material 
benefit” from the definition of “organised criminal group”, the final report of the General 
Assembly Committee that produced the Convention, U.N. document A/55/383, at paragraph 
89, and the agreed notes for the Travaux Préparatoires, A/55/383/Add.1, at paragraph 7 (scope 
of application of the Convention). 
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political debates and conflicts in the Middle East and other regions, but they 
also arise from different points of view regarding fundamental issues such as 
the equality of individuals and States before the law, whether sovereign States 
should be bound by their own laws, the extent to which the criminal law should 
be used to protect the State and its essential interests, the use of crime and 
crime-control or law enforcement measures for political ends, and the extent to 
which activities normally considered to be crimes can be justified by 
oppression, discrimination and other grievances. 
Regarding crime in general, States which embody large religious or ethno-
cultural majorities tend toward concepts of crime based on shared moral 
values, while States with more pluralistic and secular societies are more likely 
to follow social models which limit the scope of criminal law to offences and 
powers needed to prevent and punish specific harms. Formerly the preserve of 
politicians and academics at the national level and of diplomats at the 
international level, some of these debates have taken on a new life and vigour 
as the advent of the Internet and other communications media have enabled 
entire populations to engage in them, as the political transformations of 2011 in 
the Middle East illustrate.  
Such political transformation is not a matter for the Commission, but the 
underlying philosophical differences and the dynamic effects of globalisation 
and technologies do have significant effects on views about the meaning and 
scope of “crime”. Human rights and other fundamental values are often rooted 
in constitutional or fundamental laws, with criminal law coterminous, but also 
subordinate to them, in the sense that concepts of what can or should be 
criminalized ends where the protection of constitutional rights begins. The 
right to freedom of expression or speech illustrates this well, but a similar 
dynamic arises with respect to other rights and other crimes. Many countries 
which define themselves as “Islamic States” either by constitution or culture 
consider some forms of expression as criminal blasphemy, for example, 
whereas those with more diverse populations have found it necessary to allow 
for dialogue among religions and between religious and secular communities 
and have tended to curtail the scope of criminalization in favour of 
constitutional or other protections of free speech or expression.  
Even in States where the dominance of free expression and discourse is clear, 
there are differences on the extent to which it can be curtailed and the 
justifications, if any for such curtailment. The views of the United States of 
America and its nationals and delegations on the scope of some forms of crime 
are established largely by that country’s First Amendment protection of “free 
speech” and prohibition of “prior restraint”, for example, whereas the views of 
nationals and delegates of most States from Western Europe, whose post-war 
constitutions contain more circumscribed concepts of “free expression” rights 
tend to have broader views of what is, or could be, within the scope of the 
criminal law. U.S. law allows for the criminalization of speech if and only if it 
specifically and directly advocates violence or constitutes clear incitement to 
commit other offences, going beyond indirect or abstract advocacy or offensive 
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opinion.15 German constitutional and criminal law also protects free expression, 
but Germany can and does criminalise and prosecute what it considers to be 
abuses of fact, such as Holocaust-denial, and opinion which is less directly 
linked to violence, subversion. In the U.S., burning a cross on someone’s lawn 
is not a crime, and neo-Nazi political extremists can march or demonstrate as 
they please,16 while posting swastikas or other political and military symbols of 
the national socialist era in Germany is a crime, if the context links them to 
political expression. In some circumstances, the German offences extend to 
expression which originates outside of its territory but is directed to, received 
in or has effects in Germany.17  
While most States which protect the freedoms of religion, association and 
expression as fundamental values would agree that blasphemy and religious 
defamation offences could not be used based on the justification of promoting 
or protecting one religion by the suppression of others, recent developments 
such as the global reactions to the public burning of a copy of the Qur’an in the 
United States and the publication of cartoon depictions of the Islamic Prophet 
in Denmark have given harm-based justifications new attention.18 To use the 
                                                 
15 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (at 447), U.S. Supreme Court, 9 June, 1969. 
16 Brandenburg v. Ohio, previous note, and Collin. v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978) (7th Circ.), 
certiorari (leave to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court) denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See also 
Tribe, L., Constitutional Choices Harvard U. Press, (1st ed., 1985), chapter 13, and Decroos, 
M.J.L., “Criminal Jurisdiction over Transnational Speech Offences: From Unilateralism to the 
Application of Foreign Public Law by National Courts”, 13 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, (2005), pp. 365-400. 
17 See: Brugger, W. “The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law”, (2002) 3 
German Law Journal (online), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ 
index.php?pageID=11&artID=212 , staff article “Federal Court of Justice (BGH) Convicts 
Foreigner for Internet Posted Incitement to Racial Hatred”, (2001) 2 German Law Journal 
(online), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=67, Stegbauer, A., 
“The Ban on Right-Wing Extremist Symbols According to S.86a of the German 
Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code), 8 German Law Journal (online), pp. 173-84 available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=797 , and Entscheidung 
“Auschwitzlüge”, the Judgment in the “Auschwitz Lie” Case of 13 April 1994, Reports of the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Appeal Chamber) (Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts), BVerfGE, vol.90, pp. 241-255. Full German-language judgments 
of the BverfG prior to 1998 are not available on-line, but an English summary of the case can 
be found at: http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/ 
case.php?id=621. See also, Finer, Bogdanor, and Rudden, 1995, chapter 2 at pp. 35-39. 
18 See: “Afghans avenge Florida Koran burning, killing 12”, New York Times, 2 April, 2011, 
which reports on the killing of 12 persons, at least 7 of them U.N. workers (and none of them 
U.S. nationals), following the public burning of a copy of the Qur’an by a U.S. extremist and 
the broadcast of the event on-line. The article notes that: “... Unable to find Americans on 
whom to vent their anger, the mob turned instead on the next-best symbol of Western intrusion 
— the nearby United Nations headquarters. ‘Some of our colleagues were just hunted down,’ 
said a spokesman for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan ...”. A reprint 
appears on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html? 
pagewanted=all. For a discussion of the subsequent U.S. debate of the boundary between free 
speech and actions which cause harm or put U.S. soldiers and others at risk, see also: 
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famous 1919 illustration of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes that the First Amendment would not protect the (false) cry of “fire” in 
a crowded theatre, one wonders what the reaction would be (in the United 
States or elsewhere) to false disclosures or other conduct which was 
provocative and had little expressive value if it was intended to destabilise 
peacekeeping operations or provoke attacks on civilians. 
The debate over hate-propaganda is probably the most prominent recent 
illustration of the effects of national history and culture on fundamental law 
and crime prevention and criminal justice, but it is an illustration of a much 
broader issue for the Commission and not an isolated example. The 
relationship between free expression and crime has arisen mostly in 
deliberations dealing with cybercrime and Internet issues which have thus far 
taken place outside of the Commission, but fundamental differences of 
philosophy, culture, governance influence deliberations on almost every issue. 
Different approaches to the rule of law may influence positions in the 
negotiation of responses to crime where some States envisage administrative 
actions while others look to legislation, for example, or to different positions 
on whether emerging crime problems such as cybercrime or identity crime 
require specific new offences or the enhanced application of pre-existing, more 
general offences. The positions of States with federal constitutional structures 
can also be influenced by the extent to which crime in general or a specific 
problem under discussion is a matter for the federal government or regional or 
local ones.  
Beyond such profound issues lies a welter of specific differences that depend 
on how each State uses offences and punishments as instruments of social, 
economic or other policies, and whether it draws the line between criminal 
justice and other measures based on the nature of the underlying policy or on 
the nature of the laws used to accomplish it. A recurring illustration of this is 
the enforcement of copyright, patent and other intellectual property interests, 
which some States treat as “criminal law”, some treat as regulatory or non-
criminal schemes that may use, inter alia, offences and punishments, and 
others may regard as purely a civil matter between those owning the property 
interests and those who use them without authorization. 
This range of underlying differences about the concept of “crime” and its 
nature and scope constantly influence the practical deliberations of the 
Commission in ways which are not always evident to the participants, but may 
nonetheless constitute one of its greatest values to the international community. 
In bringing to light such differences and helping to disseminate different 
concepts of crime, the Commission has served both as a forum for developing 
consensus on areas of crime where this is possible, for working out practical 
means of cooperation and coordination of laws and policies where goals may 
be shared even if underlying concepts or policies are not, and by making 
                                                                                                                                 
Catapano, P., “Freedom to Inflame”, N.Y. Times online, 8 April 2011 at: 
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unilateral or exceptional concepts of and approaches to crime clear to all. 
Speaking of the United Kingdom, Prof. Ashworth observes that:19 
... The main determinants of criminalization continue to be political 
opportunism and power, both linked to the political culture of the country. 
The contours of the criminal law are not given but politically contingent. 
Seemingly objective criteria such as harm, wrongdoing and offence may 
tend to melt into political ideologies of the time ...” 
To the extent that this is true, the Commission serves two purposes. It helps to 
inform each State about what the scope, extent and “determinants” of crime are 
in other States at any given time, and in so doing it becomes itself one of those 
“determinants” by exposing the political culture of each State to the culture – 
or at any rate their effects on crime prevention and criminal justice – of all of 
the others. By showing what is possible and effective it creates positive 
incentives and by showing what is ineffective or politically or morally 
repugnant to others it creates negative ones, but in either case the net effect is 
to gradually form a consensus platform for collective global actions and for 
coordinated domestic actions for the prevention and suppression of crime. In 
building consensus as to what should be seen as “crime” and what should not, 
it also provides a valuable service in helping to situate its own work within the 
context of other subject areas and more general global deliberations and 
strategies. Whether one considers terrorism as “crime” or not, for example, is 
ultimately less important than finding as much consensus as possible on what 
the problem actually is in factual terms, what should be done about it, and 
ensuring that whatever is done about it is done coherently with other adjacent 
policies in areas such as security, human rights, and crime in general. 
(ii) Crime as a human rights, social, development and security issue 
The right to make and enforce penal law has been regarded as matter for States 
from the time basic concepts of sovereignty and law itself first emerged. In the 
first decades of the twentieth century, some international focus arose out of 
humanitarian and human rights concerns with respect to the treatment of 
prisoners. As the U.N. was founded and began to evolve, however, broader 
concepts of human rights, including the rights of persons accused of crimes, 
and eventually the rights of victims and other participants in criminal justice 
proceedings, gradually emerged. From the early years of the U.N., there were 
also debates about whether crime problems should be left to the exclusive 
authority of the Member States or whether they fell within the competence of 
the General Assembly and its new subsidiary bodies as economic and social 
matters.  
Most of the fundamental concepts on which the U.N. itself have evolved 
significantly since it was formed, and this process can be assessed subject-by-
subject, but it can also be seen in terms of common underlying elements and 
                                                 
19 Ashworth, 2006, chapter 2 at pp. 2-3, citing also MacCormick, D.N., Legal Right and Social 
Democracy, Oxford U. Press, 1982 at p. 30. 
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dynamic forces which produced similar developments or a parallel evolution 
across all of the specific elements. As transportation and communication 
capacities have expanded, national activities have become increasingly 
interdependent, giving each individual State steadily increasing interests in 
what were previously purely-domestic social, political, economic and cultural 
matters in other States. This in turn transformed early models of development 
assistance based on ad-hoc efforts driven by general altruism and/or specific 
national interests, into broader and more strategic efforts based on much longer 
time-lines, coordination among different donors or providers, local ownership 
and participation, content based on assessed needs, and general principles such 
as sustainability. This evolution influenced thinking about crime in many of the 
same specific ways as it did human rights, good governance, commercial and 
economic development, and other areas, but it also did so through the 
realisation that many specific areas of development were interdependent, and 
that the rule of law and effective criminal justice systems were a precondition 
to development in other areas and therefore an essential and often early 
element in comprehensive and long-term development strategies. 
Changing perceptions of crime were also influenced by the fact that the 
understanding of the nature of crime itself also evolved significantly in the 
decades prior to and after the founding of the United Nations. Starting in the 
late nineteenth century, various attempts to study the problem of crime 
scientifically in a number of States shifted perceptions away from early 
“classical” approaches which saw crime purely as an individual moral failure 
to be punished and deterred on an ad-hoc basis, to models based on 
anthropological, ecological, epidemiological, neurological, psychological, 
social, economic and ultimately political science principles, and to the birth 
and status of modern criminology as a social science. This study and debate 
continues, but at a fundamental level, it transformed the understanding of 
crime. By establishing the objective existence and importance of the effects of 
both internal biological and psychological factors and the social environments 
of offenders, it gave rise to principles which could – and as evidence 
accumulated, plainly did – apply in the same way in different States. As with 
other scientific disciplines, it also forged international relationships between 
academic experts, making the early U.N. Crime Congresses something closer 
to academic symposia than the intergovernmental meetings they have become. 
While local cultural, historical and other factors also had, and still have, to be 
taken into consideration, the appreciation that lessons learned in one country 
could be applied successfully in another made crime prevention and criminal 
justice a global issue for criminologists several decades before the more 
tangible effects of crime on accelerating globalisation forced reluctant 
politicians in many countries to the same conclusion.20 As discussed below, this 
                                                 
20 Among the more active States have been the academic communities in Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Most modern criminology textbooks trace the evolution of the 
study of crime through this period, citing the transformation from individual and moral 
“classical” thinking to “positivist” approaches based on the scientific and fact-based study of 
offenders themselves, and then onto the more complex approaches based on the way 
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had both policy and institutional implications in determining whether the U.N. 
should deal with crime prevention and criminal justice matters at all, and if so, 
where.21  
In the two decades since the Commission was established, Member States have 
begun to take crime much more seriously. Globalisation has increased the 
prevalence and variety of crime, and the interdependence of global social and 
economic systems has at the same time increased the seriousness of its effects 
and expanded the geographical and structural scope of those effects. The 
traditional view of crime as a social issue was based on implicit assumptions 
that it threatened people and not the State itself, and experiences of experts in 
States this was generally true and in which effective actions to prevent and 
suppress crime could be taken wholly or largely within the State’s territorial 
jurisdiction. Globalisation radically changed this, by transforming the nature or 
dynamic of crime itself, the interests it threatened, and the nature and scope of 
the countermeasures needed to respond to it effectively. In truth, extensive 
corruption, organized crime and other such problems always could and 
sometimes did threaten and largely compromise the security of individual 
States, but international security interests were not sufficiently threatened by it.  
This began to change more quickly in the mid-1980s as consensus built 
towards what would eventually become the Palermo Convention, based on the 
assessment that transnational organized crime was “... a threat to the internal 
security and stability of sovereign States...” with “... effects on national 
economies, the global financial system, and the rule of law and fundamental 
social values.”22 By the end of the 1990’s the perception of transnational 
organized crime had changed to the point where it could be said that:23 
                                                                                                                                 
individuals interact with their social environments and so-called “radical” or “critical” 
approaches that looked as much at what – and who - societies and governments chose to 
criminalise as the acts of offenders themselves. Significantly, the evolution of criminology 
beyond positivism and its acceptance as a social science by academics (if not always by 
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was a significant factor in the early consideration of crime in the U.N., and at the early Crime 
Congresses. See generally, Rock, P. (ed.) 1988, and Garland, D., “Of Crimes and Criminals: 
The Development of Criminology in Britain”, Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 1st ed., 1994, 
Part I, pp. 17-68. Concerning the role of academic criminologists in early U.N. processes, see 
Hall-Williams, 1961 and Lòpez-Rey, 1978. 
21 For more detailed review of the evolution of concepts of crime in the U.N., see the segment 
discussing the establishment, history and nature of the Crime Commission, below, and sources 
there cited, including Clark, 1994, chapt.1-3 at pp. 19-23; Clifford, 1978; and Lòpez-Rey, 
1978. 
22 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized Transnational 
Crime A/49/748, Annex, one of the primary precursor documents of the subsequent 
Convention negotiations. See also A/RES/51/60 of 12 December 1996.  
23 Godson, R., and Williams, P., “Strengthening cooperation against transnational crime: a new 
security imperative” in Williams, and Vlassis, 2001, pp. 321-355 at p. 327. 
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The emergence of these [organized criminal] groups and their increasing 
capabilities in a world of states is a broad and direct challenge to 
governability, national sovereignty, and international security. The threat, 
however, lacks the highly visible state-centric profile of a conventional 
military threat. This does not mean that organized crime is a marginal 
phenomenon. Like insurrectionists, members of transnational criminal 
organizations are largely indistinguishable from civilian populations. 
Their activities undermine the fibres of society, its economic and financial 
structure, its polity and its physical security, but do so in ways that only 
become apparent when the process is well advanced and therefore more 
difficult to counter. 
The new threats posed by transnational crime in general, and specific forms of 
transnational organized crime began to effect regional and global security 
interests at about the same time as the end of the Cold War and other 
globalisation related developments triggered an expansion of security concepts 
into what have been described as “non-traditional” security areas such as food 
production, environmental issues, individual or “human security”, and the 
domestic and international effects of crime.24 Added to this was the impetus 
generated by the Member States to use criminal law and justice policies and 
programmes to address specific aspects of policy areas such as terrorism, 
which had clear regional and global security aspects, and other policy areas, 
such as the protection of the environment or the incorporation of anti-
corruption and rule of law elements into development assistance projects, 
which were among the emerging “non-traditional” security issues and which 
attracted the interest and engagement of political interests and substance 
experts from outside of the traditional scope of Commission delegations. 
The effect is that crime it is now seen in a much broader and more contextual 
perspective. The decision to establish the Commission was an important 
recognition that crime was an expert discipline in its own right, but at the same 
time, connections between the work on crime and development, human rights, 
protection of the environment, traditional and other non-traditional security 
interests is stronger than ever before. Effective criminal justice systems are 
now regarded as an essential element of good governance, and as a key element 
in establishing and protecting the rule of law, human rights and human security 
and as a platform for protecting development and other processes and for 
implementing a wide range of other policy goals. Anti-corruption efforts have 
linked crime prevention and criminal justice work to broader development 
assistance agendas, and anti-terrorism work has established similar links to 
national, regional and international security agendas.  
                                                 
24 See: Spector, B., and Wolf, A., “Negotiating Security: New Goals, Changed Process”, 
International Negotiation, Vol.5, pp. 411-25 (2000) and Mathews, J.T., “Redefining Security” 
(1989) Foreign Affairs Vol. 68(2), pp. 162-177 (environmental issues). See also Clark, 1994, 
chapter 2 at pp. 31-32, describing discussions of many of the same non-traditional security 
issues in the 1991 process leading to the establishment of the Commission itself. 
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As with any subject matter in the U.N., the shifting conceptualisation of crime 
has institutional implications, although these have changed as the U.N. itself 
has matured. The post-war concepts of “international” peace and security on 
which the U.N. was originally founded have become considerably more 
nuanced in an era of globalization, interdependence and non-State and 
asymmetrical conflict and security scenarios, and as above, the meaning and 
scope of “security” itself has changed significantly. The United Nations 
Charter itself speaks only of “international peace and security”, from which it 
distinguishes other matters of humanitarian, social, economic affairs and 
human rights, and envisages an organization which would address primarily 
issues relating to security and other concerns between and among the Member 
States while avoiding matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of 
the States themselves.25 The creation of a “Security Council” was intended to 
address matters of peace and security at the international level, and while 
specific powers are conferred on the Council, it is clear that these do not 
derogate from or extinguish the plenary substantive authorities of the General 
Assembly, with the exception of a specific “dispute or situation” while it is 
actually before the Council. The General Assembly, and within their mandates, 
its subsidiary bodies, may deal with all matters within the scope of the Charter, 
including peace and security matters not specifically before the Council.26  
Whether one regards the new security aspects of crime as an expansion of work 
on “social” or “human rights” matters or as an expansion of the concept of 
“security” based on the erosion of the demarcation between problems with an 
international aspect and problems which are purely domestic concerns, the 
basic mandate of the Assembly and the Commission to deal with them is not 
affected. While the early concepts of “crime” led to questions about where the 
Crime Commission and its predecessors should fit within the U.N. 
organizational chart, the recognition that crime prevention and criminal justice 
is itself a distinct discipline has shifted the challenge from one of institutional 
organization to one more concerned with the coordination of thematic and 
substantive expertise. It has become clear that crime is not merely a human 
rights or social issue, but an element of virtually every aspect of international 
discourse and the work of the U.N. itself, and that it cannot and should not be 
isolated from essential work on fundamental matters such as good governance, 
rule of law and human rights. The idea that crime and responses to crime raised 
primarily domestic issues and was exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
individual States, while still intact, has been steadily eroded both directly by 
the globalisation of crime itself and indirectly by the emergence of social and 
economic interdependence and the consequent focus on matters such as 
development assistance and post-conflict and other reconstruction. Even to the 
                                                 
25 Charter of the United Nations (deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 
States of America). San Francisco, 26 June 1945, Article 1 and Article 2, paragraph 7 
(hereinafter “U.N. Charter”). 
26 U.N. Charter, Chapter IV, Articles 10-15 (General Assembly) and Chapters IX and X 
(Economic and Social Cooperation and ECOSOC). 
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extent that some crime remains largely a problem within a particular Member 
State, the Commission and Secretariat are mandated to provide assistance when 
it is requested, and economic, humanitarian, regional stability and security 
interests frequently motivate other Member States to support and provide 
resources for the necessary work.  
Thus, while U.N. insiders and Member States may not always appreciate the 
change, the questions to be addressed are no longer matters of institutional 
jurisdiction and the allocation of mandates and resources. They are the much 
more fundamental questions of how to develop and maintain solid fundamental 
rule of law, human rights and criminal justice governance structures, and how 
to ensure that sound and proven crime prevention and criminal justice 
principles are integrated into the wide range of other policy areas of which they 
have become an element. 
(iii) “International crime” 
References to “International crime” in this text refer to crimes which are 
established by international law, are subject to universal or other international 
principles with respect to jurisdiction, and are generally subject to prosecution 
by either ad hoc international tribunals, such as those established by the 
Security Council to deal with crimes relating to the situations of Yugoslavia, 
Sierra Leone and Rwanda, or more recently, by the International Criminal 
Court under the Rome Statute.27 These seldom come before the Crime 
Commission or the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, although some of the 
U.N. Programme Network Institutes have dealt with them,28 but they 
nevertheless have an influence on what the Commission does and may be 
called upon to do in the future. While the fundamental differences may arise 
from the fact that conduct criminalised by the international community reflects 
the higher degree of denunciation warranted by war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the actual conduct involved is often also addressed by conventional 
concepts of crime and by domestic criminal offences which may be 
coterminous or included within international crimes.  
Apart from questions of demarcation between murder, mass-murder and 
genocide, there are also questions of procedural and institutional overlap. As 
noted above, practical considerations and the Rome Statute both favour the use 
                                                 
27 On this subject, see Cassese, A., “The Rationale for International Criminal Justice”, and 
Bassiouni, M.C., “International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension 
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A., The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, 2009, 
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of domestic criminal offences and criminal justice proceedings over 
international proceedings where possible. The Statute establishes criminal 
offences itself and does not expressly require States Parties to adopt parallel 
offences or incorporate the international ones into domestic law, but creates 
procedural and jurisdictional incentives to do so. Older international legal 
instruments, such as the Convention against Torture,29 operate by requiring the 
States Parties to adopt the requisite offences in domestic criminal law and 
apply appropriate degrees of extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction in their 
domestic tribunals. Institutionally, most of these instruments have been 
developed in bodies or processes established outside of the Commission on the 
basis that they enforce human rights standards (freedom from torture), 
International Humanitarian Law (Rome Statute) international peace and 
security requirements (most of the terrorism instruments) or consist of criminal 
law elements of other policy areas such as aviation offences or piracy and other 
maritime offences. Decisions about where such subject matter should be dealt 
with often come down to historical factors, tactical or “forum-shopping” 
decisions among the Member States, or competition within elements of the 
U.N. Secretariat. 
Some of the same political pressures apply to international crimes as to 
domestic ones, however, and this has direct and potential effects on the work of 
the Commission. To the extent that the basis for international crime is seen as a 
greater degree of denunciation, there will always be pressures to enhance the 
denunciation of a problem by escalating it from the domestic to the 
international levels. To the extent that international criminal law may be 
imposed upon or applied to acts within a jurisdiction which does not consent, 
there may also be pressures to expand international criminal law into areas 
where the less-draconian means of dealing with transnational crime have not 
proven sufficient or productive. Such arguments are occasionally made, and are 
thus far not very influential because of the much greater counter-pressures of 
national sovereignty, but this may change over time if the balance shifts. The 
international community generally (albeit in some cases still grudgingly) 
accepts the idea that a person who has committed genocide or serious war 
crimes should face prosecution and punishment in the Hague, but is far from 
accepting the idea that those who commit more conventional offences such as 
economic frauds or cybercrime offences should be dealt with this way, even if 
they may be unlikely to face justice in the places from which they commit 
crimes. Between this lies a grey area occupied by conduct such as torture, 
terrorism and elements of corruption or organized crime that threaten State 
integrity or security. In more immediate terms, some subject matter, such as 
terrorism, has been raised in the Commission in an attempt to either re-define 
or re-frame the issue, or in the hope that labelling it as “crime” might permit 
progress in Vienna that has not been possible elsewhere. 
                                                 
29 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UNTS No.24841, Vol.1465, p. 85, adopted by the General Assembly as 
A/RES/39/46, 10 December 1984 (in force 26 June 1987). 
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(iv) “Transnational crime” 
The term “transnational crime”, as has been noted, is not a juridical one,30 but a 
practical label used to designate crimes which either occur in more than one 
State, or which have significant elements, such as offenders, victims, evidence, 
or effects, in more than one State, such that they give rise to incentives to 
respond on the part of more than one State and hence, at the international level. 
At a political level, the major reason for not constructing a legal definition has 
been the breadth of the phenomenon the term describes, particularly in the era 
of globalization, in which telecommunications media can be used to commit 
the same crime, in whole or part, in many different places at once. The concept 
also has sovereignty and jurisdictional implications, in the sense that a 
domestic law criminalising some form of transnational conduct would 
generally be seen has having some degree of extraterritorial effect. Negotiators 
and drafters have tended to focus definitions of crime and of specific offences 
on conduct and circumstances, and leave questions of transnationality to 
jurisdictional provisions. Clearly this has not precluded the development of 
offences and of jurisdictional principles allowing States to adjudicate crimes 
which have effects in their territories or which are committed there in some 
part – many such offences and jurisdictional principles were established during 
the twentieth century – but it has made many States very reluctant to deal with 
transnational crime at a general level. 
A range of specific approaches has been taken. The Conventions of 1961, 1971 
and 1988 dealing with narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances clearly 
envisage “trafficking” and “the traffic in” proscribed drugs and substances as 
being transnational in nature, but they address it by requiring the States Parties 
to criminalize a specific series of activities of which some, such as 
“cultivation” are inherently domestic, some, such as “distribution, sale, 
delivery or ... transport” might occur within or between States, and only two, 
“importation and exportation” are inherently transnational in nature.31 The 2000 
Palermo Convention defines “transnational in nature”, but does so for the 
purpose of limiting the scope of application to the sort of offences for which its 
international cooperation provisions would actually be required. The 
Convention also provides that, in adopting the domestic offences needed to 
implement its criminalisation requirements, States should ensure that these not 
                                                 
30 Mueller, G.O.W. “Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts”, in Williams, P., and 
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require any element of transnationality unless the contrary is required.32 The 
intention is that these requirements be attached to applying the Convention 
between States and not become added requirements which would narrow the 
scope and effectiveness of the offences of the offences and complicate 
prosecutions in individual States Parties. Thus, for example, money laundering 
offences can be prosecuted regardless of who commits them or what State(s) 
might be involved, but would have to demonstrate to another State Party the 
added elements if requesting its cooperation under the Convention. 
The four offences established by the parent Palermo Convention all operate in 
this manner, but two of the offences established by the Protocols do 
incorporate specific transnationality requirements. The primary offence of the 
smuggling of migrants is inherently transnational based on an underlying 
transnational concept of “migrant” and migration, and thus requires the 
procurement of the illegal entry of the migrant into a State Party, leaving 
questions of internal migration to each State Party. The primary offence of 
illicit trafficking in firearms covers a wider range of activities, including 
importing and exporting, but also such acts as delivery, transfer and movement, 
but then limits these to forms of movement through or from the territory of one 
State Party to that of another State Party. This resulted, in part, from the range 
of positions taken by delegations on domestic gun control policies and related 
offences. While there was consensus that offences such as money-laundering 
and trafficking in persons should be equally culpable and subject to 
adjudication whether committed inside a State or from one State to another, 
there was no similar consensus with respect to criminalizing domestic firearms 
trafficking activities, apart from specific provisions against illicit 
manufacturing and the alteration or removal of serial numbers. 
Clearly, it is “transnational crime” that has proven most problematic in the 
context of globalisation and has dominated discussions at the Crime 
Commission since its inception in 1992, although the mandates also extend to 
purely domestic crime “within” a Member State. Transnationality is not usually 
an element of an offence or legal definition as much as it is a description of the 
way a specific offence is committed or of a trend or pattern in offending. 
Fraud, for example, is often committed transnationally because it can be 
committed using communications media, but there is nothing inherently 
“transnational” in a crime based on the dishonest deprivation of victims and 
enrichment of offenders. Elements of transnationality may not become 
apparent, if ever, until after an offence has been fully investigated, and crimes 
that are purely domestic in their definition and in their commission can still 
raise international concerns. High crime rates or spectacular incidents can 
threaten transnational tourism revenues, for example, and social or economic 
instabilities resulting from domestic corruption or other crime problems can 
                                                 
32 Palermo Convention, A/RES/55/25, Annex I, UNTS #39574, vol.2225 p.209, at Article 3, 
paragraph 2, defining “transnational in nature and Article 34, paragraph 2, requiring that 
offences be established in domestic law independently of transnationality or the involvement of 
an organized criminal group.  
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weaken the ability of a State and its government to negotiate or represent its 
interests effectively in international fora. Major crime problems such as drug 
trafficking and corruption may take on new criminological dimensions arising 
from their scope, magnitude and the difficulty of suppressing them at the 
domestic level as a result of transnationality, but ultimately the effects of 
corruption on sustainable development are the same whether it originates at 
home or abroad, and the same can be said of its effects on members of the 
population. 
The fact that the concept of transnationality is more criminological than 
juridical has important implications in the context of Commission proceedings, 
but it is not an obstacle. Member States approach the Secretariat or raise crime 
problems in the Commission for different reasons depending on 
transnationality. States usually raise purely domestic crime, often with some 
reluctance, to ascertain whether other States have encountered the same 
problems and developed solutions, and most commonly, to seek technical 
assistance in the form of expertise, resources or both. Transnational crime, on 
the other hand, is usually raised because the States which have problems with it 
have concluded that the problems cannot be fully addressed at the domestic 
level and require some form of coordinated international response, both in 
terms of sharing information, raising awareness and building consensus, and 
through political resolutions or “hard-law” or “soft-law” instruments setting 
out the action to be taken and requiring or urging Member States to take it. 
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ESTABLISHMENT, HISTORY AND NATURE 
OF THE U.N. CRIME COMMISSION 
In the area of crime prevention and criminal justice, developments since the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1946 have been largely driven by the 
same two countervailing pressures. While the Member States have continued to 
defend sovereignty and the autonomy of their political, legislative and criminal 
justice systems on the one hand, they have been driven on the other hand in the 
direction of ever more extensive cooperation and the sorts of coordinated laws 
and procedures needed to support it by the constant expansion and proliferation 
of transnational crime and the need to protect the beneficial aspects of 
globalization from both transnational and domestic crime. 
As a general rule, anti-crime measures have tended to commence with specific 
issues in areas where the seriousness of a specific problem has overcome the 
more general sovereignty concerns and political counter-pressures, and then 
tended to condense as Member States begin to transfer lessons learned in one 
area to others and to link projects or processes where possible to avoid 
unnecessary inconsistencies and duplication of effort. The more specific and 
narrowly-focused an issue is, the more likely it is that consensus will form to 
take some sort of action, and that the action will be more forceful, up to the 
point of binding international legal instruments. Thus can be seen in the history 
of transnational organized crime and trafficking in narcotic drugs, where both 
the formation of political bodies and the development of legal instruments 
starts first with the specific and then proceeds to the more general.  
Organized crime has always had transnational aspects. It propagated with the 
population migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but 
was regarded as a largely domestic criminal justice issue in the States where it 
occurred and most of its illicit activities took place at the domestic level. The 
transnational nature of the illicit global trade in narcotic drugs could not be 
ignored, however, and the first of the two U.N. standing anti-crime bodies, the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), was created in 194633 by the Economic 
and Social Council, only one month after the U.N. and the ECOSOC were 
themselves established and less than a year after the Charter of the United 
Nations came into force. Treaty-making activities started long before the birth 
of the U.N. itself: a total of ten instruments incorporating six pre-U.N. treaties 
dating back as far as January of 1912 were adopted by the General Assembly at 
its first Session in 1946, and nine more instruments have been adopted since 
then, including the Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988, which expanded the 
scope of the subject matter by including non-drug psychotropics and gave the 
Commission functions which included reviewing the implementation and 
functioning of the instruments themselves.  
                                                 
33 E/RES/1946/9, adopted on 15 February 1946.  
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The specific nature of the problems posed by the trade in narcotic drugs 
supported consensus on the existence of the Commission, the elaboration and 
implementation of the various treaties and the commitment of substantial 
resources in this area decades before the formation of the Crime Commission, 
which deals with crime in general. At the time the Commission was formed 
there was discussion of some sort of general U.N. crime convention that would 
either consolidate all of the existing legal and normative standards or serve as a 
more general framework for international cooperation, and the same issue was 
raised on several occasions in the various Crime Congresses,34 but the breadth 
of such a project made it unsustainable. Apart from the sheer size and scope of 
such an instrument and the negotiations needed to produce it, it would have 
been impeded by the debate over whether to include many specific types of 
crime to which one Member State or another objected, the fact that it would 
have had to have been open-ended to include new forms of crime, and by 
fundamental disagreements over the basic nature and purpose of criminal law 
and criminal justice measures. The more an instrument contains, the less likely 
it is to find consensus, and this did not emerge in respect of crime until the 
development of the Palermo Convention in the late 1990s. Even that does not 
address crime in general, but only crime which is “transnational in nature” and 
involves an “organized criminal group”, and whether it should apply to all such 
crime or only to a list of specific crimes was a major issue in the negotiations. 
CND, of course, also addresses a subject area in which criminal offences and 
criminal justice measures are used to deal with what is to a large degree also a 
public health issue, which is one major reason why Member States have 
resisted proposals to merge the two bodies over the years, but common subject-
matter, such as money-laundering, has gradually shifted from the specific to 
the general as consensus permits.35  
In keeping with its more general scope, the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, which covers a much wider and more open-ended range 
of subject-matter, evolved much more gradually in the form of a series of 
political resolutions as opposed to binding international legal instruments.36 
While the challenge of trafficking in narcotic drugs represented a fairly clear 
problem and priority, the prevention and control of crime posed more of a 
challenge for the nascent U.N., not the least of which was the meaning of 
“crime” itself and the extent to which crime in general and specific forms of 
                                                 
34 See: Clark, 1994, chapter 2, pp. 48-53. 
35 This sort of dual aspect is a major challenge for criminal justice policy at both the domestic 
and international level and is discussed in more detail below. 
36 For a more detailed review of work on crime prior to the establishment of the U.N., the 
evolution of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control from 1950-1991, and the 1986-
91 process that led to the establishment of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice in 1992, see Clark, 1994, chapters 1-3, and in particular chapter 1 at pp. 19-23. See 
also: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, issues 20-21, V.93-86653, available 
on-line (2011) at: http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Newsletter/newsletter.html; Clifford, 
1978; Cooper, 1973; Lòpez-Rey, M., 1978; and Lòpez-Rey, M., 1985. 
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crime were appropriate for attention at the international level and not just 
purely domestic matters, and these issues still remain.  
There were also early questions of whether it should be dealt with as a social 
issue, a human rights issue and on a scientific/criminological or a legal basis, 
and later, during the 1970s and 1980s, the extent to which it should be treated 
as sustainable development or regional and global security issue. Attempts 
made to exclude work on crime under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. 
Charter as being “essentially within the jurisdiction” of the individual Member 
States were rejected in the 1940s in favour of dealing with it under the Social 
Committee, an early subsidiary body of the ECOSOC, as relating to the 
promotion of conditions for economic and social development and the 
resolution of economic and social problems within Article 55 of the Charter.37 
Human rights advocates have argued that crime was a human rights issue based 
on several links between human rights and criminal justice. This originated 
with pre-U.N. concerns about rights relating to prisoners and prison standards, 
then with the rights of those accused and charged with offences as they were 
set out in the post-war human rights instruments, and the collective rights of 
societies to be, to the extent possible, free of crime. 38 More recently, the range 
of issues has expanded to include the rights of victims, and the aspect of 
collective rights has included aspects of individual or human security.  
Within the U.N., these positions had institutional implications and triggered 
debates about whether the work should be done in Vienna, Geneva or New 
York, and through which channels the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control should report to the General Assembly. More fundamentally, as above, 
they also raised the question of whether crime prevention and criminal justice 
matters in general had sufficient scientific or practical elements of a universal, 
international or transnational nature to warrant dealing with them in any U.N. 
body at all. There were also debates in and around the Committee about the 
extent to which it should be composed of scientific experts independent of the 
Member States, or of experts appointed by and accountable to the States 
themselves. Throughout the institutional evolution from 1950-1991, the reality 
of crime itself and the challenge it posed remained constant in its nature and 
evolution, and these questions remained open. As will be seen, many of them 
remain among the more fundamental challenges that continue to face the 
Commission after its first two decades. 
As noted above, the general pattern is one in which the appreciation of crime as 
a social science matter made it a global issue for academic experts some 
decades before the practical effects of crime on established international 
subject-matter such as governance, development, human rights, rule of law, 
and commerce brought national governments and politicians, somewhat 
                                                 
37 Lòpez-Rey, 1978 at p. 3. See also Clark, 1994, chapter 1 at p. 15. 
38 Clark, 1994, chapter 1 at pp. 4-6, and Clark, R.S. “Human Rights and the U.N. Committee 
on Crime Prevention and Control”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 506, pp. 68-84. 
 41
reluctantly, to the same conclusion. Looking back at the early Crime 
Congresses and first two decades of work on crime in the U.N., Manuel Lopez-
Rey, the first Chief of the Secretariat unit responsible for the subject cited the 
broader contextual understandings of crime based on scientific study and the 
growing appreciation of crime as what he describes as a “world-wide socio-
political problem” as the basis of the U.N.’s engagement:39 
Perhaps the time has arrived for an evaluation of United Nations activities 
in the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders. After more than 
three decades of international action a trajectory has become evident, 
especially during the last two [Kyoto, 1970 and Geneva, 1975] congresses. 
There is an obvious contradiction between the pragmatic approach to the 
problems of crime and the assessment of crime as a world-wide socio-
political problem, in which general needs and aims, power, human rights 
and the right to self-determination of peoples are fundamental. By 
stressing this contradiction the Fourth and Fifth Congresses each made a 
very important contribution. The necessary emphasis on a global approach 
will not preclude the selection of which problems of crime are to be 
treated as part of an international plan of action. Such an approach is in 
full accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter and more particularly with the spirit and letter of its Article 55, as 
interpreted at the present juncture. 
The problem of crime had been a global concern even before the U.N. itself 
was established, and work of an older body, the International Penal and 
Penitentiary Commission, was taken up by the U.N. in 1950 and allocated to a 
new advisory committee of experts, the Advisory Committee of Experts on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.40 The same resolution also 
called for the convening of quinquennial Crime Congresses, and the first such 
Congress was held from 22 August to 3 September, 1955, in Geneva.41 The 
committee was gradually expanded, and in 1971 was made an ECOSOC 
subsidiary and designated the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. 
Further expansions and other changes followed in 1979, and in 1983, when it 
was directed to report directly to the ECOSOC (and not via the Commission on 
Social Development). Continuing dissatisfaction with the profile of anti-crime 
work eventually led to processes in 1987-89 which reviewed the entire Crime 
Programme and led ultimately to the dissolution of the Committee, still a body 
                                                 
39 Lòpez-Rey, 1978, at p.10, bracketed text added by the author. 
40 A/RES/415 (V) of 1 December 1950, Annex, calling for, inter alia, the nomination of 
consultative experts, from whose number would be chosen “... a small international Ad Hoc 
Advisory Committee of Experts ...” to advise on devising and formulating on study 
programmes and “... policies for international action in the field of the prevention of crime and 
the treatment of offenders ...”. 
41 A/CONF/6/1, January 1, 1956. 
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of individual experts, at least in theory, and its replacement with the 
Commission, an intergovernmental body, in 1992.42 
The Crime Commission was established to address concerns that the pre-
existing Committee on Crime Prevention and Control lacked the profile and 
resources it needed to address the concerns of governments about domestic and 
transnational crime problems, and that the existing arrangements did not ensure 
sufficient governmental participation or oversight.43 The documentary record 
leading up to the establishment of the Commission and of its first two sessions 
suggests a general intention to mainstream work on crime prevention and 
criminal justice issues within the work of the U.N. in general. In addition to 
references to specific crime problems and possible State responses, there are 
many references to the need to see crime-control as a foreign aid and 
development issue, and to its connection with good governance elements such 
as human rights and the rule of law, and to the need for anti-crime measures as 
a regional security issue. Following several years of discussions, the General 
Assembly called upon the ECOSOC to establish the new Commission in 
December of 1991 and it was formally established by the Council at its 1992 
                                                 
42 The major resolutions of the ECOSOC and/or General Assembly include: E/RES/1086 B, of 
30 July 1965 (increasing the size of the Advisory Committee); E/RES/731 (F) (XXVIII) of 30 
July 1959; E/RES/830 (A) (XXXII) of 3 August 1961; E/RES/1086 (B) (XXXIX) of 30 July 
1965; E/RES/1584 (L), of 21 May 1971 (further expanding the Committee, providing for 
appointment of experts by the ECOSOC, and calling for work on a list of priorities set out by 
the Fourth Congress (Kyoto, 1970)); A/RES/32/60 of 8 December 1977 (Committee members 
to be nominated by Member States and elected by ECOSOC on the basis of equitable 
geographical distribution); E/RES/1979/19 and E/RES/1979/30 of 9 May 1979; 
E/RES/1983/25 of 26 May 1983 (reporting of Committee directly to ECOSOC); and the 
sequence of ECOSOC and General Assembly Resolutions from 1986-1990 that led to the 
establishment of the Commission by ECOSOC following A/RES/46/152 of 18 December 
1991. These were: E/RES/1986/11 (21 May 1986); E/RES/1987/53 (28 May 1987); 
E/RES/1988/44 (27 May 1988); E/RES/1989/69 (24 May 1989); E/RES/1990/27 (24 May 
1990); A/RES/43/99 (8 December 1988); A/RES/44/72 (8 December 1989); and 
A/RES/45/108 (14 December 1990). The last of these convened the intergovernmental working 
group whose recommendation, after review by a Ministerial meeting, formed the basis of the 
Annex to A/RES/46/152. That resolution called upon the ECOSOC to establish the new 
Commission with mandates based on the Annex, and this was done by E/RES/1992/1 (6 
February 1992) and E/RES/1992/22 (30 July 1992). 
43 See Note of the Secretary General transmitting the Report of the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Creation of an Effective Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Paris, 21-23 
November 1991), A/46/703, at paragraph 57, and Report of the Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control, 1990, “The Need for the Creation of an Effective International Crime 
and Justice Programme”, E/1990/31/Add.1. Other more specific concerns raised in the 1991 
Report included the growing seriousness and globalisation/internationalisation of crime 
(paragraphs 43-45), the need to increase resources and ensure that crime matters were 
considered as a foreign aid issue by States (paragraphs 40-41 and 52-53, see also 
A/CONF/156/3); the need to expand and multilateralise technical assistance and cooperation 
(paragraph 48) and establish the new Commission as a “clearing house” for technical 
assistance and criminal justice information (paragraph 52, see also E/RES/1992/22, Part I, 
subparagraph 3(e)); and the need to expand the capacity of the Secretariat to support the new 
Commission and its work in these areas (paragraph 58). 
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organisational session on 6 February 1992.44 Its first session, held from 21-30 
April 1992, produced a draft resolution containing the comprehensive 
mandates of the Commission, its Secretariat and to a more limited extent, the 
other elements of the U.N. Crime Programme, which was adopted by the 
ECOSOC on July 30, 1992.45 In the convening documents, the Commission is 
treated as one element of the Crime Programme, which also includes the 
permanent Secretariat,46 the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
Network Institutes (PNI),47 and the quinquennial Crime Congresses. 
As above, one intended function of the Commission was the mobilization of 
resources from donor States for use in various crime prevention and criminal 
justice capacities based both on the perceived needs of the time and the 
substantial gap between resources used for the activities of the CND and those 
allocated to crime matters, and one action taken by the General Assembly in 
the convening Resolution was the establishment of a new Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Fund, intended to provide a receptacle for contributed 
                                                 
44 See A/RES/45/108 of 14 December 1990 (establishment of working group), A/CONF.156/2 
(report of working group), A/RES/46/152 and Annex (calling on ECOSOC to establish 
Commission, annexing principles and programme of action), A/49/399 and A/49/593 
(ministerial meeting following up on resolution 46/152), E/RES/1992/1 (establishment of 
Commission), E/RES/1992/22 of 30 July 1992 (mandate of Commission), and E/1992/30, 
Report of the Commission at its First Session (21-30 April 1992). 
45 See the Report of the Commission at its first (April 1992) Session, E/1992/30, 
E/CN.15/1992/7 and E/RES/1992/22 of 30 July 1992. 
46 The Commission Secretariat became the U.N. Centre for International Crime Prevention 
(CICP) in 1998. In 2003 it was merged with the Secretariat for the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, the U.N. Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to become the U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNDCP). 
47 These are institutes operated under the auspices of the U.N. but funded and directed by 
individual Member States. They are: Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC, Canberra), the 
College for Criminal Law Science at the Bejing Normal University, European Institute for 
Crime Prevention and Control (Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yhteydessä toimiva Euroopan 
kriminaalipolitiikan instituutti, HEUNI, Helsinki, Finland), Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 
Pretoria, South Africa), Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevencion 
del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente (ILANUD, San Jose, Costa Rica), the International 
Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR, Vancouver, Canada), 
the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, (ICPC, Montreal, Canada), International 
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, (ISISC, Siracusa, Italy), International 
Scientific and Professional Advisory Council (ISPAC, Milan, Italy), Korean Institute of Justice 
(Seoul, Republic of Korea), Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia), National Institute of Justice, (NIJ, Washington, USA), Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (Lund, Sweden), United Nations Asia and 
Far East Institute For the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI, 
Tokyo, Japan), African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(UNAFRI, Kampala, Uganda) and the United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research 
Institute, (UNICRI, Turin, Italy). 
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resources for general purposes or “earmarked by the donors for specific 
projects or purposes, and overseen by the Commission itself on a trust basis.48  
The question of how the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, 
including the new Commission and its Secretariat, would itself be funded and 
of the scale of funding and scope of the new Programme was also contentious 
when the Commission was established. At the level of the U.N. itself, there 
have been recurring debates about the need for funding decisions and the 
allocation of resources, whether voluntarily or as part of a Member State’s 
assessed contribution, independently of political considerations in order to 
ensure that the work done is not selected or carried out based on donor 
considerations as opposed to intrinsic necessity or merit. The underlying issue 
is the question of ensuring the independence of the work and priority-setting by 
the body as a whole and not individual donors, while at the same time ensuring 
a sufficient degree of accountability to ensure that resources are used as 
intended, not wasted, and satisfy the domestic audit, legal and other 
requirements of the donor States.  
This had been a major issue in the General Assembly in the years prior to the 
establishment of the Commission, and it became one in the 1990-91 
deliberations as well.49 Two basic models of the Commission were in issue.50 
The United States proposed a body which would replace much of the existing 
structure, including both the Crime Congresses and the existing Committee, 
with the intergovernmental Commission, supported by a minimal Secretariat 
and funded from within the levels of pre-existing resource allocations. France, 
on the other hand, saw the Commission as a new addition bringing an 
intergovernmental element to the existing institutional landscape, with an 
expanded budget not only supporting the procedural requirements of the 
Commission itself, but also injecting badly-needed resources into the anti-
crime work of the Programme in general. The resulting compromise was the 
Commission as it was created, but the underlying disagreements over the basic 
scope of the work, how it should be funded, and the balance between Member 
                                                 
48 The Fund was renamed as such by A/RES/46/152, which established the modern Crime 
Programme and the Crime Commission in 1992. Control of the Fund was transferred from the 
Undersecretary General for Finance in New York to the UNODC Executive Director on 1 
January 2003. For a history and how the Fund is managed, see E/CN.15/2005/18, Part VI. 
Concerning contributions prior to 1995 see: E/CN.15/1996/8, paragraph 75. Annual 
contributions to the Drug Control Programme at the time were approximately $50-60M 
(E/CN.7/1996/2, paragraph 138). Concerning present use of the Fund and the allocation of 
resources, see Part F.II, “Issues related to the contribution and management of financial 
resources”, below. 
49 See Luck, E.C., “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, in 
Krasno, J.E., The United Nations: Confronting Challenges in a Global Society, Rienner, 
London, 2004, chapter 11, pp. 359-97 at pp. 381-87. See also, in the same volume, Laurenti, J. 
“Financing the United Nations”, chapter 9, pp. 271-310. 
50 For discussion of the debate over resources and visions of the Commission and Programme, 
see Clark, 1994, chapter 2 at pp. 33-37 and A/AC.239/L.3, L.4 and L.5, containing, 
respectively, the proposals of Australia, France, and the United States. 
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States which prefer a Programme which develops and maintains a standing 
level of substantive crime prevention and criminal justice capacity and those 
which prefer a more focused and ad-hoc approach to the work as allocated and 
funded by the Member States year-by-year and issue-by-issue remain.51 
The Commission described as both a “standing” body in the sense that it has 
been established based on an ongoing and open-ended mandate as (as opposed 
to an “ad-hoc” body established for a specific purpose and which ceases to 
exist once its mandate is discharged), and as a “functional” body, in the sense 
that it has been assigned the specific substantive subject area of crime, as 
opposed to a more general mandate that it or its parent body could modify from 
time to time. It reports to and is subsidiary to the ECOSOC, but is politically 
autonomous in the sense that its membership is determined by a separate 
process of election from among all Member States of the U.N. and not election 
or appointment from among the States who may be Members of the ECOSOC 
itself from time to time. It is one of nine functional Commissions established 
by either the General Assembly or the ECOSOC itself as subsidiary to the 
ECOSOC.52 It is composed of 40 Member States, elected for three-year terms 
and reflecting geographical distribution.53 It is required to hold regular annual 
sessions of eight working days and not more than ten working days,54 and to 
report annually to the ECOSOC.  
Its primary inputs have been substantive reports prepared by the Secretariat, 
political direction in the form of resolutions by the ECOSOC and General 
Assembly, and views expressed by delegations in its sessions.55 Its principal 
                                                 
51 See Part F.II, “Issues related to the contribution and management of financial resources”, 
below. 
52 Several of these, including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, were established by the 
ECOSOC in the early years of the U.N., from 1946-50. A second group, including the Crime 
Commission, was established from 1991-93, and one further body was added in 2000. The 
Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006) was convened 
by the ECOSOC at its first session, but is based on authority from a treaty, the U.N. Charter 
itself. Other Commissions, such as the Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
have been established by and are subordinate to the General Assembly itself.  
53 The formula is not quite equitable geographical distribution – a modified formula gives 
slightly greater representation to the African and Asian groups at the expense of WEOG and 
Eastern Europe. See A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 24 and footnote 216. 
54 A/RES/46/152, Annex, para. 25. See also E/CN.15/1993/9 – E/1993/32, Report of the 
Commission at its Second Session, 13-23 April 1993, Draft Decision II, subparagraph (b), 
deciding that the duration of future sessions should be eight days. This was reduced to only 
five days on an “exceptional and non-precedential basis” for the session following the 2005 
(Bangkok) Congress, but the meetings were never expanded again and since then the practice 
has been to only meet for five days. See “Insufficient Duration of the Annual Sessions”, below, 
and Report of the Commission at its 13th Session, E/2004/30, E/CN.15/2004/16, Draft Decision 
#1, paragraph (c). 
55 Reports of the Secretary General to the Commission and Annual Reports of the Commission 
itself for sessions since the 5th (1996) session can be found at: http://www. 
unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_commission.html. 
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outputs are its Annual Report, which includes decisions and resolutions of the 
Commission itself, and draft resolutions adopted and/or submitted to the 
ECOSOC or to the General Assembly via the ECOSOC. Resolutions often 
annex substantive texts, such as the results of research carried out by subsidiary 
bodies and “soft law” standards and norms. Whether resolutions are adopted 
only by the Commission itself or transmitted on to the ECOSOC or the General 
Assembly depends partly on content and partly on politics. The practice has 
been to submit most resolutions to the ECOSOC for its consideration and 
adoption, with a few from each session addressed to the General Assembly, via 
the ECOSOC.  
Once substantive content has been agreed in the Commission it is rarely altered 
before adoption by the other bodies, and this has become even less likely since 
the pre-existing Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, a body of 
experts, was replaced by the intergovernmental Commission in 1991. The 
intended process is one in which crime prevention and criminal justice 
substance developed in the Commission and its subordinate bodies is then 
reviewed and adopted – or not – by the ECOSOC and General Assembly in 
accordance with the political wishes of the delegations. Member States rarely, 
if ever, send crime experts to meetings of the New York bodies, and they are 
reluctant to re-open substantive elements, although this may occasionally be 
done to correct errors. Prof. Clarke describes proposals in the ECOSOC by the 
U.S.A. in the mid-1980s to increase the focus on transnational organized crime, 
but even the 1998 resolution mandating the negotiations that eventually 
produced the Palermo Convention does not appear to have attracted much, if 
any, debate in either the ECOSOC or General Assembly, where the vast 
majority of subject matter originating in the Commission is adopted without 
either debate or vote.56 A rare exception was the adoption of the Palermo 
Convention in 2000, when the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee mandated 
to develop it and four Member States spoke, all in support.57 Apart from this, 
actual debate once the Commission Report and resolutions reach the ECOSOC 
and General Assembly have generally been confined to budgetary, 
organizational and political matters.  
The practice of the Commission has been to address resolutions to the General 
Assembly only where they raised major or cross-cutting policy issues of 
importance to other elements of the U.N., where budgetary implications were 
raised,58 or where the Assembly itself had so directed.59 The general practice of 
                                                 
56 See Clark, 1994, chapter 3, pp. 65-70 at p. 69 See also Report of the ECOSOC to the General 
Assembly for 1998, A/55/3, p.82, adopting and transmitting E/RES/1998/14, later adopted by 
the General Assembly as A/RES/53/111, also without discussion, A/53/PV.85 of 9 December 
1998. 
57 See A/55/PV.62, A/55/383 A/55/383/Add.1, and A/RES/55/25, Annex. The Convention was 
elaborated by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Assembly itself and not the Commission, and 
hence was transmitted there directly via Third Committee. 
58 All questions affecting the Regular Budget of the U.N. must be reviewed by Fifth Committee 
(Administration and Budget) of the General Assembly. This includes any new mandate which 
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the ECOSOC has also been not to interfere with decisions of the Commission 
about where each resolution was addressed. This was departed from when the 
ECOSOC at its 2005 session decided not to transmit to the General Assembly 
several resolutions so addressed by the Commission, but this caused problems 
and has not been repeated.60 States sponsoring substantive resolutions 
sometimes seek referral to the General Assembly to underscore the political 
importance of an issue and occasionally succeed, but as the number of 
resolutions placed before the General Assembly has steadily increased,61 so has 
the pressure to consolidate, and where possible, deal with subject matter such 
as crime at a lower level, the reason given by ECOSOC for not transmitting the 
Commission resolutions on to the General Assembly in 2005. While the 
intended function of the Commission is to have crime proposals vetted by 
experts before they proceed further, Member States are also free to submit 
resolutions dealing specifically with crime directly to the General Assembly,62 
and many resolutions of the Assembly and other bodies, such as the Human 
Rights Commission and Human Rights Council, also deal with crime matters 
incidental to their primary substantive mandates.63  
                                                                                                                                 
cannot be delivered within existing budgetary resources and for which no extra-budgetary 
source, such as voluntary contributions from one or more Member States, is identified. It does 
not include mandates which are made contingent on or subject to the availability of extra-
budgetary resources. 
59 See, for example resolutions 51/120, 53/111, 55/25 and 55/255, calling on the Commission 
to consider a possible legal instrument against transnational organized crime, establishing an ad 
hoc Committee of the General Assembly to negotiate the instruments, and adopting the 
finalised texts. These required the attention of the Assembly for both substantive and budgetary 
reasons. See also resolutions 53/110, calling for the Tenth Crime Congress and deciding to 
convene it in Vienna, and 55/59 and 55/60, following up on the Congress and taking note of 
the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice produced by the Congress. Only resolutions 
which affect the U.N. Regular Budget require a review by the General Assembly’s 5th 
Committee; the majority of resolutions calling for action on the part of UNODC are made 
subject to the availability of extra-budgetary resources and do not require such a review. See, 
for example, resolution 56/261, taking notice of Plans of Action for the follow up and 
implementation of the 2000 Vienna Declaration. 
60 Two of the three resolutions blocked had expressly been requested by the Assembly and had 
eventually to be submitted directly by sponsoring Member States and re-negotiated in New 
York. See A/RES/59/157, paragraph 9, and A/RES/59/151, paragraph 19 (requests) and the 
adopted resolutions, A/RES/60/175 (transnational organized crime) and A/RES/60/177 
(follow-up to the Tenth Crime Congress). 
61 Numbers of resolutions actually adopted at each session have gone from fewer than 100 
around 1960 to 250 in the mid-1980s, and to over 300 in the years since 2000. 
62 One example is resolution 55/63, “Combating the Criminal Misuse of Computer 
Technologies”.  
63 Concerning present and possible future practice regarding reasons for the referral of 
resolutions to the ECOSOC and General Assembly, see Part G, Recommendation #9, below. 
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Proceedings of the Commission itself are governed by the ECOSOC Rules of 
Procedure and the Rules for functional Commissions of the ECSOSOC,64 as 
well as modifications within the framework of those rules (such as the adoption 
of standing agenda items) adopted by resolutions or decisions of the 
Commission and/or ECOSOC from time to time. Parallel meetings within each 
session are common, with a Committee-of-the-Whole refining draft resolutions 
and other substantive texts before they are taken up in the plenary. Decisions 
are taken on consensus: there has not been a single vote since the body was 
established, reflecting the desire of most delegations to emphasize the role of 
the Commission as a technical forum for the exchange of substantive 
information and policy ideas as opposed to a body for political decision-
making. That said, the increasing importance with which many Member States 
have begun to regard crime issues has led to a trend in which the proceedings 
have tended to shift to a more political and politicised focus, and if this 
continues, the practice of consensus-based decision making may well be 
discarded in favour of voting at future sessions.65 In recent sessions, several 
resolutions, not finding consensus, have been withdrawn rather than being put 
to a vote. The Commission has not established standing or ad-hoc sub-
commissions or sub-committees under the ECOSOC Rules, but it has 
frequently established and relied upon the work of expert panels, both to 
conduct research studies and to review materials produced by the Secretariat 
for technical assistance and other purposes.  
The Commission meets once each year, usually in April. This falls after the 
annual session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, but still early enough to 
permit production and circulation of resolutions and the Commission’s Annual 
Report in time for the June session of the ECOSOC. The two Commissions 
oversee the work of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and following the 
merger of the former Crime and Drug Secretariats in 2003, the consolidation of 
budgetary measures has led to a practice in which parallel deliberations are 
conducted at each Commission, and consecutive extended sessions of both 
bodies are held in December each year to finalise both. The Crime Commission 
also usually holds intersessional meetings. These have no formal standing 
under the ECOSOC Rules and last only a few hours. They are generally limited 
to procedural matters, such as agenda-setting, because they are attended only 
by Vienna-based diplomats and not crime experts.66 
Proposals have been made over the years to simplify the organizational 
structure and reduce costs by merging the various bodies, and as discussed 
above, attempts were made to create a single body by merging the mandates 
                                                 
64 E/5715/Rev.2 (ECOSOC Rules), and E/5975/Rev.1 (Rules for Commissions). The Rules for 
the Functional Commissions were last revised in 1983. 
65 For a discussion of the possible implications of voting, see Politicisation of the Commission, 
Part F.I.1, below. 
66 For discussion of limits on what intersessional and re-convened sessions should be allowed 
to consider, see Part G, recommendation 12, below. 
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and functions of the antecedent Committee and the Crime Congresses into the 
new Commission when it was established in 1991-92.67 Other proposals to 
merge the two Commissions themselves have not been accepted by the 
Member States, although those seeking a more streamlined governance 
structure for UNODC keep trying.68 Proposals to greatly reduce or dissolve the 
Crime Commission following the establishment of the Conferences of Parties 
to the Palermo Convention and Merida Convention have fared no better. Often 
debates have been as much between diplomats, whose focus is on institutional 
efficiency and political decision-making, and crime prevention and criminal 
justice experts, whose focus is on substantive research, the sharing of 
information and expertise about crime, and policy-making, as it has been 
between the national delegations of the Member States themselves. The same is 
true within the Secretariat: the most recent merger proposals are discussed as a 
means of simplifying the complex governance structure of UNODC by the 
U.N.’s Joint Inspection Unit, which looks primarily at governance, but not 
accepted by either the J.I.U. or the Office itself.69 The J.I.U. cites resistance to 
the idea on the part of the Member States and the sheer difficulty of 
implementing such reforms in the U.N., mentioning the difficulties associated 
with the 2006 replacement of the Human Rights Commission with the Human 
Rights Council (at significantly increased costs) in 2006. Within UNODC 
itself, concerns include the difficulty of managing political and substantive 
issues in a larger and more complex Commission, and the high probability that 
a merged and “streamlined” body would retain even less capacity to consider 
substantive matters regarding either crime or drugs than the already-inadequate 
combined capacity of the two existing Commissions. 
Apart from the general reluctance to “streamline” the work of the U.N. by 
extinguishing existing bodies, there are significant substantive reasons why the 
Commission remains as it does. Primary among these is the comprehensive 
jurisdiction of the Commission to consider any form of “crime” and any issue 
placed before it which is seen as relating to “crime” in the most general sense, 
by any Member State. All of the other bodies deal with specific substantive 
issues delineated by their mandates to deal with narcotic drugs, transnational 
organized crime and corruption, respectively, and the inherent difficulties in 
defining and describing crime make it an important forum. Apart from 
                                                 
67 Clark, 1994, chapter 2 at p.26 (concerns prior to the establishment of the Commission) and 
pp. 33-34 (proposal to merge the pre-existing Committee and the Congresses, but not CND, in 
1991. See also A/41/49, the Report of a 1986 group of high level experts established to 
consider institutional reforms, calling for, inter alia a process to “...identify measures to 
rationalize and simplify the intergovernmental structure of U.N. functional bodies” 
(Recommendation 8, subpara.3(a)), and A/AC.239/L.5, proposal of the United States to the 
Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Creation of an Effective International 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (August 1991). 
68 See, most recently, Joint Inspection Unit, 2010, Review of management and administration 
in the UNODC, A/66/315, Part II.B, Option 1 (Merger), which the Report chose not to 
recommend. 
69 A/66/315, Part II.B, Option 1 
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considering new and emerging forms of criminality, it also has the ability to 
consider problems from a substantive standpoint without the requirement for 
consensus on definitional matters beforehand. This allows for processes which 
can include the task of creating new definitions as the basis for research and/or 
substantive work, and which can consider various aspects of a new problem as 
the basis of deciding whether it is best dealt with in the Commission, one of the 
other crime bodies, or in some other U.N. forum altogether. Added to this in 
the case of CND is the fact that its mandates to deal with narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances integrate matters seen by many States as having 
aspects of both public health policy and crime-control. 
Looking beyond the immediate tactical and political motivations on each side, 
the underlying positions relate to two different perceptions of crime and the 
functions of the Commissions themselves by these two groups. Those seeking 
a more streamlined, efficient and accountable management structure and/or a 
single Commission which administers and oversees the entire Programme as 
opposed to developing policy in either of the present areas support merger of 
the two. This includes some management experts within the U.N. itself, and in 
some cases political pressure from the States via their diplomats seeking to 
reduce the political risks associated with a more substantive body. Experts on 
crime and drugs, within the Secretariat itself, from the interior, health, and 
justice ministries of the Member States, and most academic and non-
governmental crime experts favour the higher profile and greater substantive 
capacity of a stand-alone Commission and Secretariat.  
A single merged Commission would clearly make the diplomatic oversight of 
management and budgetary matters easier for the Member States and for 
UNODC itself, and in theory, a larger crime and drug Commission could deal 
successfully with the merged subject-matter, including the public-health 
element of the present work of CND. Such a reform would be a major 
undertaking for the Secretariat, however, and would also require the political 
will of the Member States for a fairly fundamental reorienting of their own 
present domestic and international work on both issues. By and large, the 
problems that arise from having two separate bodies relate to management and 
not substance, and a merged body would probably still require sub-committees 
to deal with many of the major issues, such as organized crime, drug-
trafficking and corruption. The reorganization and reorientation would also 
likely take years, during which the effectiveness of political oversight, and with 
it the funding and effectiveness of the work of UNODC would probably be 
reduced. It seems a high price to pay for a more streamlined oversight structure 
with little or no increase in substantive effectiveness and a high risk that 
substantive capacity would be further eroded. 
As with most U.N. entities, the Commission is an “intergovernmental” body, in 
the sense that only Member States of the U.N. itself can have full status as 
Members. This is consistent with the international view that crime prevention 
and criminal justice issues are matters of domestic national sovereignty and the 
domestic view of most governments that they should be treated primarily or 
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exclusively as public-sector issues. That said, the complexity of crime and the 
growth of the community of international non-governmental organisations and 
the international commercial private sector has generated pressures to take into 
consideration the views of private commercial interests, especially in areas 
such as economic crime, identity-related crime and cybercrime, and more 
generally, the views of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).70 Non-
governmental organizations may be accorded consultative status by the 
ECOSOC Committee on NGOs under Part XIII of ECOSOC Rules, and where 
such status is accorded, NGOs are permitted to attend and observe open 
plenary proceedings of the Commission, but not closed plenary proceedings or 
informal or parallel proceedings, including the Committee of the Whole, where 
most of the draft resolutions and other political texts of the Commission are 
considered. In the plenary, NGOs may be permitted to intervene,71 but are 
generally only given the floor if there is time remaining after all of the Member 
States wishing to intervene on a particular agenda item have done so.  
Within the overall structure of the United Nations, the Commission is the 
forum in which all of the critical elements of anti-crime efforts converge. As 
the political oversight body, it is the primary forum in which the work of crime 
prevention and criminal justice elements of the Secretariat is overseen and 
directed by the Member States. It also bridges or connects scientific and 
diplomatic experts and agendas. Crime prevention and criminal justice policy 
issues tend to progress from the work of substantive experts in matters such as 
social science and criminology, law, law enforcement, penal policy and 
forensic science to reviews by bodies which represent the political interests of 
the Member States. Most of the bodies and processes established by and 
subordinate to the Commission are composed of substantive crime experts, and 
transmit substantive information and analysis to it. The history of the U.N. 
Crime Committees prior to the Commission shows a gradual shift from bodies 
composed of independent criminological experts to experts nominated by 
governments in an effort to gain influence and recognition, but which also 
reduced independence and shifted the focus away from policy deliberations 
based on social science in the direction of a more political dialogue among the 
Member States.72 This trend has continued since the Commission itself was 
established. Where the Committees prior to 1992 were composed originally of 
independent criminological and other experts, and eventually of similar experts 
nominated by the Member States, the convening mandate is that of a body 
                                                 
70 See Commission Resolution 19/1, “Strengthening public-private partnerships to counter 
crime in all its forms and manifestations”, Report of the Commission at its 19th Session, 
E/2010/30, Chapt. I, Part D. The 2010 resolution transmitted by the Commission to the General 
Assembly following up the Twelfth Crime Congress, A/RES/65/230 also makes several 
references to the need for action by or cooperation with the private sector, as does the annexed 
Declaration of the Congress itself.  
71 ECOSOC Rule 84, paragraph 2, E/5715/Rev.2, and E/RES/1996/31. 
72 See: Clark, 1994, chapter 1 at pp. 19-23 and chapter 3 at pp. 42-46. 
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which would have diplomatic delegations that “include” such experts to ensure 
substantive deliberations:73 
Each Member State shall make every effort to ensure that its delegation 
includes experts and senior officials with special training and practical 
experience in crime prevention and criminal justice, preferably with policy 
responsibility in the field. 
The balance since 1992 has gradually shifted in favour of diplomatic 
delegations, both in terms of the selection of delegates by many Member States 
and of the duration of the sessions and opportunities for substantive 
discussions. To some extent, however, the deliberations of the Commission 
itself still feature both diplomatic and criminological or legal debate, and the 
bodies to which the Commission itself reports, the Economic and Social 
Council and the General Assembly are almost exclusively diplomatic in nature. 
As the primary forum for substantive deliberations on crime, the Commission 
is also the primary access point for the U.N. programme network institutions 
and non-governmental organisations, and in recent years, as consideration of 
economic crime and cybercrime have increased the Commission and its 
subordinate bodies are also the primary access point for interested private 
sector entities. 
                                                 
73 GA/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 24. 
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SUBSTANTIVE WORK AND MANDATES OF 
THE COMMISSION 
(i) Subject matter within the 1992 mandates 
The Commission is intended to be the principal U.N. policy-making body with 
respect to crime prevention and criminal justice74 and to have a comprehensive 
competence over such matters. This includes both proactive and reactive 
aspects and crime which is both transnational nature, or which occurs within 
individual Member States.75 In essence, its substantive mandate is to consider 
any issues which may be referred to it as crime prevention and criminal justice 
subject-matter by the Member States, subject to other bodies with more 
specific mandates, including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the 
Conferences of States Parties to the 2000 and 2003 Conventions. Even where 
another body has a more specific, overlapping mandate, the competence of the 
Commission over crime matter remains: the Commission is merely directed to 
consider the need to avoid such overlaps.76 This ensures that there is 
comprehensive coverage of the subject matter, but can also lead to duplication. 
The inherent difficulty in distinguishing between purely “crime” issues and the 
use of the criminal law in support of other policies makes a broad mandate 
necessary, but it can lead to “forum-shopping” scenarios in which delegations 
unsatisfied with results in other fora seek to re-open issues based on their 
criminal aspects.  
The scope of the substantive issues and subject-matter before the Commission 
is established by the convening resolution and the extensive Statement of 
Principles annexed thereto, which mandates the U.N. Crime Programme and 
gives the Commission political oversight over it. The stated goals of the 
programme include the following:77 
 the prevention of crime “within and among States”; 
 control of crime both nationally and internationally; 
                                                 
74 E/RES/1992/22, Part IV, paragraph 4. 
75 See, for example GA/RES/46/152, preambular paragraph 7, referring to “… assistance to 
States in combating both national and transnational crime”, and operative paragraphs 3 
(“…whose aim will be to respond to the most pressing priorities and needs of the international 
community in the face of both national and transnational criminality”) and 5 (“… in order to 
achieve the goals of preventing crime within and among States …”). Similar references appear 
in the annexed Statement of Principles (e.g., para.15, subparagraphs 16(a) and (b), paragraph 
17 and subparagraph 17(e).  
76 The Commission may consider overlapping issues, but is called upon to consider, inter alia, 
“…avoidance of overlapping with the activities of other entities of the United Nations system 
or of other organizations…” in establishing its own programme priorities. See 
GA/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraph 21(g). 
77 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paras.15 and 16. 
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 strengthening regional and international cooperation; 
 the integration and consolidation of the efforts of Member States; 
 the more efficient and effective administration of justice, with due 
respect for human rights; and, 
 the promotion of the highest standards of fairness, humanity, justice 
and professional conduct. 
The statement of principles also draws specific attention to the links between 
crime prevention and criminal justice issues and a wide range of other issues of 
ongoing concern, including the support, protection or enhancement of: the rule 
of law;78 “equity, constructive social change and social justice”;79 progress and 
development;80 human rights;81 democracy, peace and security;82 and 
improvement of social conditions.83 Also highlighted are the need to generate 
new responses to the growing internationalisation of crime and its exploitation 
by organized crime,84 and the need to match increases in crime with increased 
capacity, especially in developing countries.85  
The work actually done by the Secretariat under the mandates of the 
Commission, ECOSOC and the General Assembly has been expanded to 
include terrorism-prevention, and merged to some extent with anti-narcotics 
work under CND mandates since 2003. In 2007, a strategic review broke the 
work down into three basic categories: “normative services”, which included 
support for the various international legal instruments and “soft law” 
instruments, as well as supporting the development of new legal instruments 
where appropriate; research and analysis functions; and the development and 
delivery of technical assistance.86  
Over the 20 sessions held between 1992 and 2011, the attention of the 
Commission has been directed over the full range of crime prevention and 
criminal justice issues of concern to its Member States. Issues raised at the 1st 
through 20th sessions include an impressive list of subject matter:87  
                                                 
78 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 1, and E/RES/1992/22, Part I, paragraph 3, subparagraph 
(b). 
79 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 2. 
80 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraphs 4 and 8. 
81 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 1. 
82 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraphs 1 and 7. 
83 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 3. 
84 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 5. 
85 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paragraph 8. 
86 UNODC Strategy for 2008-11, E/RES/2007/12, Annex.  
87 In many cases the characterisation of issues has also evolved from session to session. The 
items listed are general descriptions and characterisations of the author only and many 
 55
computer-related crimes and 
cybercrime 
cooperation between the 
CICP/UNODC and other U.N. 
entities and other bodies 
corruption issues (corruption 
offences, transnational corruption, 
corruption in criminal justice 
systems, international cooperation, 
proceeds and asset recovery) 
crimes against children (missing 
children, sexual and other 
exploitation, trafficking) and 
protection of child victims and 
witnesses 
crimes against cultural property and 
trafficking in cultural property 
Crime Congresses (general 
organization, periodicity and 
development of agendas and 
documents for each Congress) 
crime data: collection, reporting, 
and statistical research and analysis 
issues 
crime prevention (general and 
specific crimes, community-based 
prevention) 
death penalty 
environmental crime 
economic crime issues, including 
money-laundering and proceeds of 
crime issues, economic fraud and 
other economic crimes 
regulation of firearms  
good governance 
hate crimes and incitement of racial 
hatred or religious fanaticism 
human rights in criminal justice 
systems 
identity-related crime (criminal 
misuse and falsification of identity) 
use of information technologies in 
crime prevention and criminal 
justice 
gathering, storage, use and sharing 
of information in criminal justice 
matters 
international cooperation issues 
(extradition, mutual legal 
assistance, informal cooperation) 
international criminal court 
juvenile justice issues and issues 
relating to children as offenders, 
victims and witnesses 
kidnapping 
legal aid and access to justice 
issues 
management of criminal justice 
systems 
medico-legal issues in prevention, 
sentencing and treatment 
migrant smuggling 
non-custodial measures, diversion 
from custody and reduction of pre-
trial detention 
organized crime (domestic and 
transnational, including gangs) 
peacekeeping and post-conflict 
reconstruction (criminal justice 
issues, institution-building, role of 
U.N. Crime Programme) 
prison and custodial issues, and 
non-custodial alternative options 
(remand, probation, diversion and 
reduction, prison conditions, 
parole, combating HIV/AIDS) 
reform of criminal justice systems 
restorative justice, mediation and 
related issues 
reporting issues (research and 
reporting on general trends and 
specific crimes, proposals for 
World Crime Report) 
roles of criminal justice officials 
(lawyers, prosecutors, judges, 
prison officials etc.) 
research and data methods and 
issues (crime statistics, use of 
questionnaires and other research 
methods) 
rule of law, transparency, integrity 
and related issues 
standards and norms on: capital 
punishment; child victims and 
witnesses; human rights; 
international cooperation issues 
(model laws and treaties); juvenile 
justice; law enforcement (codes of 
conduct and guidelines); non-
custodial measures; judicial 
independence; roles of participants 
in criminal justice (judges, lawyers 
and prosecutors, law enforcement 
etc.); torture; treatment of 
prisoners, 
technical assistance, international 
advisory services and resource-
mobilization 
terrorism issues (relationships 
between organized crime and 
terrorism, work of CICP and 
UNODC terrorism branches, 
implementation of treaties) 
trafficking in human beings 
trafficking in commodities, 
including: cultural property, 
explosives, firearms, human tissues 
and organs, motor vehicles, forest 
products, genetic material, and 
protected flora and fauna, 
treaty issues (development of 
treaty mandates, application to 
successor States, support of 
ratification and implementation of 
2000 and 2003 treaties) 
urban crime  
victims of crime 
violence against women and girls 
violent crime 
 
A review of the topics considered by the pre-1991 Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control and its predecessors back as far as the early days of the 
U.N.88 suggests that the shift from independent crime experts to an 
intergovernmental body of substance and diplomatic experts representing the 
                                                                                                                                 
encompass several specific issues raised in the Commission. The list is not necessarily 
exhaustive or comprehensive. 
88 Clark, 1994, chapter 1 at pp. 14-15, citing Lòpez-Rey, 1960, p. 4. 
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Member States directly shows to some extent a general shift from prevention 
and treatment-based matters to more legislative and reactive ones, a trend 
which will not surprise criminologists. That said, there is also a striking degree 
of continuity of issues in areas such as crime research and reporting, juvenile 
justice and prison conditions, no doubt due to the fact that while political 
approaches to crime may change from time to time and State to State, the 
actual problems posed by crime, such as prevention, suppression and the 
interests of specific participants such as offenders, officials and victims, does 
not. 
A recurrent theme has been the consideration of issues relating to technical 
assistance and the mobilization of the resources needed to develop and deliver 
the necessary projects and related materials.89 These have been considered both 
in general and in relation to the execution of specific mandates, such as the 
calls on the Secretariat to promote and assist ratification of the 2000 and 2003 
treaties before these came into force and their respective Conferences of States 
Parties were convened, and most recently in areas such as cybercrime and 
identity-related crime.90 The responsibility of the Commission “… to plan, 
implement and evaluate crime prevention and criminal justice assistance 
projects …”91 is established as part of its general responsibility to oversee and 
mobilise support for the U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme, which in turn assesses needs and delivers technical assistance. The 
specific responsibilities of the Commission include mobilising resources and 
support92 and generally overseeing the work of the Secretariat and other 
elements of the Programme, including in their roles with respect to technical 
assistance.93 The Programme itself includes technical assistance among other 
measures,94 and the work of the Secretariat specifically includes mobilising 
resources,95 bringing together potential donors of criminal justice assistance 
                                                 
89 Technical assistance is designated as a standing agenda item for the Commission. See 
E/RES/1992/22, Part VII, paragraph 2. 
90 A/RES/55/25, of 4 December 2000, paragraphs 8-12 (organized crime), A/RES/58/4, of 31 
October 2003, paragraphs 3, 8, and 9 (corruption), E/RES/2007/26, of 26 July 2007, paragraph 
14 (identity related crime), and Commission Resolution 20/7 (E/2011/30, resolution 20/7, 
cybercrime). 
91 E/RES/1992/22, Part I, paragraph 3, subparagraph (c). 
92 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraph 26(d) and E/RES/1992/22, Part V.  
93 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subpara.26(b). ECOSOC then designated CICP (now UNODC) as 
the Secretariat of the programme itself, under the guidance of the Commission. See 
E/RES/1992/22, Part I, paragraph 1. 
94 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraph 17(e). 
95 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraphs 31(a) and (e). 
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with countries in need of such assistance,96 and generally assisting the 
Commission as it may direct.97 
(ii) Mandate changes in the 1990s (transnational organized crime, 
corruption and prevention of terrorism) 
Since 1992, there have been at least two substantial changes in the substantive 
work overseen by the Commission. The subject-matter of transnational 
organized crime and many aspects of corruption were within the original 
mandates and can be seen as recurring themes in the first decade of the 
Commission, and much of the initial consensus-building in support of the 
Palermo Convention (2000) and Merida Convention (2003) took place there. 
The elaboration of the two Conventions changed the mandates to some degree 
as subject-matter within the scope of application of the new treaties now fell to 
their respective Conferences of States Parties. The Commission still retains 
default jurisdiction, in the sense that organised crime or corruption issues 
outside of the Conventions or of uncertain status can still be raised there, and in 
practice issues tend to be raised in both bodies, with the result that Commission 
workloads have not been significantly decreased. Delegations unable to find 
support for a proposal in one forum also sometimes re-label it and re-introduce 
it in the other. Overall work in these two areas has increased, which places 
additional demands on the Secretariat, but not for the most part on the 
Commission itself.  
The second major change involves the substantial expansion of ongoing 
terrorism prevention work following the 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent 
Security Council actions. Ironically, a comprehensive plan of action against 
terrorism had been finalised and adopted by the Commission as part of its 
mandate to follow up on the Declaration of the 2000 Crime Congress (Vienna 
Declaration) on Friday 8 September 2001. This work has proven highly 
successful due largely to the fact that UNODC mandates have been confined to 
providing technical assistance in implementing the existing treaties and 
Security Council resolutions, and have avoided the political questions relating 
to the scope and meaning of “terrorism” that have impeded progress in other 
U.N. fora.98  
 
                                                 
96 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraph 31(d). 
97 A/RES/46/152, Annex, subparagraph 31(c). 
98 See: E/CN.15/2009/5; E/CN.15/2010/9 and E/CN.15/2011/4 and earlier reports. 
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MAJOR FUNCTIONS: WHAT THE 
COMMISSION ACTUALLY DOES 
As noted above,99 views about the raison(s) d’être for the Commission, how 
“crime” should be characterized in political, scientific and institutional terms, 
and whether the Commission should be regarded as a forum for the discourse 
of political representatives from the Member States or experts in social science 
and law have changed over the decades since the U.N. itself was established 
and the Commission evolved into its present form. The links between crime 
itself, crime-prevention and criminal justice responses to crime, the work of the 
new Commission, and human rights, democracy, the rule of law, security at 
both the State and human levels, development and the social conditions of 
populations, the differing interests of developed and developing countries and 
their populations, the need to address both domestic and transnational crime, 
and the need to include other U.N. entities and Institutes, as well as other 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, are all prominently 
mentioned in the preambular and/or operative paragraphs of the convening 
resolution.100 The relationship between its different expert constituencies – the 
respective roles of diplomats and procedural experts and of substantive crime 
experts representing Member States or independent of them – is much less 
prominent, but also addressed.101 
These issues remain very much open as the Commission begins its third 
decade, and it is my view that this arises not from the political or institutional 
dynamics of the U.N. or the various interested Member States, but from the 
inherent subject-matter itself. The reality is that what we as Member States, 
and as individuals regard as “crime prevention and criminal justice” issues 
inevitably raise aspects of the rule of law, the human rights of offenders and 
victims, the collective rights of societies, the stability and development of 
States and regions. There has been some shifting and clarification of these 
aspects and how they interact and knowledge has been refined since 1949 and 
                                                 
99 See note 27, supra, and Clark, 1994, chapter 1, pp. 4 
100 A/RES/46/152 of 18 December 1992, preambular paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 10, and 11 and 
operative paragraph 8. 
101 The text refers to the need for “direct involvement” of the Member States to ensure the 
effectiveness of the programme (preambular para. 7), while the expert members of the pre-
existing Committee are expressly invited to attend only for the first two days of the 1992 
inaugural session (operative para. 12), The need for States to include crime prevention and 
criminal justice experts in their delegations appears only in the annexed Programme of Action, 
A/RES/46/152, Annex, Part II.E, paragraph 24: “Each Member State shall make every effort to 
ensure that its delegation includes experts and senior officials with special training and 
practical experience in crime prevention and criminal justice, preferably with policy 
responsibility in the field.” For discussion, see Clark, 1994, chapt. 2 at pp. 42-46 and “Possible 
Reforms (The greater involvement of substance experts, including independent experts)”, 
below.  
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as the institutional structure of the U.N. itself has evolved, but the fact is that 
crime has always had social, economic, political and security aspects at the 
local, national, regional and global levels. This, in my view, is essential to 
understanding the history and present status of the Commission and its 
Secretariat, and to critical and effective thinking about its future. 
In this context, the most basic function of the Commission is to provide a 
forum in which Member States can communicate collectively about crime 
prevention and criminal justice issues and in which all of these legal, social, 
economic and political threads can woven into a cloth that serves the shared 
interests of individuals, Member States and the international community as a 
collective. This includes a forum for the States to provide information to one 
another about crime and their policies, laws and other responses to it, raising 
problems or issues for consideration by other States, and gathering information 
from one another that can be used to support the development of effective 
domestic responses to crime and more effective participation in regional and 
globally coordinated responses to it. State-to-State information exchange is the 
primarily-political function that is regarded as the primary function by most of 
the Member States, but arguably the Commission should go beyond this. It 
should also be a forum in which there is dynamic and effective interaction 
among the human rights, development, rule of law and security elements of the 
U.N. that share interests in the prevention and suppression of crime and who 
generally have mandates that overlap with those of the Commission. Beyond 
that, the Commission also has, or should have, value as a forum in which there 
is a similar interaction between the Member States as individuals and as a 
collective, and legal, criminological and other policy experts as appropriate for 
the various issues it is called upon to consider by its Members.  
I. Substantive functions  
1. Issue identification and definition  
The Commission is an open forum in which any State which identifies an issue 
as a “crime prevention or criminal justice” issue may raise it. The sponsoring 
State is afforded an opportunity to explain the problem and why it believes a 
domestic and/or international criminal justice response to be necessary. As 
discussed above, what constitutes “crime” for purposes of domestic and 
international responses and the extent to which criminal justice mechanisms 
should be used in support of non-criminal social policies can itself be an issue, 
making the Commission an important forum for determining the definition and 
scope of crime itself. The Commission also affords States an opportunity to 
identify new and emerging crime issues, alerting others to the problem and 
allowing a global definition and description to develop as the perspectives of 
different States and regions are added to the discussion. This in turn forms a 
more viable basis for research, technical assistance and the development of 
focused and appropriate policies, domestic laws and international cooperation 
frameworks. It also allows States to hear and assess the perspectives of other 
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States on new developments as they are reported. Crime definitions and 
typologies are seldom stable over time. Re-assessment of crime issues is a 
constant element of popular and academic discourse, and the Crime 
Commission provides an important forum in which key definitions and 
typologies evolve in ways which influence and are influenced by the political 
and criminological thinking of governments themselves.  
2. Policy-making 
Once issues are identified, the Commission is, first and foremost, the primary 
body within the U.N. for the development of policy on crime prevention and 
criminal justice. As discussed above, the term “policy-making” is itself fairly 
elastic. Some delegations have tended to interpreting it narrowly, as a reference 
to simply setting out the positions of the various Member States and trying to 
reach a political consensus on what ought to be done at the international and 
collective level. Others have taken a rather broader interpretation, seeing the 
past and future potential for the Commission as a body in which substantive 
experts can meet and freely discuss evidence and policy issues with a view to 
generating not only consensus on collective international responses to crime, 
but also to the generation of new and innovative policy approaches for the 
Member States themselves, and to the coordination of domestic policies to 
maximise effectiveness and avoid inconsistencies and gaps that could be 
exploited by offenders. 
To a certain extent the present work of the Commission reflects both models 
and a range of policy-related activities. Some international policies reflect 
consensus and/or compromise among the domestic policies articulated by the 
Member States, while others originate in the Commission itself. Collective or 
multilateral crime policies are developed and periodically assessed and revised, 
which entails the gathering and assessment of policy-related information such 
as crime statistics and the views of experts within States, by the Secretariat, 
and by the Commission and by ad hoc bodies established and mandated by it. 
The Commission and its Secretariat also assist individual Member States in 
developing domestic policies and bringing these into coherence or conformity 
with international ones, and supporting the transfer of policy-related ideas and 
experiences from one Member State to another. 
3. Information-sharing 
In a more general sense, the Commission also provides an important forum in 
which substantive crime prevention and criminal justice experts can meet 
regularly and exchange a wide range of information. This includes identifying 
experts on a specific issue in various Member States and opening formal and 
informal channels of communication, and the sharing of almost every 
conceivable type of information, ranging from general theoretical assessments 
of problems, to examples of policy and legislative responses and even criminal 
intelligence or investigative information. Discussions on general themes and 
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specific agenda items serve to help identify new trends or problems, bring 
together groups of States or regions which share common crime-related 
problems, identify needs and capacity for research, review relevant work being 
carried on within States and in other international bodies, and similar matters. 
Often the general exchange of information leads over several years to more 
focused consideration and action on specific topics as the need becomes 
apparent.  
4. The development of expertise and transfer of knowledge 
Information-sharing can take on an additional dimension in the context of new 
and emerging crime issues and in the relationships between developed and 
developing countries. New knowledge and expertise tends to be created in one 
of two scenarios. Specialised knowledge and expertise is developed among 
those who are first to encounter a new form of crime, which may have a 
regional or geographical aspect driven by factors such as the relative locations 
of supply and demand or the relative strengths of organised crime and crime-
control mechanisms, and practical knowledge is thus brought to sessions of the 
Commission or its subordinate expert bodies by experts from the affected 
regions. Specialised knowledge is also developed in some cases by Member 
States with the expertise and financial resources to commit to research and 
assessment of a new crime problem. In many scenarios where globalised 
transnational crime is involved, some combination of Member States will bring 
different perspectives and knowledge to the proceedings like the pieces of a 
puzzle. The expertise and perspectives of Member States on trafficking in 
persons may differ, for example, depending on whether the State concerned is a 
source of trafficking victims, a place through which victims are trafficked, one 
in which victims are held and exploited, or a destination of proceeds of the 
criminal scheme.  
The transfer of knowledge and expertise is a critical function for several 
reasons. Synthesizing the knowledge of all relevant States on a problem usually 
results in a more complete understanding of the problem which is greater than 
the sum of its parts, and which may be developed much more quickly than if 
each Member State had done so on its own. At the international level it also 
supports effective cooperation by encouraging States to develop and implement 
policies which tend to be more coherent with those of other States and 
therefore more interoperable. It also strengthens individual States and 
reinforces national sovereignty and autonomy by helping those which lack 
knowledge or domestic capacity to develop it for themselves. This in turn 
makes them more able to assess their own legitimate national interests and to 
articulate them effectively in multilateral contexts, which increases the 
likelihood that viable policy compromises will emerge.  
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5. The development of experts 
Implicit in the development of institutional expertise is also the development 
and enhancement of individual experts. This tends to occur more in the less-
formal environments of the many subordinate expert group meetings, technical 
assistance meetings and similar processes than in the Commission plenary 
itself, but it is nonetheless a distinct and important function. For Member 
States with well-developed academic and governmental research, policy and 
legislative capacities, the pattern tends to be one of sending individuals with 
domestic expertise into the process, where their understanding of both the 
issues at hand and of crime in general are expanded by encountering the views 
of other experts and the experiences and perceptions of other (developed and 
developing) States. Almost every aspect of crime prevention and criminal 
justice, whether it relates to criminal offences such as cybercrime, economic 
crime, domestic violence or the sexual exploitation of children, or to the 
functioning of criminal courts, law enforcement agencies or prisons, are very 
different in developed and developing countries, and it is rare that experts from 
one do not benefit substantially from encounters with the realities of the other. 
These experts take what they have gained back to their States of origin, where 
it influences everything from fundamental thinking about the nature of crime 
and State responses to it to the very practical aspects of transnational crime and 
international cooperation in its prevention, investigation and prosecution. 
6. Resource mobilization 
A major stated objective of the establishment of the Commission was to 
enhance resource mobilisation and encourage Member States to treat crime 
problems as a question of using foreign aid resources in support of sustainable 
development and good governance,102 and this has been a major preoccupation 
ever since. Specific concerns include: overall levels of funding; the extent to 
which contributions tend to be earmarked for specific projects; and the extent 
to which financial accountability should be dealt with in the Commission 
generally or by individual States on a project-by-project basis.103  
7. Developing technical assistance 
“Technical assistance” is the term used in the U.N. to refer to assistance 
provided to U.N. Member States under the auspices of the U.N. by other 
Member States, the U.N. itself, or other providers, such as the Institutes of the 
Programme Network. Such assistance, described also in some contexts as 
                                                 
102 See Note of the Secretary General transmitting the report of the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Creation of an Effective Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Paris, 21-23 
November 1991), A/46/703 (paragraphs 40-41 and 52-53, see also A/CONF/156/3). 
103 These functions and past and current resource issues are discussed in detail in Part F.II, 
below. 
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“capacity-building” can range from simply providing financial or material 
resources to providing technical expertise or materials. In the context of crime 
prevention and criminal justice, most technical assistance efforts contain both 
elements. A project might assist with setting up and equipping a new forensic 
science facility as well as expert training in the form of instructors and 
materials to teach scientists and law enforcement in the recipient State how to 
use it, for example. The Commission does not actually deliver technical 
assistance. It serves as the primary U.N. forum in which the demand for such 
assistance is linked to the supply. Various source documents refer to the 
Commission as a having a “clearing house” function in which States in need of 
technical cooperation or technical assistance can seek and receive such 
assistance.104 Actual technical assistance is either delivered by the UNODC 
itself, in the form of materials and training activities, or under its auspices by 
the Institutes of the Programme Network, individual contractors or other 
providers. This is also often done in concert with other international or regional 
organizations such as the Organization of American States and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. In many cases the primary role of UNODC is not 
to maintain and provide substantive expertise, but to function as a broker, 
organising activities which bring together expertise from Member States which 
have it and Member States which request assistance.  
8. Treaty and international law functions 
The Commission has played a role in the development of the 2000 Palermo 
Convention and 2003 Merida Convention, but these functions are more limited 
than many Member States believe. Clearly, the application of international law 
and legal instruments must be considered as an important option in responding 
to globalised crime problems, but the very high degree of consensus needed 
and the lengths of time and elaborate and expensive processes needed to build 
and establish the necessary consensus and then to refine the subject matter and 
actually elaborate a viable legal instrument make them something of a response 
of last resort. The vast majority of the mandates adopted by the Commission do 
not even propose treaty-making, and of the several hundred resolutions adopted 
by the Commission during its first 20 sessions, only a handful deal with treaty 
negotiations. 
The Crime Commission itself was not established by a treaty, and unlike its 
counterpart the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), its mandates do not 
include the oversight of any of the treaties for which its Secretariat is 
responsible. The Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 dealing with narcotic 
                                                 
104 Early texts tend to refer to “technical cooperation” in the same context. See Note of the 
Secretary General transmitting the Report of the Ministerial Meeting on the Creation of an 
Effective Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Paris, 21-23 November 1991), 
A/46/703, paragraphs 48, 52 and 58. See also E/RES/1992/22, Part I, subparagraph 3(e)). 
Technical assistance was subsequently designated as a standing agenda item for the 
Commission. See E/RES/1992/22, Part VII, paragraph 2. 
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drugs designate CND and the INCB as responsible for oversight of the 
instruments and the conformity of the States Parties with them,105 but in the 
Palermo and Merida processes it was decided instead to follow the more 
general practice of establishing a specific new body for each of the crime 
conventions, the membership of which would be drawn from the States Parties 
and not the Member States of the U.N. as a whole. Thus, while the Crime 
Commission still retains residual jurisdiction over the subject-matter of 
organized crime and corruption in general, matters covered by the two 
Conventions and relating to the operation of the Conventions themselves are 
for their respective Conferences of States Parties. 
The Commission does not play a significant role in the actual negotiation of 
new treaties, because these are prima facie open to the participation of all U.N. 
Member States and not only the 40 who happen to have been elected to serve 
on the Commission at any given time. In both the Palermo and Merida 
processes the actual negotiations were carried out by Ad Hoc Committees of 
the General Assembly established for this purpose, and the later stages of the 
processes leading up to the commencement of formal negotiations were carried 
out by intergovernmental expert groups designated as “open-ended” so as to 
ensure the participation of as many States as possible.  
The fact that the work of the Commission has recently led to the development 
of four global legal instruments against transnational organized crime and 
corruption this has led to raised expectations for some delegations that further 
treaty-making should be seen as a major response to crime problems and a 
much larger portion of the work of the Commission. For other delegations it 
has led to fears that other proposals put to the Commission, not so amenable to 
legal measures, might follow a similar path. It should be borne in mind that the 
primary function of the Commission is to act as a general policy forum, and 
that the treaties were developed in other bodies established and convened for 
that express purpose. While the Commission remains the logical place to start 
such initiatives, and treaty-making is always a possible outcome in 
Commission deliberations, it is not the only or even a common outcome: of the 
55 general topics considered by the Commission at its first 15 sessions, only 
four have resulted in treaties. The elaboration of new legal instruments is 
important, but should not be seen as the sole measure of success of the 
Commission. Similarly, the fact that deliberations on particular subject matter 
might eventually lead to proposals for new legal instruments or other outcomes 
which may raise political or diplomatic concerns should not be the basis for 
blocking such deliberations at their inception. All responses to crime should be, 
first and foremost, evidence-based. Treaty-making exercises are no exception, 
and in such cases the evidence has to include not only the nature and extent of 
the problem, but the relative difficulties of treaty and other responses and the 
                                                 
105 See Articles 21-22 of the 1988 Convention and Commentary on the U.N. Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, E/CN.7/590, U.N. 
Publication Sales No. E.98.XI.5, at pp. 368-86. 
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predicted effectiveness of any treaty measures that are seen as likely to find 
consensus. 
II. Political and procedural functions 
1.  Building and managing consensus 
The Commission is primarily a consensus-based organization, and a major 
function is to provide conditions where issues can be clearly understood and 
consensus can be reached if possible. As an intergovernmental body, the 
primary focus of most participants is on finding consensus among Member 
States. This is certainly a critical function, but it often masks the fact that the 
need for another sort of consensus often emerges in its deliberations. 
Horizontally, the Commission brings together Member States with differing 
views and priorities, but vertically, it is also the primary forum in which the 
legal and technical perspectives of the crime experts that participate in most of 
its subordinate processes first encounters the political perspectives of the 
Member States themselves. It is also the forum in which the political views of 
Member States at different places on the right/left partisan spectrum sometimes 
collide. The resulting tension between partisan views and between politics and 
science echoes similar tensions in many of the Member States, but the need to 
achieve both inter-State consensus and consensus between scientific and 
political interests can make deliberations in the Commission more unstable and 
difficult, especially in negotiations where some States are represented by 
diplomatic experts articulating their political interests and others are 
represented by substance experts committed more to legal and criminological 
objectives. Getting the right mix of these two perspectives and ensuring that 
each understands the agenda of the other can in many cases be critical to 
finding compromise and consensus on results that are appropriate for everyone.  
2.  Integrating and moderating of partisan political views on 
 crime 
As discussed above, in the various Member States where democratic political 
systems exist, there tends to be a pattern of oscillation between right-wing and 
left-wing partisan political governments over time, and this has a significant 
impact on many aspects of crime prevention and criminal justice policy. The 
Commission builds consensus among the various partisan political 
perspectives, and because the right/left oscillation in the various States does not 
coincide, the collective effect in the Commission is to generally reduce the 
more extreme perspectives and over time, to push policy consensus in the 
direction of more moderate, centrist views. In effect, at any given time, the 
various Member States are at different points on the political spectrum, and 
positions in the centre are the only ones that can find consensus. That said, the 
Commission is not entirely free of policy oscillations of its own, and the 
balance between proactive and reactive policies changes over time. Many long-
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time participants view its first decade as focused primarily on crime prevention 
and sociological or criminological approaches to crime, followed by a more 
reactive period from 1997 to 2005, during which activities were dominated by 
the processes before, during and immediately after the development of the two 
Conventions. Once the treaties were established, States tending to prefer 
reactive policies sought to narrow and focus work on the “hard law” treaties 
and related matters, while States leaning more towards proactive areas sought 
to re-balance the Commission’s work by returning more to crime prevention 
and the “soft law” U.N. Standards and Norms on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice.106 
3.  Establishing legitimacy 
Just as the political accountability of national legislative bodies and their 
members to general populations serves to establish legitimacy within 
individual Member States, the Commission performs a similar function at the 
global level. As the Commission is an intergovernmental body, delegations 
representing each Member State are expected to represent its political and 
expert views, and their decisions to join consensus on the actions taken by the 
Commission politically commit or bind the States they represent. In the process 
of developing consensus on each issue, the articulation of positions and their 
adjustment by delegations in the course of negotiations perform several 
simultaneous functions. Limits on the extent of each policy proposal are 
established, in some cases eliminating some proposals from further 
consideration. Within those limits, diverse interests are reconciled to reach 
consensus on what remains. The negotiation process both establishes the 
content of the consensus and, ideally, convinces each Member State that its 
views have been considered and to the extent possible, incorporated into the 
final product. Having made concessions and accepted the concessions of other 
States, each State becomes politically committed to the outcome. This is 
further removed from the ultimate consent of the people in each Member State, 
but is otherwise similar and in many ways parallel to the process of 
compromise and consensus in national legislatures, and in States where they 
exist, within coalition governments. 
4.  Merging political, diplomatic and substantive 
 perspectives 
As noted in the introduction and the previous segment, a critical issue for the 
Commission is the maintenance of a balance in which there is sufficient 
substantive social science expertise to ensure valid and viable policies and in 
                                                 
106 This debate has frequently taken place and many examples can be found in the deliberations 
of the past decade. See for example the Report on the reconvened 10th Session, which took 
place in April and September of 2001, just after the Palermo Convention was adopted by the 
General Assembly in October of 2000, E/CN.15/2001/30/Rev.1, at paragraphs 67 and 93-94. 
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which there is also sufficient political influence and oversight that those 
policies are seen as legitimate. Many of the functions of the Commission relate 
to the integration and reconciliation of the national and political interests of the 
various Member States, but compromise and reconciliation between politics 
and policy are equally important. The overall task is to develop policies which 
will actually be effective against crime, while respecting not only the divergent 
views of Member States in different places on the continuum of social and 
economic development and right-left political ideologies, but also the divergent 
views of diplomats representing governments and social science and legal 
experts representing criminology, human rights and other such perspectives. 
5.  Institutional coordination 
As discussed above, it is in the nature of “crime” or the penal law that it is 
recognized as a distinct area of domestic policy and law, but also as a means to 
the ends of a wide range of other public policies. Other functional bodies of the 
U.N. and elements of its Secretariat charged with health, development, air and 
sea matters, the environment, migration, refugee and humanitarian matters and 
trade and commercial matters all have interests in crime prevention and 
criminal justice matters, and many elements of the Secretariat have experts or 
units that deal with crime matters as they apply to the subject matter at hand. 
This is also true of human rights and rule of law matters and institutions, but 
here the relationship is more complex and reciprocal. As with other subject-
areas, the criminal law is often needed to protect the rule of law through 
offences protecting governance in general and the integrity of the legislative 
and judicial processes in particular, and it is also needed as a means of 
protecting human rights and criminalizing abuses such as torture. But these 
areas are also essential elements of criminal law and criminal justice itself, 
which makes the links between human rights, criminal justice, and the rule of 
law, and among elements of the Secretariat mandated to develop and maintain 
them, more important. In this context, the Commission and the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime function as a basis of expertise in a structural or substantive 
sense, but they also function as a nexus through which mandates and work of a 
multidisciplinary nature can be coordinated in a procedural sense. Whether a 
particular project is characterized as a human rights project with crime 
prevention and criminal justice elements or vice versa, for example, can often 
depend on relatively inconsequential matters of timing or political debate. 
What matters is that the content of the project and its means of delivery both 
respect the institutional structures and mandates and reflect the expertise of all 
of the various disciplines needed to ensure efficient delivery and effective 
outcomes. 
6.  Priority setting 
The Commission provides the primary forum in which competing crime issues 
are debated and priorities are set, giving due consideration to the views and 
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priorities of all of the Member States and input from experts in all relevant 
substantive areas. Nominally, the Commission is directly responsible only for 
the priorities of the U.N. Crime Programme,107 but its deliberations also assist 
in the setting of priorities in other U.N. entities and within the Member States 
themselves. Effectively, the Commission also sets its own priorities, subject to 
the affirmation of the ECOSOC, and for some subject matter, the General 
Assembly. This is now done session by session, although an initial list of 
priorities for its work from 1992-1996 was set by the Commission and 
affirmed by the ECOSOC.108 Efforts at setting priorities inevitably fall prey to 
the fact that Member States cannot agree on what the priorities are or should 
be, and in a consensus-based process, this tends to produce gradually longer 
lists until every imaginable sort of crime or concern about crime has been 
added to the list either at the behest of a Member State, or in an attempt to 
bring one or more reluctant States into the consensus. Once the process has 
reached the saturation point someone proposes to “refocus” or “revitalise” 
strategic priorities and starts the process all over again. In early 2007, there was 
some discussion of how priorities should be set during the negotiation of a 
mid-term strategy for the UNODC. 109 Some States argued that the proposed 
strategy should set priorities or allow the Secretariat to do so, while others 
argued that this was the exclusive prerogative of the two Commissions 
themselves. The agreed text affirms the exclusive authority of the two 
Commissions to set priorities, and that the Strategy is based on existing 
mandates and does not modify them, which preserves existing priorities. As 
sovereign bodies, it is of course always open to the Commissions to establish 
new mandates or set new priorities at any time. Presumably, as bodies of 
Member States, the two Conferences of States Parties will also have some 
influence in setting overall priorities. This has not arisen with the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs because the Commission itself fulfils both roles, 
supplemented by the International Narcotics Control Board.110 A related issue, 
discussed below, is the extent to which priorities should be set in the 
Commissions and Conferences on a political basis, as opposed to the de-facto 
priority setting that is done by donor States in deciding what projects they will 
fund. 
                                                 
107 E/RES/1992/22, Part I, paragraph 3, subparagraph (l). 
108 E/RES/1992/22, Part VI. 
109 E/CN.15/2007/5, E/CN.7/2007/14, Part I. The Strategy applies to all of UNODC and was 
adopted by the 50th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the 16th session of the 
Crime Commission.  
110 See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 Articles 9-16, and Final Act of the 
Conference to Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
Resolution 1, 25 March 1961. 
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7.  Strategic planning (work of the Crime Programme and 
 Secretariat) 
As part of its management and oversight functions, the Commission is the 
forum in which strategic planning for the Secretariat and other elements of the 
U.N. Crime Programme is done, and strategic planning for the Programme was 
added to the standing agenda of the Commission at one of its early sessions. 
The major substantive challenge is that many priorities cannot be predicted 
very far in advance, both because crime itself is inherently unpredictable, and 
because the partisan views and substantive policy priorities of the Member 
States themselves are constantly shifting. Added to this, as noted above, is the 
fact that in any consensus-based process, once a list is started, more and more 
“priorities” are added to it until saturation is reached and the process repeats. 
Underlying all of this are political and economic differences between 
developed and developing Member States. As donor States, the developed 
countries contribute most (approximately 90%) of the resources and tend to use 
this to focus the strategic agenda on what they see as priorities. The developing 
countries, on the other hand, emphasize the equality of Member States in the 
U.N., and want priorities chosen and strategic planning done in the 
Commission itself. This long-standing issue is discussed in more detail below. 
8.  Strategic planning (work of the Crime Commission 
 itself) 
The ability of the Commission to plan multi-year strategies for its own work is 
more limited. As discussed above, there has been some success in establishing 
standing or recurring agenda items, but emerging issues annual priorities and 
the content of resolutions submitted each year cannot be predicted very far in 
advance. Generally, the priority-setting and strategic planning functions of the 
Commission must compromise between two conflicting objectives. On one 
hand, conducting substantive discussions requires time in advance, to allow 
Member States to consider the domestic implications of issues and options, 
consult with other States and prepare their delegations, which requires that 
issues be clarified and any supporting documentation from the Secretariat be 
disseminated well in advance. On the other hand, both crime itself and the 
political priorities of Member States are inherently unpredictable, and most 
delegations wish to maintain as much flexibility as possible to raise issues of 
concern to them with little or no advance notice to the Commission. At the 20th 
session, in April 2011, frustrations arising from this problem led to a decision 
of the Commission on several reform measures, including requirements that 
draft resolutions be submitted a month in advance to permit time for the 
Secretariat to translate and disseminate the texts in all languages and to allow 
Member States to select appropriate experts, and a requirement that there be a 
sufficient interval between the sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
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(usually held in March) and the Crime Commission (usually held in April) to 
permit the Secretariat and delegations to efficiently prepare.111, 112 
9.  Oversight of the Secretariat by Member States 
The two Commissions are the primary mechanisms whereby Member States 
oversee and direct the work of the UNODC. As noted above, the Commission 
and Secretariat were established jointly, and their functions are closely related: 
anything that the Secretariat is called upon to do, the Commission is called 
upon to oversee. This oversight can be notionally broken down into several 
distinct aspects, including oversight and input into policy-development and 
programme planning and priority setting; oversight of the ways in which 
projects and other work are carried out, and financial oversight or 
accountability. The Commission also exercises a more limited oversight role in 
areas where the subject matter involved may be within the mandates of other 
bodies as well. As discussed below, the oversight functions of the Commission 
and the amount of attention paid to this function, have increased substantially 
since the Commission was first established, partly due to the substantial 
increase in resources and mandates for crime prevention and criminal justice 
activities by the Secretariat and partly as a result of the increasing tendency to 
perceive the work as being sufficiently important and serious to raise political 
sensitivities. The need for continuity and coherence in the oversight of the 
Secretariat by the two Commissions led to the joint establishment of a standing 
open-ended intergovernmental working group on governance and finance by 
the Crime and Drug Commissions in 2009, and the mandate of this Group was 
continued by joint resolutions of the two bodies at their 2011 sessions.113 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 See E/2011/30, Draft Decision 20/1, “Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice on its twentieth session, provisional agenda for its twenty-first session and 
organization of work of its future sessions.” Generally, the timing of the two Commissions 
must balance among ensuring that Member States have enough time to prepare, the conflicting 
demands of crime, drug and other Vienna based processes (notably those of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency) for document translation and other Secretariat support, and the need 
to ensure that the Reports of both bodies, including resolutions addressed to the ECOSOC 
and/or General Assembly, are processed and disseminated early enough to permit 
consideration and the next annual sessions of the ECOSOC, which usually take up the crime 
and drug subject matter in June or early July each year. 
112 See also the discussion of thematic planning for the Commission itself, Part G, 
recommendation 5, below. 
113 See resolutions 52/13 of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and 18/3 of the Crime 
Commission. Documents generated by the group, commonly known as “Fin-Gov”, can be 
found at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/wg-governance-finance-2.html.  
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CURRENT ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND 
OBSTACLES TO PERFORMING BASIC 
FUNCTIONS 
I. Issues relating to the capacity and function of 
 the Commission itself 
1.  Politicisation of the Commission 
Most observers agree that, while the Commission was originally intended to 
deal with crime prevention and criminal justice issues primarily from a 
scientific and technical perspective, the emphasis has shifted in recent years 
more in the direction of diplomatic and political perspectives on crime issues 
and an expanded role in overseeing the work of the Secretariat. Lawyers and 
criminologists have tended to regard this trend with some dismay, but it is 
important that the reasons for it be explored.  
The gradual shift from a primarily criminological and social-science based 
body to a more governmental, political and diplomatic focus began long before 
the present Commission was established. The pre-1991 Committees began as 
small ad hoc advisory committees of independent academic experts in the 
1950s and gradually became more closely tied to the Member States as 
nominations became governmental and the bodies expanded to represent all of 
the geographical regions through to the mid-1980’s. The process which led to 
the establishment of the Commission itself was to some extent a “deal with the 
devil” in scientific terms, seeking greater governmental and political 
involvement as a means of mobilizing greater resources and governmental 
commitment to the outputs of the new Commission, but increasingly at the 
expense of the independence and scientific calibre and validity of its 
deliberations.114  
Prof. Clark argued at the time the Commission was first established that it 
required substantive experts with both governmental and non-governmental 
perspectives, and this continues to be true, but two further layers have been 
added. A greatly-expanded Secretariat has taken a much more active and 
substantive role, not just in running the sessions of the Commission, but it 
providing it with substantive reports and discussion outlines intended to better 
inform its deliberations and to some extent to focus discussions more closely. It 
also often provides Member States with advice and assistance in representing 
their interests and on the sorts of mandates it feels it needs to do its work, a role 
supported by some delegations and criticised by others as an erosion of 
neutrality. The other major shift has been towards representation by Vienna-
based diplomats who are experts in multilateral diplomacy and the 
                                                 
114 See: Clark, 1994, chapters 1 and 2 at pp. 19-23 and 42-46. 
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management of the UNODC and other U.N. institutions, but in many cases 
know relatively little about the study of crime or the mechanics of prevention 
and criminal justice itself. They can serve as a conduit for the exchange of 
information and the representation of the interests of their governments in 
negotiations within parameters defined by their instructions, but they are not 
able to participate effectively in interactive criminological or policy 
deliberations of a substantive nature and generally lack the instructions to do so 
even if they had the substantive expertise. 
This evolution has taken the form of gradual changes in the composition of 
national delegations in the Commission and other U.N. bodies, but it is more 
than just a gradual shift in diplomatic practice. It has been strongly influenced, 
if not driven by, the evolution of crime itself during the twentieth century. As 
discussed above, the concept of “crime” itself has evolved substantially from 
early views that it should be considered as a matter of the individual human 
rights of offender and/or victims and of collective social rights to be free of 
crime, and as a primarily social issue to be dealt with mostly within States. 
Globalisation and changes both to the seriousness and extent of transnational 
crime, and the strategic and security interests in areas such as terrorism, global 
economic stability, the rule of law, human rights and development assistance 
have led to greater consideration of crime as a national, regional and global 
security issue, and to more frequent consideration of crime issues by the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. The same developments have also 
led to increasing substantive and institutional overlap with security, economic, 
development, human rights and other thematic subject-matter, and the range of 
substantive issues raised in the Commission has expanded significantly, as 
Member States seek to take up the criminal justice aspects of otherwise non-
criminal subject matter, such as the protection of cultural property or protection 
of the environment.  
Whether this is a legitimate attempt to focus criminal justice expertise on the 
problem or simply an attempt to raise controversial issues that did not achieve 
satisfactory outcomes in one forum in another forum, the practical effect has 
been to raise the political temperature of some deliberations and to bring into 
the Commission a broader range of diplomatic and other experts from outside 
of the traditional crime prevention and criminal justice field. The adoption of 
the Palermo and Merida Conventions also follows the precedent of the earlier 
narcotics instruments in using international law to induce individual Member 
States to adopt, strengthen and apply domestic criminal law measures to 
individuals, as discussions of crime issues have matured and consensus on the 
scope of actions to be taken and the willingness to move more in the direction 
of prescriptive and legally-binding measures has increased.  
The same pressures which have expanded the quantity and scope of the 
subject-matter before the Commission have also greatly expanded the work of 
the Secretariat, including into the politically-sensitive area of terrorism 
prevention. The last two decades have seen large increases in workloads, 
personnel and resources allocated to UNODC. The assessment of trends in 
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workloads and budget or resource issues is complicated by the 2003 merger of 
the former U.N. Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention (CICP), but the overall picture is clear. There 
has been a major expansion in staff and budget, and the vast majority of the 
increases have been in areas that fall primarily under the oversight of the Crime 
Commission. Resource issues are examined in detail below, but the combined 
budget for crime and drugs (and after 2003, terrorism) increased about 400%, 
from less than $60 million in the early 1990s to a peak of almost $250 million 
in 2008, and deliberations over how the funds are raised, how they are spent 
and how they are accounted for have become a major issue for the 
Commission, and since 2008, the intergovernmental group on finance and 
governance. 
Paradoxically, as the concern about crime, the breadth of the range of subjects 
raised at each session, and the scope of the Secretariat work and resources 
overseen by the Commission have all increased the amount of time available 
for deliberations has been sharply reduced, which has tended to further 
politicise matters by reducing the substantive evidence before the Commission 
and the attendance of the substantive experts needed to assess it and develop 
substantive legal and criminological outputs as opposed to political ones. As 
discussed below, political risks to the Member States may have been reduced 
by this, but so has the value of the Commission and its work in developing 
accurate assessments of the nature and scope of crime and effective responses 
to it.  
As noted above, while the Commission could in theory vote on the resolutions 
and decisions it makes, the practice is to adopt on consensus or not at all, and it 
has never voted. This is consistent with technical and scientific conceptions of 
the Commission, which place more emphasis on exchanging information and 
developing new knowledge and policy options than on concrete actions, but to 
a certain degree it also reflects fairly shrewd political strategies among the 
States concerned. Given the strict approaches taken to national sovereignty in 
the making and enforcement of the penal law, most delegations have 
recognised that getting any sort of effective results out of the Commission 
requires persuasion ahead of coercion or majoritarian decision-making. In this, 
among the delegates, the diplomats tend to have the advantage over many of 
the national crime experts, who are sometimes prone to forget the fundamental 
differences between making laws in a constitutional legislative system and 
establishing legal or other principles based on the consent and actual support of 
Member States at the international level.  
Whether voting will come, and if so what the effects will be, is difficult to 
predict. Faced with the possibility of voting, it becomes more likely that 
delegations will arrive with pre-determined voting instructions, which may 
exacerbate the existing trends away from actual knowledge-transfer and active 
policy-making during the Commission sessions. It is also possible that tactical 
measures might be used to keep sensitive items off the agenda by those who 
fear an adverse decision, which could short-circuit the sort of deliberations and 
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negotiations that, over time, form the basis of consensus. Voting might 
transform the hitherto-chaotic attempts to set strategic priorities, enabling 
concrete priorities to be set, but this might not prove the panacea that many 
delegations seek. Such voting could alienate those States whose priorities were 
voted down and could trigger the same sort of budgetary problems encountered 
in the General Assembly in the 1980s: if larger numbers of small developing 
Member States can use voting to control priorities, then the financial support of 
the smaller number of developed Member States whose priorities are not 
chosen could evaporate. This does not occur in consensus-based decision 
making, which requires each group to support the priorities of the other to 
some degree in order to set priorities and adopt mandates.115  
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Commission lies not just in its ability to 
make concrete decisions, but its ability to do so based on factual evidence and 
sound analysis which combines technical validity and political viability, and to 
reach decisions that enjoy the support of the Member States to the point where 
the will of other States will be respected and the decisions actually 
implemented. A major risk, should voting become commonplace, is that it 
would weaken or reduce the capacity to negotiate consensus-based decisions. 
At present, delegations must often weaken texts or accept compromises, and if 
these go too far or make the proposal ineffective, then its proponents have the 
option of withdrawing or abandoning it, perhaps with a view to building the 
necessary support over the longer term. Faced with the prospect of voting, 
much of the pressure to compromise – and much of the debate needed to work 
out the substantive details – would be lost. In substantive terms more and 
stronger decisions might be made, but they might also not be implemented, 
especially by some of the Member States whose interests are most affected and 
whose support is most needed. In domestic political structures, legitimacy 
springs from the recognition that elections are fair, decision making is 
majority-based and transparent, and that all else being equal, the social benefits 
and cohesion of acceding to the will of the majority is more beneficial than 
non-conformity. In the U.N., it is not at all clear that the same dynamic would 
apply. At the Commission, legitimacy and long term support for a course of 
action on crime prevention or criminal justice is more likely to attach to 
consensus-based decisions than majoritarian ones. 
It seems apparent that the Commission has become more politicised primarily 
because the Member States have begun to take crime, and in consequence, 
Commission itself, seriously. While this clearly has disadvantages when efforts 
to find technical and legal solutions to specific technical crime problems are 
impeded, the greater political engagement is essential to preventing and 
suppressing crime and is a positive development. Political aspects of crime 
prevention and criminal justice are a factor in every Member State, and they 
                                                 
115 See “Issues related to the contribution of financial resources”, Part F.II, below, and Luck, 
2004, at pp. 381-87. See also, Laurenti, 2004. Ultimately, after an extended budgetary crisis, 
the General Assembly decided to revert to consensus-based budgeting, subject to the ultimate 
authority of Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations (⅔ majority vote on certain issues).  
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can become even more problematic at the multilateral level, where many 
different political concerns will usually be engaged and consensus or near-
consensus must be found. Such developments may make consensus more 
difficult, but the functions of the Commission go beyond consensus-building. 
Commission delegations do not just bring the political views of their 
governments into the forum, they also take out of it their assessments of how 
other Member States perceive the issues, and this form of dialogue, while 
laborious and time-consuming, is ultimately essential to forming the more 
fundamental global consensus at a political level that is needed to deal with the 
problem that globalised crime has become. It is for technical experts to develop 
practical responses to crime and to explain what needs to be done, how it 
would be done and why it needs to be done, but ultimately getting it done 
depends on the individual and collective political will of the Member States.  
2.  Regional groups and equitable geographical 
 representation 
The practice in the U.N. is that intergovernmental processes should represent 
the five regional groups more or less equally. This applies to the election of 
Member States to the Commission itself, and this has never been a major 
problem, but it also applies to many of the subordinate bodies and processes 
established or undertaken by the Commission, and this becomes problematic 
when the needs for regional representation and representation of substantive 
subject matter or expertise do not coincide. This conflict frequently arises with 
respect to the composition of expert panels for thematic discussions, in subjects 
where most of the available expertise resides in the developed countries 
concentrated in WEOG, for example. In some cases, substantive experts from 
one group have been turned away, even though places allocated to another 
group remain vacant as it has no experts or is unable to reach consensus on 
which ones should be invited to participate. The basic composition of the 
regional groups, which have no official U.N. status, is also at best a very rough 
approximation of the social, political and economic patterns that underlie the 
sorts of crime that come before the Commission. In Commission deliberations, 
regional interests most commonly break down as between the developing 
countries which seek technical assistance and the developed countries which 
provide the expertise and resources, and on other interests unrelated to regional 
group status. States with large coastlines and maritime interests have enhanced 
interests in subject matter such as maritime piracy, the smuggling of migrants 
and some forms of environmental crime, for example, and this is equally true 
for States in Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, or Asia. A further complication for 
the Commission and other U.N. bodies arises from the fact that most Members 
of the Eastern European Group were in the Warsaw Pact when it was 
established and are now politically part of the European Union, the other 
Members of which all belong to the WEOG group. 
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3.  Difficulties predicting subject matter and preparing for 
 sessions in advance 
There is an ongoing tension between the need to maintain a Commission which 
is flexible and responsive to the needs and priorities of the Member States on 
one hand, while on the other hand ensuring that delegations and experts have 
sufficient time to prepare properly and where necessary to consult on the 
positions they will take during the session. Commission agendas include some 
predictable elements, in the form of thematic discussions and standing agenda 
items, which are supposed to be set sufficiently far in advance for appropriate 
experts to be selected and presentations to be prepared and coordinated. The 
other major element is composed of the resolutions proposed at each session. 
These are not as predictable because Member States are free to introduce them 
until noon of the first day of the session, and many wait until the last minute.  
Both of these have proven problematic. In the case of thematic debates and 
standing agenda items, the failure to reach consensus on topics and sub-topics 
in the annual sessions when substantive crime experts are present has led to 
intersessional negotiations among the representatives from the permanent 
missions who do not understand the substantive issues well enough to arrive at 
topics which are valid in legal and criminological terms, and who often do not 
reach consensus on the items until a few weeks before the session, by which 
time it is too late to locate, prepare and coordinate among appropriate experts. 
In the case of draft resolutions, the rules of procedure (which were made on the 
basis of eight-day sessions and not the present five-day duration) permit 
introduction up until the first day of the session, which means that in some 
sessions, texts are not available in all languages until as late as the third day of 
the five-day session, and those which are not agreed in the Committee of the 
Whole by the end of the fourth day are not available in translated and revised 
versions for adoption by the plenary on the final day. Distribution of copies 
during the final hours of each session has become common and verbal adoption 
followed by dissemination of translated texts only as part of the report after the 
session has adjourned has occurred on several occasions. The increasing 
diversity of subject-matter raised by Member States has led to larger numbers 
of resolutions at each session, and increases in the time needed to negotiate 
them. The higher volume of resolutions and the reduction of the duration of 
Commission sessions from eight working days to only five in 2005 has greatly 
reduced the role of many developing countries. Their experts are generally not 
in Vienna to attend the informal discussions of proposed resolutions the Friday 
before each session, and those with small delegations and fewer substantive 
experts cannot attend the parallel informal discussions of many resolutions now 
conducted at the same time during the sessions. 
Attempts have been made to induce Member States to submit texts several 
weeks in advance, so as to permit sufficient time for translation and 
dissemination before delegations are finalised and despatched by Member 
States, but without much success thus far. At the 20th session, in April 2011, 
the Commission recommended to the ECOSOC a formal decision that would 
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require the submission of proposed resolutions a month prior to each session 
and dissemination of all proposed resolutions in languages three weeks in 
advance, and urging the Member States to consolidate and merge proposals 
where possible.116 The strong support needed to adopt this draft decision is 
certainly encouraging, but it remains to be seen how effective it will be in 
allowing future Chairpersons to resist pressure by Member States seeking to 
introduce proposals at the last minute. There are on occasion legitimate reasons 
why resolutions cannot be formulated far in advance, and those which can be 
submitted early may prove less well-developed and require more time to 
negotiate during the session. One example of this is the various resolutions 
setting out the agendas for Crime Congresses, which are usually proposed by 
the host State, but which require broad consultations and consensus that can 
only be reached once the Commission is in session. There is also the potential 
for multiple resolutions on the same subject where the sponsors did not have an 
opportunity to develop a compromise text, although arguably having two 
versions in languages at the beginning of the session may still be better than 
nothing at all. There are also in some cases tactical reasons for States not to 
disclose proposals in advance, and there may be attempts to circumvent the 
new rule for this reason. The major advantages of the proposed change include 
the fact that texts will be available in languages at the beginning of the session 
and that delegations should be better prepared with instructions and appropriate 
experts to negotiate them. Since the practice of holding eight day sessions was 
changed to reduce duration to five days in 2005, informal sessions have been 
held the Friday before each formal session to permit such preliminary 
discussions. Most delegations support this as a useful supplement to the formal 
work of the Commission, but it does marginalise some delegations, as the 
smaller delegations from developing countries are usually not in Vienna early 
enough, and the discussions and texts are in English only. 
4.  Limited capacity to conduct and participate effectively in 
 substantive deliberations  
The purely diplomatic elements of the Commission’s work, such as the 
budgetary and management oversight of the Secretariat, are generally carried 
out by the resident diplomats who represent the interests of each Member State 
in Vienna.117 Resident diplomatic representatives regularly participate in 
oversight processes ranging from bilateral or multilateral discussions of 
specific projects to ongoing processes such as the standing open-ended 
                                                 
116 Report of the Commission at its 20th Session, E/2011/30, Chapter I(C), Draft Decision 1: 
“Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on its twentieth session, 
provisional agenda for its twenty-first session and organization of work of its future sessions”.  
117 Not every country has such representation, but in 2011 about 135 of the 193 Member States, 
as well as Palestine and the Vatican have diplomatic or consular missions in Vienna, and many 
of them have either separate missions to the U.N. and other international organizations or 
mission staff specifically assigned to such functions.  
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intergovernmental working group on governance and finance and the 
intersessional meetings of the Commission itself. This provides adequate 
capacity for the sort of ongoing oversight needed for finance and governance 
matters, and capacity limits, when they arise, tend to be within individual 
missions, and within UNODC, which has chronic problems arising from the 
lack of Regular Budget resources and the fact that voluntary contributions tend 
to be “earmarked” for specific projects and cannot be used for internal 
management and other core functions.  
Capacity to conduct and effectively participate in substantive deliberations on 
crime issues presents a much greater problem. Substance experts must be sent 
from national capitals, which is expensive and diverts them from work on 
domestic issues at home. In developed countries, transnational crime problems 
in general, and the work of the Commission itself usually form only a small 
part of the work of lawyers, criminologists and other such experts, which limits 
the amounts of time available to review agendas, reports and draft resolutions 
even if they are available sufficiently far in advance. Developing countries may 
not have the necessary experts at all, and if they do exist, they may not be sent 
due to the costs, which in turn leads to systematic under-representation. The 
increasingly diverse range of issues that are now being raised poses a new and 
significant challenge. Member States usually send crime prevention and 
criminal justice experts who can address a range of general topics such as 
criminal law reform, crime prevention, juvenile justice or prison issues as well 
as core crime areas such as organised crime or corruption issues, but the 
increasing use of the Commission to take up the criminal justice aspects of 
non-crime subject matter such as the protection of endangered species or 
cultural heritage property exceeds the capacity of even most developed 
countries to include subject-matter experts on their delegations.  
5.  Insufficient duration of the annual sessions 
The 2005 reduction of Commission sessions from eight working days to five 
has significantly reduced the capacity of the Commission to consider the wide 
range of issues within its mandate, and has also reduced the quality of some of 
the deliberations that have taken place. In general, the shorter sessions have 
reduced the length of time available for the Secretariat to produce in-session 
documents, including draft resolutions and elements of the Commission’s 
report itself, in the six official U.N. languages, and the amounts of time 
available for the delegations to review proposals and obtain instructions as well 
as to negotiate and adopt the resulting resolutions. The reduction of available 
time in the Committee of the Whole and Plenary has shifted negotiations into 
informal meetings, which often take place in parallel with proceedings in the 
Committee, the Plenary and other informal meetings. The effectiveness of 
many experts is reduced by the need to negotiate several unrelated issues at the 
same time, and Member States with small delegations are often unable to 
attend informal discussions on issues where they have an interest. Apart from 
under-representation, this also leads to the re-opening of issues when the texts 
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are presented in the Committee and Plenary, often in the later stages of the 
session when there is little time left to discuss them. 
At its 2001 session, the Commission adopted five resolutions, and had before it 
revised versions in languages of all five, including three successive revisions of 
one of the draft resolutions, two revised versions of three of the draft texts, and 
one revision of the remaining text. At its 2006 session, the number of 
resolutions had increased to 14, of which 12 were adopted, of which only four 
were translated and distributed as in-session documents before adoption by the 
Commission. At the 2011 session, 15 resolutions were proposed and all were 
adopted. Of these, only 9 were revised and disseminated in all languages as in-
session documents prior to adoption. Four others were distributed in English 
only during the final meeting, a portion of which was also conducted in English 
only after available simultaneous interpretation personnel and resources were 
exhausted. The remaining two were adopted verbally, in English only, and 
were not made available until the report of the session itself was released.118  
The 2005 reduction of the number of days in the annual sessions of the 
Commission, during a period when the workload expected of it has been 
steadily increasing is perplexing, even more so in the context of a decision by 
the General Assembly the following year to increase the time allocated for the 
deliberation of human rights issues each year from six to a minimum of ten 
weeks.119 The initial proposal was to have a five-day session focused on 
following up the 2005 Crime Congress on an “exceptional and non-
precedential basis”,120 but this was quickly disregarded by proponents of a 
shorter, more diplomatic and less-substantive Commission. Unofficially, the 
justifications tendered by delegations which supported the change were that it 
would reduce the accommodation and related costs of attending the annual 
sessions, and that some of the work of the Commission would be taken on by 
the Conferences of States Parties to the Palermo Convention, which first 
convened in 2004 and to the Merida Convention, which first convened in 2006. 
The treaty bodies have indeed taken up some of the work, but their mandates 
                                                 
118 Documentation for the 2001, 2006 and 2011 sessions was reviewed because the previous 
years in each case followed Crime Congresses and these sessions usually receive fewer 
proposed resolutions. The 2011 session followed a practice which has evolved of necessity, 
under which last-minute texts and elements of the draft report which cannot be translated and 
circulated in time are posted on-line in the draft Report, in English only, a week or two after 
the session. Other languages are posted as they become available and the Member States are 
given an opportunity to request changes before the Report is finalised and officially transmitted 
to the ECOSOC. 
119 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, established by E/RES/5(1) in 1946, generally 
convened for six weeks each year. The year after the Crime Commission decided to reduce 
sessions from 8 working days to only 5 on a “non-precedential basis”, the same Member States 
in the General Assembly decided to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a new 
Human Rights Council, which is mandated to meet for at least 10 weeks each year and usually 
now convenes for three four-week sessions. See A/RES/60/251, paragraph 10. 
120 Report of the Commission at its 13th Session, E/2004/30, E/CN.15/2004/16, Draft Decision 
#1, paragraph (c). 
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are more narrowly circumscribed by the treaties themselves, and they meet 
only every second year, and any reduction has been overtaken by increases in 
new subject matter placed before the Commission. No one who has worked in 
the high-pressure environments of the five day annual sessions could be 
blamed for asking whether the cost-savings to Member States represent a false 
economy when the overall value of the functions and work of the Commission 
are taken into consideration. 
6.  Limited capacity to produce supporting documentation 
 of Commission inputs and outputs 
An ongoing concern has always been the high cost of producing documents in 
all of the six official languages of the U.N. The Secretariat must first edit 
source texts, which must be submitted in a U.N. official language, but are often 
written by authors who may not be fully proficient in any of them. Editing also 
ensures that standard U.N. terminology is used where possible, and checks for 
consistency with any prior texts on the same subject to ensure that cross-
references are accurate and that translated versions maintain consistency with 
earlier versions. Once this is done, texts are translated into the other five 
official U.N. languages, edited again in each language and then printed and 
posted electronically. Often this is done overnight or in the space of a few 
hours for in-session documents during meetings, such as draft resolutions 
under consideration during sessions of the Commission. The cost has gradually 
risen, and in 2011 was estimated by U.N. personnel at between $1,300-2,000 
per page, depending on the nature of the text, the number of words per page 
and how pages were formatted. Concern within the U.N. about the effects of 
large volumes on the quality of information and translation, on timeliness of 
submission and production for meetings, and in various periods of cost or 
budget constraints, on the high costs of documentation pre-date the 
establishment of the Crime Commission, and in 1997, the General Assembly 
adopted a policy that limited the length of documents produced from within the 
Secretariat (i.e., in which the Secretariat or Secretary General reports to a body 
on some issue or process) and urged the Secretariat and Member States to 
exercise restraint on the length of documents which originated with 
intergovernmental bodies such as the functional commissions and any 
subordinate intergovernmental bodies.121  
                                                 
121 A/RES/50/206C, A/RES/52/214, Part B, and subsequent resolutions, including 
A/RES/59/265, Part III, paragraph 4, and most recently A/RES/65/245. Implementing the 
policy with respect to UNODC and the Commission, see UNOV/DGB.15-ODC/EDB.15, of 6 
November 2002. See also A/RES/36/117, paragraph 5 (1981), which calls for reports to bodies 
such as the Commission of no more than 32 pages; A/RES/50/206 (1995) complaining that 
these limits were not observed; A/52/291 and A/RES/52/214, Part B, paragraphs 4 and 7 
(1997), calling for reports made from the Secretariat to intergovernmental bodies of no more 
than 16 pages and for the reduction of reports by intergovernmental bodies from 32 to 20 
pages; and A/58/CRP.7, containing guidelines for text that should be included and excluded 
from these documents to reduce length. 
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This has not been observed in practice, in the Crime Commission or in other 
bodies, prompting the Secretary General to note in 2002 that “... documentation 
had been a chronic problem of the United Nations and that it had worsened to 
such an extent that the Organization was in danger of being overwhelmed by a 
flood of documents ...”122 Targeted at 32 pages, annual reports of the 
Commission increased from about that length prior to 2000, to over 100 pages 
in 2010, with some reductions in the 2011 report and further reductions 
planned for the future.123 While timeliness and other factors are concerns, the 
major problem is the overall cost of production, which continues to escalate 
faster than the U.N.’s frozen budget. U.N. officials briefing the 2011 session 
indicated that new efforts would be made to bring documentation down to the 
lengths of 8500 words for documents originating within the Secretariat and 
10,700 words for texts originating with intergovernmental bodies, with some 
provision for waivers of these limits in appropriate cases.  
While the need to reduce costs is clearly a serious challenge, the proposed 
limits raise fundamental questions about the role of the Commission, its 
subordinate bodies and UNODC. The functions of the Commission include 
mandating the conduct of research and the development of conclusions and 
recommendations, the development of normative materials and the 
development of technical assistance and similar materials. This is done by 
intergovernmental and technical expert bodies, the Secretariat, consultants and 
other sources, usually at great cost, and is only documented and produced in 
the six official languages of the U.N. when it is transmitted back to the 
Commission. Such reports are in most cases reviewed and accepted or adopted 
by the Commission to signify the approval of the Member States and authorise 
their dissemination and use by UNODC and other elements of the Secretariat 
and the Member States, and this must be done in all languages. Such 
documents do not usually become part of the annual reports of the Commission 
itself, but they are archived in the U.N. Official Document System (ODS), 
which makes them available for use by the Secretariat and Member States. 
Since 2000, they have been publicly available in all languages at the web site 
of the Commission, and since 2004, also publicly available through ODS itself. 
While these texts are submitted to the Commission in response to its requests 
and to assist it in its deliberations, much of their real value lies in wider 
dissemination and use, particularly since annual reports contain only very brief 
summaries of discussions. If it is not the function of the Commission to gather, 
adopt, archive and disseminate this content, then the question must be asked 
where, how and with what resources that function should be performed. 
                                                 
122 Report on improving the performance of the Department of General Assembly Affairs and 
Conference Services, A/57/289, paragraph 49.  
123 The annual reports from 2000 onward show a steady increase in length, from 30-50 pages in 
2000-01 to 105 pages in 2004, and 120 pages in 2010, with a further 20-40 pages of annexes 
each session. In 2011, in response to the request for restraint, the length was reduced to 77 
pages, and the Secretariat indicated that further cuts would be attempted in 2012. 
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Similar problems arise with the annual reports themselves. Of the 120 pages of 
the 2010 report, the first 77 pages are composed of seven resolutions and one 
decision of the Commission itself, two resolutions and one decision referred to 
the ECOSOC, and four resolutions transmitted to the General Assembly via the 
ECOSOC. A further 68 pages report on management issues, and only 17 deal 
with substantive crime issues, including a one-day thematic discussion and 
follow up to the 2010 Crime Congress, with the latter also being the focus if 
additional discussion outside of the Plenary and the follow-up resolution 
subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as its resolution 56/230. The 
function of the annual reports is only to document what takes place in the 
sessions and what the Commission actually decides to do with whatever 
information is transmitted to it, and if the incoming information contains 
sufficient detail and quality to document the work that has been done and is 
maintained in accessible records, then the annual reports can be kept relatively 
brief by using cross-references to the materials under discussion, but it is 
difficult to see how they could be reduced to the proposed lengths, given the 
ever-increasing volume and diversity of the subject-matter presented to the 
Commission each year. 
An underlying problem is the fact that the Commission includes and serves 
several different constituencies, who generally disagree on what needs to be 
published and why. For the diplomatic constituencies and functions, the 
priority is to document which Member States have taken part in a process, 
whether they produced some form of consensus, and if so, on what. This group 
also generally sees a need to document the oversight functions of the 
Commission, such as the priority-setting and budgetary information needed to 
justify and account for contributed resources. For the scientific and 
criminological element, the priority is to document research data and 
assessments of crime itself, and the substantive content of technical assistance 
information, model laws or practices and other such information that can be 
taken up and used by Member States. Time and resources are expended on 
disseminating and returning questionnaires and analysing the responses, and 
there would be little point in this if the results are not then placed on the record 
in languages so that the Secretariat and Member States can actually make use 
of what has been learned. 
How the new effort to reduce documentation will play out remains to be seen. 
The core functions of the Commission depend on the use of documents in 
languages as a key input of substantive information for its proceedings and as a 
key output whereby what the Commission, its subordinate bodies and the 
Secretariat produces is actually transmitted to and used by the Member States. 
This means that reducing document costs will depend first and foremost on 
avoiding the elimination of content which is essential to these functions and 
developing some form of process and criteria for distinguishing between what 
is essential and what is not. Electronic dissemination speeds up the process, but 
only marginally reduces costs because the vast majority of these are for editing 
and translation services. Producing texts in only one language (almost always 
English) is occasionally possible in small group processes, but is not viable as 
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a general practice because it systematically marginalises non-English-speaking 
States and experts, which biases the underlying analysis itself. Within the 
Secretariat, the uptake of new technologies for processing documents and 
comparing and verifying related texts, may also help reduce costs.  
7.  Participation of representatives of other 
 intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies, 
 representatives of the private sector and individual  
A further issue with respect to the competence and preparation of national 
delegations is the question of whether individuals who are not members of the 
delegations should participate in deliberations, and if so, how. As noted above, 
non-governmental organizations may seek accredited status with the ECOSOC, 
and having obtained it, may attend the open proceedings during Commission 
sessions, and may intervene on an issue if time remains after all of the Member 
States requesting the floor have spoken. In recent years, however, the situation 
has become more complex, because the broader range of issues and some of 
the effects of the globalisation of crime itself have drawn in experts from 
outside of the ECOSOC framework. The majority of NGOs which have 
regularly attended the Commission are concerned with criminal justice, penal 
or human rights matters, but recent discussions in areas such as economic 
crime, identity-related crime and cybercrime have demonstrated the need to 
include private sector commercial interests and expertise, on the basis that 
much of the infrastructure in which these crimes occur, and other key interests, 
such as the development and marketing of crime-prevention security products, 
are located largely in the domestic and international private sectors. 
NGO and other non-governmental experts have on occasion been included in 
the national delegations of some Member States in order to permit them to 
participate, but this can be problematic for both the experts, who may prefer to 
express independent opinions on issues, and for the Member States, who may 
support the participation of such experts without necessarily wishing to be 
committed or associated with any views they may express. Private sector 
representatives may also be from multinational companies or industry 
associations not associated directly with any individual State. In recent 
sessions, the traditional reserve of Member States about the engagement of 
non-governmental interests has faded to some degree in the face of the need for 
such participation, especially in activities such as expert presentations or panel 
discussions, and in 2009 a formal decision to allow private sector 
representatives to participate in a thematic discussion on economic fraud and 
identity-related crime in their own right was adopted.124 
                                                 
124 Report of the Commission at its 18th (2009) Session, E/2009/30, E/CN.15/2009/20, Chapt. I 
(D), Decision 18/1, paragraph (c). While this may serve as a precedent for the future, it was 
addressed only to the thematic discussion in that particular session. 
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II. Issues related to the contribution and 
 management of financial resources 
For obvious reasons, the management of and accountability for the financial 
resources used to support the Secretariat and its work on crime prevention and 
criminal justice are a major concern for the Member States, and one of the 
most critical functions of the Commission.  
The management of the Secretariat itself is not within the scope of this book,125 
but a number of its financial and budgetary challenges do affect the way the 
Commission functions and the way it carries out the Commission’s mandates. 
The basic quantum of annual contributions and the breadth of the donor base 
are recurrent issues. Reliance on a small number of large donors leads to short-
term instabilities in funding and a lack of diversity in projects, as the donors 
are selective in what they are willing to fund. The preference of Member States 
for allocating resources to specific projects – called “earmarking” – which 
offer high political profile, accord with their own policy goals and are easily 
quantifiable to support accounting requirements has under-funded institutional 
infrastructure and core capacities needed to generate projects and support the 
Commission itself. The lack of stable, predictable funding is also a problem 
within the Secretariat, as it makes it difficult to plan long-term projects for 
greater efficiencies and economies of scale, and to attract highly-qualified staff 
through offers of stable employment in an area where essential skills and 
judgment can only be learned through on-the-job experience. Over the past 
decade, the total volume of work has increased substantially, but the work has 
been funded almost entirely through a rapid increase in extrabudgetary 
resources earmarked for specific purposes, leading to a shortfall in resources to 
support the general management and other functions needed to support the 
increased substantive workload. 
Any assessment of U.N. budget issues (not to mention the work of U.N. 
personnel in actually managing those budgets) is complicated for the Member 
States and outsiders by the complexity of the sources of funds, conditions 
which are placed on their use and other factors. Since the allocations and 
characterisations of work by donors frequently do not coincide exactly with the 
allocation of posts and resources within the Secretariat, one frequent result of 
this complexity is that many specific posts and projects are funded by a 
complex web of resources coming from many different sources, each with its 
own requirements for reporting and accountability.  
                                                 
125 A number of U.N. reports have examined the functions and organization of the Office on 
Drugs and Crime. For a recent overview see: U.N. Joint Investigation Unit, “Review of 
Management and Administration in the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime”, 2010, 
JIU/REP/2010/10. For an overview of the effects of resource issues, see Report of the 
Executive Director to the 2008 sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice “Report of the Executive Director on 
Financial and Budgetary Issues”, E/CN.7/2008/11, E/CN.15/2008/15. 
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For U.N. entities such as UNODC, resources fall into two basic categories and 
several sub-categories:  
 Regular Budget (RB) Resources come from the assessments paid by 
Member States pursuant o membership and the U.N. Charter. They 
are allocated under the biennial programme budget of the United 
Nations by the General Assembly every two years in accordance with 
established specific programme planning and budgeting procedures. 
The Regular Budget resources are linked to specific programme 
mandates, outputs and the related specific posts and expenditures, 
including management and support functions (e.g. IT or conference 
services).  
 Extrabudgetary (XB) Resources come, as the name implies, from 
outside of the Regular Budgetary process, in the form of voluntary 
contributions. The vast majority come from the Member States, but 
the private sector has become a further source since the late 1990s.126 
XB Resources then fall into three further sub-groups, depending on 
what, if any, conditions were placed by the donor on how they can be 
used. 
o General Purpose Funds are XB resources which have been 
contributed without specific conditions and can thus be used for 
any purpose within the programme to which they were 
contributed, although donors still generally expect an 
accounting of how they have been spent.  
o Special Purpose Funds are always XB resources which have 
been contributed either with some general conditions on how 
they may (or in some cases may not) be used or which have 
been “earmarked” for use for a specific project, programme or 
other purpose. 
o Programme Support Cost (PSC) resources. These arise pursuant 
to a decision of the General Assembly that a Programme 
Support Charge of 13% should be charged against all voluntary 
contributions.127 PSC resources are intended to be used to cover 
the programme support costs associated with the donated 
resources themselves, so that these costs will not place an added 
demand on core functions funded by the Regular Budget. PSC 
resources may be used for purposes directly or indirectly linked 
to the contributed resources (e.g. various financial management 
tasks, staff recruitment, project or programme management 
                                                 
126 The 1997 contribution of $1 Billion by U.S. broadcaster Ted Turner is the largest single 
such contribution and is regarded as something of a symbolic milestone. Since then specific 
funds have been established to administer such contributions, which like those of Member 
States, are often directed at specific programmes or projects. See: 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/about.html . 
127 In the case of the Crime Programme, see A/RES/61/252, Part XI, paragraph 1. 
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tasks and programme coordination tasks), but not for other 
purposes. 
As will be seen below, further complexities arise from the fact that the 
originally-distinct U.N. Drug Control Programme and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention were merged in 2003, but are still under the 
political oversight of the two Commissions, as well as the INCB and the 
Conferences of Parties for the Palermo and Merida Conventions. The RB 
allocations have since been merged into a consolidated budget,128 but the two 
trust funds used to account for and disseminate contributed resources for crime 
and drug mandates remain separate, although many projects are co-funded by 
both. 
Three major resource-related challenges presently confront the Commission 
and UNODC. 
1.  The demand for technical assistance and Secretariat 
 services exceeds the supply of expertise and resources 
A major function of the Commission is to serve as a forum to identify technical 
assistance needs and to bring together States which require assistance and those 
with expertise and/or the resources needed to develop and deliver assistance 
projects. Resources are never completely sufficient, which raises questions 
both about the assessment of needs and priorities and mobilization of donor 
resources in response. Specific challenges include how needs are assessed, how 
priorities are set, and how resources can be allocated in ways which take into 
account the views of both donors and recipients, and which meet the 
requirements of maximum efficiency, transparency, and accountability. While 
there are never enough resources to meet all demands, voluntary contributions 
have expanded substantially, especially during the second decade of the 
Commission’s existence. These have provided resources for a range of specific 
technical assistance initiatives, especially in subject areas the donor States have 
seen as priorities, such as corruption, terrorism and transnational organised 
crime. As a result, a number of sources suggest that the greatest challenge is 
not raising and allocating resources to high-profile demands for technical 
assistance, but of funding less-glamorous external work in areas such as 
fundamental reforms in rule of law and criminal justice systems, and the 
internal core management, institutional capacities and support functions of the 
Secretariat which are not linked to any specific technical assistance 
contribution or project. In recent years, the problems associated with a lack of 
financial support for core infrastructure within the Secretariat, from both the 
regular and extrabudgetary sources, has grown to the point where the shortfall 
in core funding might actually jeopardise the ability of UNODC to utilise 
                                                 
128 A/RES/61/252, Part XI. 
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resources the Member States were willing to contribute for specific technical 
assistance or other purposes.129 
The actual increases in contributions for technical assistance work form the 
bulk of overall budget increases in the Commission’s second decade, and can 
be attributed to the same basic evolution which has led Member States to take 
the Commission more seriously as a political body: the understanding that 
globalised crime affects everyone and that providing assistance to Member 
States which seek it is no longer just a matter of altruistic development aid, but 
a matter of direct self-interest. One delegation summed up the basic 
relationship in discussions of the subject-matter of cybercrime in early 2011, 
noting that in that area every Member State shared an equal desire and 
obligation to prevent and combat transnational crime, and that Member States 
in a position to contribute resources and expertise had as much to gain from 
technical assistance as did those who were seeking the assistance.130 This is 
perhaps more evident with cybercrime, where on-line offenders can easily 
exploit any Member State which lacks the will, law or technical capacity to 
investigate and prosecute, but in a broader sense it is true of almost any form of 
globalised transnational crime. In the words of the former Executive Director 
of UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa:131  
“In a global community, to combat crime anywhere requires efforts to combat 
it everywhere.”  
2.  Whether donors or the Commission set priorities, and 
 unfunded mandates 
A chronic problem in the Commission has been the question of whether 
UNODC priorities should be set politically and strategically by the 
Commission itself, or on an ad hoc basis by the donors, through decisions 
about what projects they will fund. Developing countries argue that it should 
be for the Commission as a whole to establish mandates and set priorities, and 
that resources should be allocated and projects carried out based on collective 
political consensus. For the major donors the domestic decisions to contribute 
the resources are frequently based on domestic decisions linked to specific 
anti-crime priorities, and contributions are therefore often donated with the 
requirement that they be used for specific purposes. Donor selection of projects 
                                                 
129 See U.N. Joint Investigation Unit, “Review of Management and Administration in the U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime”, 2010, JIU/REP/2010/10, paragraph 52 and Report of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its 51st Session, E/CN.7/2008/15, E/2008/28, paragraph 
137. 
130 Remarks of the Delegation of Argentina, from the author’s notes, unpublished. 
131 Variations of this observation were made by Mr. Costa on a number of occasions before the 
Commission and other bodies in the context of transnational crime in general and of specific 
types of crime, especially those associated with modern technologies. See, for example, his 
remarks to the U.N. Security Council, 27 February 2010, SC/9867. 
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is usually based on the domestic or regional priorities of each donor and the 
ability to meet results-based management accountability requirements. For 
reasons of both accountability and political profile, projects with fairly clear 
outcomes and short delivery times tend to be preferred over larger more 
complex projects or other work with less tangible or quantifiable benefits, such 
as research work, institutional capacity or core management functions. Thus, 
while recipient States express frustration at the inability to get technical 
assistance or other work done in areas where they are able to secure mandates 
but not resources, major donors reply that it is difficult to persuade national 
governments and funding agencies to contribute resources to work that is 
undefined or not in accordance with national priorities.  
The third variable, the U.N. regular budget, is intended to address some of 
these concerns, in the sense that it is generated from the general assessments 
paid by all Member States under the U.N. Charter, but it has been the subject 
of a similar debate in the General Assembly, and has not grown significantly 
for many years. There the outcome was a decision that major budget decisions 
would be adopted on consensus, effectively giving a veto, if not to each 
Member State, then to any group large enough to block consensus without 
being isolated.132 The effect on UNODC, which is discussed in the following 
segment, is that the portion of the Office’s overall budget which is provided 
from regular budget (RB) resources has fallen over the past two decades, and is 
well below the minimum levels needed merely to maintain core Secretariat 
functions (management, substantive services, institutional support and internal 
capacity-building). Some substantive work, such as the servicing of expert 
meetings, has been done using RB resources allocated for the holding of major 
meetings, but in practice, RB resources are seldom if ever used for technical 
assistance and other project work. 
In the Commission, where the practice is to adopt resolutions on consensus, the 
same problem should not have arisen as in the General Assembly, but the 
practice has been not to block consensus only for financial reasons, and many 
resolutions containing un-funded mandates have been adopted over the years. 
These serve a useful purpose in articulating the collective (and over the years, 
cumulative) political will of the Member States, but are either subject to a 
statement of Programme Budget Implications or a paragraph making 
implementation subject to the availability of resources. The effect, in either 
case, is to make them contingent on either the allocation (extremely rare) of 
resources from the regular budget, or the contribution of the necessary 
extrabudgetary resources by a Member State. Large numbers of un-
                                                 
132 See A/RES/41/213, paragraphs 5-7 and Annex (opinion of the Legal Advisor), based on a 
report of a high-level group of experts dealing with a number of reform questions, A/41/59, at 
paragraphs 8 and 51-71. Generally, the decision involved substantial reductions in senior level 
Secretariat posts, and consensus-based decision-making, subject to the ultimate authority of 
Article 18 of the U.N. Charter, which provides for decisions based on a 2/3 majority vote on 
“important questions” if consensus fails. For an assessment of the 1985-86 process, see Luck, 
2004 at pp. 381-87. See also Laurenti, 2004. 
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implemented or partially implemented mandates have accumulated, prompting 
periodic proposals to consolidate or extinguish them,133 and raising concerns 
that with so many mandates, attempts to focus the work along strategic lines 
are illusory, because the timing of projects is governed by decisions based on 
funding decisions by individual donors rather than any sort of collective 
strategy. In effect, attempts at strategic planning in the Commission have been 
trapped between the inability of the Commission itself to reach consensus on 
what should – and should not – be a priority; the duality of mandates as both a 
general expression of political will and specific authorities that direct the 
Secretariat to engage in work that consumes resources; and the need of donor 
States to link their contributions to work that their governments – and their 
taxpayers – have agreed to support. 
As in other bodies, this issue has led to time-consuming and generally fruitless 
debates in many sessions of the Commission, and so many attempts at 
compromise language in resolutions that the various successive texts such as 
“... subject to the availability of extrabudgetary resources ...” added to each 
resolution eventually became to be known as “the financial or budgetary 
mantra”. The issue also dominated 2007 intersessional discussions of a 
proposed medium-term strategy for UNODC and was one factor in the decision 
of the 17th (2008) session to establish an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group to discuss and prepare recommendations on how to ensure 
political ownership by the Member States and to improve the governance 
structure and financial situation of the UNODC.134 This process offers some 
hope of developing more consistent and coherent strategies as between the 
Crime Commission, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Conferences 
of Parties to the Palermo and Merida Conventions, but it seems unlikely to do 
much to address the underlying problems. Similarly, both of the functions of 
established mandates can be improved to some degree by efforts to generate 
consolidated versions and/or propose the extinction of old or obsolete 
mandates, in the sense that they would become clearer as an articulation of the 
will of the Member States, and that mandates which have been exhausted or 
superseded could be extinguished, but the fundamental question of how to deal 
with valid but unfunded mandates would still remain. 
                                                 
133 The 2008 Report of the Joint Investigation Unit (J.I.U.) notes that as of 2006, 364 UNODC 
mandates were outstanding. See JIU/REP/2010/10 paragraphs 23-38. While the majority of 
mandates requiring some form of reporting had been met, 33% were not fully implemented, 
most commonly due to a lack of resources. A 2006 Report of the Secretary General 
recommended the consolidation of mandates and established a centralised registry of mandates 
to facilitate this. See A/60/733, paragraphs 9-15 and 123 and 
http://www.un.org/mandatereview/index.html. The J.I.U. Report also surveyed those who work 
in UNODC and its regional offices and found that a majority of the people who work there felt 
that the mandates were useful whether implemented or not. 
134 E/RES/2007/12, Annex, and E/2008/30, Decision 17/2 [E/CN.15/2008/L.5].  
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3.  Imbalance between resources earmarked for specific 
 projects and resources for general-purpose, core and 
 programme-support functions 
The allocation of funds for specific projects by donors presents a different 
problem for the Secretariat itself. As the levels of earmarked, special purpose 
and project funding have increased, resources available to fund the core 
management functions of the Office and other work not specifically linked to 
funded mandates have not kept pace. This affects the operation and capacity of 
Commission itself directly and indirectly, and also affects whether and how the 
mandates that it creates are carried out. The direct effects can be seen in the 
lack of resources available to prepare, edit, translate and disseminate the input 
documents on which the Commission’s deliberations are based and its report, 
which contains the texts it adopts and a summary of the deliberations whereby 
agreement was reached on those texts. Perhaps the most obvious direct effect, 
however, is the fact that the duration of annual sessions has been reduced from 
eight working days to five during a period in which the range of substantive 
issues before the Commission has expanded significantly. Indirect effects 
include the fact that, while the workloads of the Commission Secretariat staff 
have expanded, the size of the staff (which supports both the Crime 
Commission and Commission on Narcotic Drugs) and administrative and other 
resources available to it have not.  
A further, highly corrosive, effect is the reduction of substantive capacity and 
expertise within the Secretariat itself. The over-dependence of the Office on 
Drugs and Crime on project-specific funding means that staff positions for 
crime prevention experts tend to be short-term and to change substantive focus 
as donor priorities shift. This is inconsistent with the sort of expertise needed to 
perform many of the Office’s substantive functions, which require a unique 
combination of substantive crime prevention and criminal justice expertise, 
diplomatic skills, language skills and expertise in tasks such as running major 
intergovernmental meetings, writing U.N. reports, and generally transferring 
knowledge from source to destination across geographic, cultural, legal, 
linguistic, and other gaps in the course of developing and delivering technical 
assistance. Staff are usually recruited based on specific skills such as 
specialised law or criminology experience or facility in U.N. or other high-
demand languages, and the remaining elements of the essential skill-set can 
only be acquired on the job. In most cases it takes many years to develop a 
fully-functional mid-level staff member. The lack of certainty with respect to 
posts is both a dis-incentive for promising candidates to join UNODC, and an 
incentive for them to leave for other more secure employment when 
opportunities present themselves. Biennial budgetary submissions are 
calculated in dollars, not posts, but an assessment carried out by the 2010 Joint 
Investigation Unit review shows that almost all field staff (in 2009, all but two 
of 1942 posts) and over three-quarters of headquarters (Vienna) posts are 
extrabudgetary ones (159 of 668 posts or 24%), and that the ratio continues to 
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shift away from the regular budget. Overall, from 2005 to 2009, the percentage 
of RB posts fell from 16.5% to only 6.1%.135 Lacking the time and job security 
needed to develop these skills and expertise, UNODC has tended to function 
more as a technical assistance broker in many subject areas, organising 
meetings and projects which rely on experts provided by donors to deliver the 
actual assistance to recipients. 
Two major factors have contributed to the funding imbalance. First, the U.N. 
regular budget, which is funded by the dues assessed against States as a 
condition of membership under the U.N. Charter, which is intended to fund 
most core activities, has not been increased in proportion to the demands and 
expectations of the Member States in respect of what the Secretariat is 
expected to produce. Second, the additional resources contributed by Member 
States on a voluntary basis, known as “extrabudgetary resources”, must be used 
for whatever purpose, if any, is specified by the donor State, and the tendency 
of donor States to “earmark” funds for specific purposes has increased, 
reducing the pool of funds which can be used for general purposes such as core 
Secretariat and management functions. 
(i) Limits on the U.N. Regular Budget 
As noted in the previous section, the Member States which contribute the 
majority of the U.N.’s extrabudgetary resources have at various times sought to 
impose constraints on administration and management and set strategic 
priorities, to ensure that the resources are used effectively. Unable to do 
accomplish this politically, they have instead imposed de facto limits by 
earmarking their contributions, which means that the contributed resources can 
only be used for purposes connected to the mandate for which they are 
earmarked, and severely limited the growth of the U.N. regular budget in what 
is sometimes described as a “zero nominal growth” policy.  
The regular budget has not been completely frozen, but increases allocated to 
UNODC – notably funding increases to cover the cost of additional posts when 
UNODC became responsible for the Palermo and Merida Conventions – have 
been allocated only as a direct response to the allocation of new and substantial 
work-loads. In absolute terms, the regular budget allocation for crime and 
drugs has gone from slightly less than $20M for the biennium 1994-95, the 
first for which there was a separate crime allocation, to just under $40M for the 
most recent biennium, 2010-11. Prior to that, the portion of the resources for 
social development and humanitarian affairs allocated to the newly-
restructured Crime Programme was about $1.7 million per year, not including 
conference services costs, levels described as “modest in the extreme” 
compared to the allocations for narcotic drugs and other U.N. work.136 This was 
allocated among three sub-programmes: collaborative action against 
transnational crime, crime prevention planning and criminal justice 
                                                 
135 See JIU/REP/2010/10, Part B, “UNODC Workforce”, paragraphs 102-110. 
136 Clark, 1994, chapter 1, pp. 15-18. 
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management, and crime prevention and criminal justice standards and norms. 
The 2010-11 budget included all of the crime and drug programmes, the two 
Commissions, and the INCB, which existed in 1992, but in addition also 
included the terrorism-prevention programme and support of the Conferences 
of States Parties to the Palermo and Merida Conventions. Various official and 
private sources estimate the inflation of the U.S. dollar, in which U.N. budgets 
are calculated, at about 37% from 1992-2010, so the actual increase based on 
1992 values, is slightly over $5M, or about 26%, up to the 2010-11 
biennium.137 In December 2011, this was increased another 4.9% for the 2012-
13 biennium.138 
Figures for voluntary contributions over the entire period are not available, but 
the earliest available levels of voluntary contributions to the Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Fund appear to have been less than $1M annually in the 
early 1990s.139 For the biennium 1996-97 this had risen to $3.1M, and for 2000-
01 it was about $7.6M. Contributions then began to rise more steeply, due in 
part to efforts at resource mobilisation and in part to significant additional 
contributions earmarked for the negotiation of the Palermo Convention (1999-
2000), the ensuing pre-ratification technical assistance project, and the newly-
expanded terrorism-prevention programme.140 More recently, figures tracking 
                                                 
137 Prior to the 1994-95 biennium there were ad-hoc allocations for the crime programme: see 
A/RES/46/152, 47/91 and 48/103 and A/46/6, section 21 (1991, Programme Budget for 1992-
93). In the 1994-95 biennium, the allocation was $15.04M for drug control and $4.6M for 
crime prevention and criminal justice, including the INCB and the respective Commissions 
(A/RES/50/205, parts 13 (crime) and 14 (drugs)). The ad hoc allocation for crime in 1992-93 
was $0.97M for the Commission itself and $3.13M for the Crime Programme 
(A/46/6/Rev.1/Add.1(SUPP), section 21). Terrorism prevention was created and further 
resources were added in support of the Palermo and Merida Conventions between 2001-04. For 
the most recent biennium, 2010-11, the total Regular Budget allocation for all of “International 
drug control, crime and terrorism prevention and criminal justice” was $39.191M 
(A/RES/65/260, section 16). U.S. dollar values are difficult to estimate, but public and 
commercial sources generally agree that between 1992-2010 the value of the U.S. dollar 
measured against other currencies and the U.S. Consumer Price Index decreased by about 37-
38%, such that $1000 in 1992 would be the equivalent of about $1600 in 2010 dollars. This 
means that in absolute terms, the total $19.6M allocated in 1992 would have become about 
$31.6M had the same Regular Budget levels been maintained against inflationary decreases in 
value over the years, and that only about $7.6M, or 19.4% of the 2010 allocation, or an average 
of about 2% per year, represents an actual increase. 
138 See below and First report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013, 
A/66/7, Section 16, pp. 136-49 and Tables 4 and 9 and A/RES/66/637, Section 16, (A/66/637, 
Draft Resolution III). 
139 Prof. Clark reported an estimated total of $561,000 in 1993-93, of which all but $20,000 
was a single contribution from Italy to fund the Rome-based U.N. Crime Research Institute 
(UNICRI). See Clark, 1994, chapter 1, p.18. 
140 See: E/CN.15/1998/10, Annex; E/CN.15/2002/3 (chart, paragraph 28); E/CN.15/2005/18, 
Table 2, and for a description of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund and its 
operation from 1992 onward, E/CN.15/2005/18, Part VI. The last document indicates that total 
contributions from 1992-2004 were slightly less than $40M. Contributions in 2002-03 were 
about $7.5M per year ($14.77M for the biennium), and of this, in 2003 alone, $1.49M (not 
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contributions show a total of $81.3M in 2003, peaking at $246.9M in 2008, and 
declining slightly to $240-250M since then.141 Estimates provided to ACABQ 
and the General Assembly for the 2012-13 biennium were $476.7 million, or 
about $238 million per year. 142 This suggests voluntary contribution levels 
have increased by about 400% since the Commission was established, from 
about $50-60M in the early 1990’s, to the 2008 peak of $247M, and then 
declining to the present levels of $235-40M. 
Since the two programmes were merged in August of 2003, it is no longer 
possible to distinguish between resources contributed for work on drug control 
versus crime prevention and criminal justice, but if it were possible, the 
proportional increase in voluntary contributions for the crime programme for 
the period 1992-2012 would be far greater. Not only were the crime figures 
extremely low in the first years of the crime programme, when the regular 
budget levels were set, but the vast majority of the increases in contributions 
have been in crime-related areas such as transnational organised crime 
(including sub-topics such as trafficking in persons), terrorism and 
corruption.143 As the political focus of the Member States has broadened 
beyond the specific topic of trafficking in narcotic drugs to a wider focus on 
other forms of transnational crime seen as problematic at the level of requiring 
international consideration and action, the allocation of resources to “crime” as 
opposed to “drugs” has reflected this. At the same time, the increasing 
sophistication of criminal offenders and groups, and of experts in the 
Secretariat and the Member States, has also led to a merger of the subject 
matter and the work to the point where the two are becoming indistinguishable. 
Thus, while the overall budget, staffing levels and workload have increased 
four-fold between 1992-2010, the portion of the work, and the number of posts, 
funded from the regular budget, have increased only by about one-quarter. In 
areas of UNODC that are primarily crime-oriented, the asymmetry is much 
greater than that. The majority of work by UNDCP, CICP, and since 2003 by 
the merged UNODC, has always been funded by contributions, but the 
proportion has changed substantially. When the Crime Programme and 
Commission were first established in the early 1990s, it started with a regular 
budget allocation of about $4.6M and voluntary contributions of about $1M, 
                                                                                                                                 
including several contributions-in-kind) was contributed to the terrorism prevention 
programme (E/CN.15/2004/14, Table 2, and E/CN.15/2003/9, Part VI). 
141 Chart: “Funding Trends”, UNODC Co-financing and Partnerships Section, 2011, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuside . 
142 First report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013, A/66/7, pp. 
136-49 at p. 136 (summary Table). 
143 Two areas which illustrate the difficulty in arbitrarily distinguishing “crime” and “drug” 
projects are money-laundering (found in both Conventions) and terrorism. Two terrorism-
prevention posts existed in the Crime Programme prior to 2001, but the subsequently-expanded 
Terrorism Prevention Branch has been active in a number of regions (e.g. Latin America and 
South Asia) where organised crime, the production of narcotic drugs such as opium and 
cocaine and the activities of terrorist organisations are indistinguishable. 
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making RB resources about 83% of the total, although the balance quickly 
shifted in the mid-1990s. The budget of the Drug Control Programme was 
about four times larger and had the opposite proportions, estimated at about 
20% RB to 80% XB resources. By 2000, the Crime Programme ratios had 
completely reversed and the proportion of RB resources has continued to 
plummet since. In 2000, the portion of the overall crime budget funded by RB 
resources had fallen to about 15%. The Crime and Drug Programmes merged 
in 2003 for purposes of RB and other general purpose resources, although the 
two trust funds used to direct special purpose resources remained separate.144 
This makes subsequent comparisons imprecise, but by 2007, the portion of the 
consolidated budget funded by RB resources had fallen to12%, and according 
to estimates provided at the 2011 session of the Commission, had fallen to a 
mere 7% by that year.145 The most recent estimates show a projected level of 
extrabudgetary resources of $476.7 million, with a regular budget allocation 
increased by 4.9%, from $39.2 million (2010-11) to $41.1 million (2012-13), a 
new ratio of 8.6%. Based on the decline of extrabudgetary resources the 
percentage would have been 8.2% without the 2012-13 increase.146 
(ii)  Donor “earmarking” of contributions  
As noted above, RB resources and resources contributed by donors with no 
conditions are considered “general purpose funds” which must still be 
accounted for but can be spent on any purpose for which they are needed 
within the general programme to which they were contributed. The vast 
majority of contributed resources, however, are “earmarked”, in the sense that 
donors attach specific conditions on the purposes for which they may be spent. 
The General Assembly has established a mandatory charge of 13% of such 
resources, which are deducted from each contribution for use as programme 
support costs. These may be used to cover the programme support costs 
associated with the donated resources themselves, so that these costs will not 
place an added demand on core functions funded by the regular budget. They 
may be used for purposes directly or indirectly linked to the contributed 
resources (e.g. various financial management tasks, staff recruitment, project or 
                                                 
144 The fact that UNODC has the two funds requires parallel accounting and audit structures 
and is another target for possible reform. The 2010 Report of the Joint Investigation Unit also 
recommended a merger of the two trust funds for this purpose. See: JIU/REP/2010/10, now 
A/66/315, Recommendation #3 and discussion at Part III.B, pp. 14-16. Apart from 
administrative changes, the main challenge would be maintaining donor confidence, but the 
risk of funds contributed for work on drugs being used for work on crime and vice versa would 
appear to be low, given the degree of earmarking and oversight imposed by the major donors 
and the fact that an increasing volume of the work itself falls into areas which are, if not 
merged, then certainly open to synergies in project development and implementation. 
145 E/RES/2007/12, Annex, paragraph 4(a) (2007 ratio). For the most recent proposed 
consolidated budget see: E/CN.7/2011/11, E/CN.15/2011/11, which is one document cited for 
both the Drug (E/CN.7) and Crime (E/CN.15) Commissions. 
146 See: First report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013, A/66/7, 
pp. 136-49 at p. 136 (summary Table). 
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programme management tasks and programme coordination tasks), but not for 
other purposes.  
Only RB funds specifically so allocated in the Programme Budget or those 
funds available through general purpose contributions and PSC earnings can be 
used for core programme management, institutional capacity-building and 
support functions such as senior management, specialized knowledge and 
expertise development in emerging substantive areas, basic infrastructure for 
field operations, information technologies or Secretariat support of the 
Commission itself. As a result of limits on growth of the regular budget, it has 
not kept pace with the expansion in mandates, staff and workloads in UNODC. 
In the past, these shortfalls have been somewhat made up by resorting to 
general purpose voluntary contributions, but these also have become less 
prevalent.147  
Several possible reasons contribute to the reluctance of donors to contribute 
general-purpose funds. One major reason cited both by the Secretariat and 
Member States is the degree of confidence in Secretariat management and 
transparency. Donor confidence and contributions declined sharply during the 
final years of tenure for Pino Arlacchi as Executive Director,148 and the need to 
restore donor confidence and contributions was cited as a top priority of his 
successor, Antonio Maria Costa, when he assumed the post in 2002. More 
recently, the 2008 establishment of the intergovernmental joint working group 
on financial and governance issues, the establishment and enhancement of 
results-based management philosophies and practices within the Office, and 
general increases in transparency and coherent management of the separate 
crime and drug trust-funds (through which all voluntary contributions flow) 
have all been cited as essential to increasing donor confidence, and with it both 
overall contributions and the willingness of donors to contribute General 
Purpose funds.149  
Questions of UNODC transparency and donor confidence aside, the trend in 
many donor governments towards results based management and similar 
practices has probably contributed to the decline in General Purpose 
contributions more directly. Results-based management structures tend to 
prefer projects which can be set out in fairly concrete terms, with clear 
objectives and clear criteria for results assessment, and which will produce 
tangible results within the accounting time-frames (usually annual) used by 
donors. This means that, all other factors being equal, some types of project 
                                                 
147 Generally totalling about $15M, they declined to $11M in 2009 but have rebounded back, 
probably in response to pleas by the secretariat. See, for example the Report of Executive 
Director Costa highlighting the problem, presented to both Commissions in 2008, 
E/CN.7/2008/11 and E/CN.15/2008/15. 
148 See “U.N. Drug Chief, Under Attack, Says He's Cast as the Outsider”, New York Times, 9 
February 2001. 
149 See U.N. Joint Investigation Unit, “Review of Management and Administration in the U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime”, 2010, JIU/REP/2010/10, now A/66/315. 
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will be more attractive to donors and others less so, and that the sorts of 
ongoing activity which involve strategic planning, specialized knowledge- and 
expertise-build up in thematic areas, the support of other activities, and core 
management not linked to specific projects will be the least attractive of all. 
The practice of “earmarking” has also created a form of donor competition, in 
which high profile issues such as terrorism-prevention have attracted donor 
attention, while less attractive, subject matter has been under-funded, and core 
management and Secretariat functions, because of their general nature, are 
rarely earmarked at all. While not exactly congruent, the domestic political 
priorities of donors tend to cluster around specific priority areas – which 
priorities are not always shared by recipients – and work in those areas expands 
while less-attractive areas go un-funded. Contributions from private sector 
sources were not reviewed, but are likely to follow a similar pattern, in the 
sense that companies or charitable sources will generally support work in 
specific areas or projects of interest to them. Work expands in proportion to 
contributions rather than demand, because the Secretariat cannot transfer 
resources to areas or activities for which they were not earmarked without 
donor consent. There has also been a tendency in the Secretariat to select and 
formulate projects to meet these criteria, even if the resulting projects might be 
less-than-optimal in delivery terms.150 General work on money laundering was 
presented (not incorrectly) to donors as the development of necessary 
infrastructure to suppress the financing of terrorism, for example.  
Overall, the picture is one of a consolidated crime and drug programme which, 
compared with many other areas of the United Nations, is seen as a major 
political priority for the Member States and one which delivers good value for 
the resources contributed by donors, but also one in which the asymmetry 
between the funds available for donor priority areas, other substantive work 
(often in recipient priority areas), and the general purpose funds needed for 
core management, strategic planning, Commission Secretariat and other 
support functions has created substantial problems. Efforts have been made to 
address these problems by enhancing donor confidence and increasing general 
purpose contributions, but the marginal success of these has led to several 
recent proposals to link earmarked and general purpose resources, in the sense 
that a fixed portion of any contribution would automatically be allocated for 
general purpose uses. Whether this finds both political and the necessary donor 
consensus remains to be seen. A better, but less attainable, option would be to 
restore the function of the U.N. regular budget to its intended purpose of 
supporting core functions and allow overall increases with the stipulation that 
they be directed at programmes such as the crime and drug programmes. 151 In 
                                                 
150 See U.N. Joint Investigation Unit, “Review of Management and Administration in the U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime”, 2010, JIU/REP/2010/10, paragraphs 51-56. 
151 Both were recommended both by the Report of the Executive Director in 2008 and of the 
Joint Investigation Unit in 2010. See E/CN.7/2008/11 and E/CN.15/2008/15, at paragraphs 19-
20 and JIU/REP/2010/10, paragraphs 43-48, and A/66/315 Part III. 
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its essence, the policy of zero nominal growth in the U.N. Regular Budget 
amounts to holding some of the valuable work of the Secretariat hostage to the 
legitimate desire of major donors to reduce waste and hold the entire 
organization accountable. While the objectives may be valid, the experience 
suggests results that are equally damaging to donors, recipients and the 
organization itself.152 
                                                 
152 As this book was finalised in late 2011 and early 2012, some progress was finally being 
made on this issue. Following the 2010 J.I.U. Report, the General Assembly requested the 
Secretary General to submit additional proposals for the 2012-13 Programme Budget to enable 
the Office on Drugs and Crime to carry out its mandates (A/RES/64/243, paragraphs 83-85), 
and in August 2011, the General Assembly Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget 
Questions (ACABQ) recommended a 4.9% Regular Budget increase, adding 8 new 
professional level posts. See: First report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 
2012-2013, A/66/7, Section 16, pp. 136-49 and Tables 4 and 9. This proposal was accepted by 
the General Assembly at its December 2011 session (A/RES/66/637, Section 16, A/66/637, 
Draft Resolution III).  
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POSSIBLE REFORMS 
The Commission has a number of different functions, many of them 
overlapping or interdependent. Some are causally related, in the sense that 
reforms in one area will generally be expected to produce consequential 
changes in others. The biggest example of this is the cost/benefit/duration 
relationship. While some reforms may produce marginal improvements in 
terms of cost-efficient processes or results, in general, reducing delegation 
costs by reducing the duration of sessions, and reducing Secretariat costs by 
limiting the production of documents and other supports limits the value of the 
Commission itself. Shorter sessions reduce Secretariat and delegation costs, but 
they also reduce the volume of issues that can be considered and the quality of 
the deliberations and resulting consensus on what to do about crime. Similarly, 
while document translation and production is a major cost, limiting 
documentation severely limits the use of what the Commission produces. To 
some degree, reforms intended to enhance the overall value and cost-
effectiveness of the body may have to pick and choose among priorities, and at 
the end of any reform process, the Member States will still be faced with the 
fact that as a major multilateral body that functions in six languages, the 
Commission cannot be starved of time and resources and still be expected to 
deliver value in terms of quality results. As Members of the international 
community, we get what we pay for, and the less we invest in resources, the 
less we will realise in the dividends of crime prevention and criminal justice.  
It is also essential that, in assessing the value of the outputs of the Commission, 
we adopt a common metric for the assessment, bearing in mind that the 
Commission is a common ground on which different groups perform different 
functions, and that functions seen as unnecessary or inefficient to one group are 
often seen as valuable and necessary to another. A better perspective is that the 
various functions are in reality interdependent, generating not only results in 
specific areas, but much greater value in the over-arching function of linking 
the various areas together. To be accurate and fair, any assessment metric has 
to follow the same geometry: it has to be based on not only an appreciation of 
the various functions and an appropriate balance among them, but also greater 
linking of each function to all of the others, and upon better communications 
and understanding among those who perform the functions. 
Reforms or changes which might address or respond to some of the foregoing 
goals and challenges could include the following. 
1. Clearer relationships between substantive expert 
functions and diplomatic functions 
As the historical record demonstrates, there has been a steady shift away from 
independent substantive expertise towards an increasingly governmental 
perspective on the part of experts in criminology, law, human rights and other 
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disciplines, and away from expertise in all of those areas in favour of 
diplomatic participants who have procedural expertise in representing their 
governments, but not in crime prevention and criminal justice matters. This has 
been a dominant theme in the history of the Commission and will be a 
recurring issue in many of the reforms I believe would be needed to increase 
the utility of the Commission in actually preventing crime and strengthening 
criminal justice in and among the Member States. Fundamentally, striking the 
right balance between social science and diplomacy requires the political will 
in the various delegations and their governments to treat the Commission as a 
policy-development body as opposed to a mere channel of communications, or 
worse, as an international political platform for national positions on crime. 
That will requires, in turn, the recognition that Member States have much to 
learn from one another about crime and responses to it, that the Commission 
has much greater value if dynamic and interactive exchanges among 
substantive experts are permitted and encouraged, and the willingness to take 
the inevitable political risks that the results of research and objective 
professional assessment and reporting may not always support national 
political positions. 
At the level of global discussions in the Commission, the legal/criminological, 
political/diplomatic processes are closely linked, but there is a need for some 
degree of separation and sequencing. At the diplomatic level the Member 
States oversee the operations and expenditures of the Secretariat, set priorities, 
decide which projects or processes to mandate, and then decide what to do with 
the results. The legal and criminological stages of the process are (or should 
be) essentially objective and scientific in nature. These develop the information 
products that political policy-makers need at the national and international 
levels to make informed decisions about how Member States and the 
international community should respond to crime. Member States are under no 
obligation to develop domestic policies based on the results or implement any 
recommendations, but the political pressures that can result generate incentives 
to interfere with the scientific elements of the process by means such as 
defining questions or limiting the scope of the work in an attempt to reach, or 
to avoid, particular results. The development of viable policy options and the 
efficient use of resources to obtain the most reliable results depend on some 
degree of independence or separation between the diplomatic and 
criminological functions. There is a need for mutual respect and good 
communications, but also for safeguards to ensure that functions such as 
research and policy analysis are not subject to undue diplomatic influence so 
that the criminological results on which political decisions must be made are 
valid to begin with.  
2.  Greater involvement of substance experts, including 
 independent experts 
The Committee which existed prior to the Commission was primarily a 
substantive body and composed of substantive experts, who whose separation 
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and independence of the Member States gradually diminished as the size of the 
Committee increased and its mandates evolved.153 In the words of Prof. Clark, 
“... As an expert committee designed to play a substantial role in a highly 
political area, its existence was always somewhat quixotic”,154 and the desire to 
move to a body with greater governmental representation to give the body and 
its work greater attention and support, and its recommendations more political 
influence, was a major reason for both the evolution of the Committee prior to 
1992 and the structure and mandates set out for the Commission when it was 
established. Prof. Clark, writing after the second session of the new 
Commission in 1994, went on to discuss the different roles played by crime 
prevention and criminal justice experts who represented governments and 
independent experts, argued in support of the need for political and expert 
inputs into the work, drawing in part on arguments made with respect to other 
U.N. expert bodies, and closed with the observation that the first two sessions 
were well attended by government experts and that the future use of 
independent experts “remains to be seen”.  
This reflects the optimistic call in the convening mandate for Member States to 
include governmental delegates who would be experts on crime with policy 
responsibility in the field, but even this expert element has not always been 
reflected. Mandate references to “civil society” and other formulations that 
would lead to the engagement and direct participation of independent experts 
has generally been resisted by some delegations, as has the participation of 
non-governmental experts on discussion panels and other such bodies. As a 
result, any reliance on independent, non-governmental experts has been largely 
confined to their engagement as employees or contractors by the Secretariat, 
although growing calls for more effective cooperation with the private sector 
and the highly technical nature and strong non-governmental aspects of subject 
areas such as cybercrime have led to a very slight and recent reversal of the 
general trend.155 The Commission itself has become a completely 
“intergovernmental” body, and as a general rule, subordinate bodies and 
processes established by the Commission itself (as opposed to technical 
advisory bodies set up by the Secretariat) have been exclusively 
intergovernmental in nature. 
The Commission itself was intended to maintain a significant element of 
substantive expertise through the inclusion of legal and policy crime experts on 
national delegations, but has gradually become more diplomatic than 
                                                 
153 A/RES/415 (V) of 1 December 1950, Annex; E/RES/1086 B, of 30 July 1965; E/RES/1584 
(L), of 21 May 1971 and E/RES/1979/30 of 9 May 1979. See also Clark, 1994, pp. 19-20.  
154 Clark, 1994, chapt.1, p.4. 
155 See Commission Resolution 19/1, “Strengthening public-private partnerships to counter 
crime in all its forms and manifestations”, Report of the Commission at its 19th Session, 
E/2010/30, Chapt. I, Part D. See also E/RES/2004/26, 2007/20 and 2009/22, which call for 
cooperation with the private sector and/or the engagement of outside experts in work on 
economic fraud and identity-related crime, and A/RES/65/230, which calls for the ongoing 
study of cybercrime, including responses to it by the private sector. 
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substantive. Meetings which are composed of diplomats are appropriate fora 
for considering matters such as the management of the Secretariat and raising 
and expenditure of resources, but meetings composed of professional diplomats 
who are not crime experts poses a serious problem for some of the policy 
functions the Commission was intended to fulfil. Properly instructed, diplomats 
can effectively represent national political interests and serve as a conduit for 
the reciprocal transmission of crime-related information, but they cannot 
develop new knowledge or policy insights based on such exchanges in the 
same way that meetings composed of substantive experts can. Recent sessions 
of the Commission and some of its subordinate expert processes have included 
varying combinations of Vienna-based diplomats and substance experts from 
the Secretariat or sent from the participating Member States, and in some cases 
the diplomatic element has proven an impediment to any sort of meaningful 
interactive deliberations at a substantive expert level. 
The trend towards greater diplomatic engagement can be seen in part as a 
reflection of the increasing importance with which Member States regard crime 
issues, but it is also due in part to the much more practical problem of resource 
constraints. Maintaining diplomatic participation has not been a problem 
because most Member States maintain a resident diplomatic presence in 
Vienna or cover proceedings from a nearby country.156 The participation of 
crime experts is expensive in terms of travel and other costs and diverts the 
experts from their work at home, all of which are more problematic for 
developing countries and may result in their under-representation. This, in turn, 
has led to a tendency of Member States to rely on resident diplomats instead. In 
one sense, this is a form of economic “free riding” in the sense that the value 
these States derive from the proceedings is largely generated by other States 
which have gone to the trouble and cost of preparing and sending substantive 
crime experts who have the knowledge and background to understand complex 
crime problems and sufficient authority to negotiate effective responses to 
them.  
Such “free riding” is useful for developing countries, who can use their 
diplomats to assess emerging issues and priorities as the basis for committing 
scarce expert resources and identifying the need to develop new expertise, but 
it should not be acceptable for developed countries, who have an obligation to 
ensure that both the Commission and its subordinate bodies include both 
sufficient substantive expertise and regional or other diversity to ensure valid 
results. To a substantial degree addressing these problems comes down to the 
commitment of adequate financial and expert resources, and the recognition by 
each Member State that while the implementation of crime prevention and 
criminal justice policy at the domestic and international level is a political 
matter, the gathering and assessment of evidence and the development of such 
policy requires scientific, legal and technical expertise. 
                                                 
156 Representation varies, but at present about 135 of the 193 Member States, as well as 
Palestine and the Vatican have embassies or consular missions in Vienna. 
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Some ways expert participation could be expanded include the following, 
applied to both the Commission plenary and its various subordinate and ad-hoc 
processes, mutatis mutandis. 
 Ensuring that meetings are of sufficient duration to permit appropriate 
discussion and that agendas, draft resolutions and other source texts 
are clearly identify the issues being raised and are available far 
enough in advance to permit Member States to choose appropriate 
experts and instructions for the session.157 
 Greater use of subordinate bodies such as technical expert groups to 
examine subject matter and generate substantive information and 
recommendations for consideration by political representatives at the 
Commission itself.158 
 Ensuring that developing countries are able to send experts and 
represent their interests effectively generally requires the commitment 
of resources, and in subject areas where there is a long-term or open-
ended process, it may even require support for the development of the 
necessary expertise. This expertise would not only help to achieve 
globally-viable outcomes from Commission proceedings, but also 
would help ensure that the necessary expertise was present in every 
Member State to actually implement those outcomes. 
 Reconsidering and renewing the commitment to the use of “... a 
limited number of qualified and experienced experts, either as 
individual consultants or in working groups ...” 159 in preparing for and 
following up the work of the Commission, and expanding this role to 
allow for the participation of experts who are not members of a 
national delegation in the Commission itself. This has already been 
tried on occasion and has proven effective as a means of bringing in 
non-Secretariat experts to brief sessions or subordinate proceedings 
and in support of panel discussions of specific topics. In preparation 
for the 19th Session, the Commission decided in 2009 that “... 
independent experts, such as private sector representatives and 
academics” could be invited to participate in the thematic discussion 
(dealing with illicit trafficking in cultural property) of the following 
year.160 Thematic discussions have often been plagued by difficulty in 
assembling expert panels which reflect regional representation while 
at the same time covering the range of substance and expert opinion 
on the thematic topic at hand, and by the fact that panellists are 
invited too late to permit coordination with other panellists. The focus 
                                                 
157 See Recommendation 7, below. 
158 See Recommendation 2.2, below. 
159 A/RES/46/152, Annex, paras.24 (government experts) and 27-28 (independent experts). 
160 Report of the Commission at its 18th Session, E/2009/30, Commission Decision 18/2 
“Guidelines for the thematic discussions of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice”, paragraph (c). 
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of thematic discussions should be on the substantive topic at hand and 
the effects of regional representation, if any, will vary from topic to 
topic, depending on the global dynamic of the topic concerned and 
the global distribution of experts on it, and better expert coverage 
could be provided by the assembly of panels based on substantive 
expertise and not other factors.  
2.1  The use of Special Rapporteurs or Special Representatives 
One suggestion that has been advanced on several occasions is the appointment 
of Special Rapporteurs by the Commission or the appointment of Special 
Representatives by Secretary General on the advice of the Commission.  
Properly mandated, such officials could investigate or research any specific 
crime issue and report back to the Commission, but their substantive and 
political viability is difficult to assess or predict because they have been used 
very unevenly – and in some areas controversially – in the U.N. in the past. 
They could offer an economical and valuable new option for gathering 
information, developing global, regional or national assessments or 
recommendations that was mid-way between the political deliberations of the 
Commission and the substantive work of the Secretariat. There is no single 
pattern or practice governing mandates from other U.N. entities, apart from the 
legal, budgetary and political requirements for any delegated authority. 
Mandates can be tailored to suit the requirements of the work at hand and the 
wishes of the Member States. In practice, they must be sufficiently specific to 
give clear direction to the Special Rapporteur and ensure that the work remains 
within the scope authorised by the Member States, but beyond this both the 
duration and substantive scope can vary from mandate to mandate. Mandates 
can focus on specific subject matter over a long period of time, although where 
an open-ended function is desired this is usually subject to periodic renewal to 
allow oversight of the work and periodic adjustments as needed. They could 
focus on ongoing work on a general subject area such as organized crime or on 
a specific task, such as examining a specific emerging form of crime to assess 
the factual situation, the scope of activities of other bodies, if any, and the 
views of Member States as to how to respond to it.  
Equipped with sufficient autonomy, resources and expertise, a Special 
Rapporteur could also prove a more cost-effective means of gathering and 
assessing information than some of the present practices, providing global or 
regional assessments that were more extensive and reliable, and at the same 
time less costly and burdensome on the Member States than the global 
questionnaires presently used for most research and assessment purposes. To 
some extent, such research and assessment must be global and consider both 
common global elements and elements that are different from place to place. 
An independent Special Rapporteur would gradually develop a valid global 
picture, but at the same time be in a position to exercise a degree of 
professional judgment to focus research efforts differently from place to place 
and over time, reducing the demands on Member States to respond to questions 
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that were not important or relevant to them, and focusing efforts on the aspects 
of the problem most in need of attention. A key issue in developing global 
assessments of crime has always been the challenge of obtaining data that were 
valid from a regional and global perspective. The more affluent and developed 
States tend to be over-represented, having better information resources and 
more capacity to respond to requests for information, issues relating to crime 
matters do not always coincide with U.N. structural and other parameters such 
as the composition of the regional groups on expert bodies, and many of these 
issues present very differently from one substantive area to another. In some 
circumstances, the use of expert Special Rapporteurs could also address 
another significant obstacle to obtaining accurate information from many 
developing countries, the lack of centralised data and expertise, by travelling to 
a State and simply visiting and interviewing the relevant officials and other 
sources of information at the local level. This would be a matter of some 
sensitivity for some countries, but given assurances that the basis of the work 
was independent and of a technical and not a political nature, such a 
methodology has the potential to inject badly-needed professional expertise 
and human resources into research and assessment processes and to bridge 
some critical gaps between knowledge at the local level and global 
deliberations in the Commission. 
A number of issues would have to be resolved before the Commission would 
agree to mandate and use Special Rapporteurs. The most critical of these is 
finding a balance between accountability and varying degrees of independence 
and separation from the Commission, the Member States and the Secretariat. 
Other factors, such as cost or cost-effectiveness and providing institutional and 
logistical support also arise, but these are soluble if the fundamental political 
questions can be resolved, and to some degree the development of appropriate 
mandates may permit institutional solutions that could be as cost-effective as 
the status quo, if not more so. A Special Rapporteur mandated to conduct the 
sort of complaint- and accountability-driven assessments common in the 
Human Rights Council (below) requires fully-independent institutional 
support, for example, whereas one charged with largely technical factual 
research and analysis would not. There would be a need for support in terms of 
document translation and production, but these are the same as for any process 
which is mandated by and reports back to the Commission. There could be 
increased costs for travel and related expenses where this is needed, but these 
would be mitigated to some degree by the fact that modern technologies allow 
much more to be done using telecommunications. To the extent that travel was 
needed to gather information from developing countries first-hand, it would be 
justified by the information obtained and the greater depth of input from such 
States into the analysis and reports. To some extent this function could also 
bring added value as a form of assessment, when it was possible to develop and 
deliver technical assistance as a result. 
In terms of both costs and political significance, independence could be seen as 
a liability by the Member States, especially in the context of the monitoring 
and accountability or political functions of Special Rapporteurs to the human 
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rights bodies, but in the context of the more technical mandates needed for 
work on crime, it would also be an asset. An independent expert would be in a 
position to develop high-value evidence and analysis more cheaply and 
effectively than some Commission-driven processes, and while an independent 
expert may not always tell the Member States what they want to hear, the same 
independence that made this possible would also ensure that the Commission 
and the Member States were not bound to accept any recommendations that 
resulted from his or her work. In general, this could provide a means of getting 
a clear assessment of the facts and issues associated with a particular crime 
problem, while at the same time not being bound by the results. It would be for 
the Commission itself to decide what to do at a political level, while at the 
same time increasing the extent to which the ultimate decisions on each issue 
were evidence-based.  
The key issue of reaching a satisfactory balance between structural and 
functional independence and oversight of the work by the Commission is 
complicated by the fact that two very different approaches have been taken to 
this in other U.N. bodies, but at the same time the “special” nature of the 
mandates and wide range of precedents would leave the Commission more or 
less completely free to strike whatever it decides would be the right balance, 
and to do so differently in each case depending both on the factual scenario and 
political sensitivities. Some mandates could be very specific and technical, 
with others more open and potentially controversial, and given the fact that 
Commission decisions are consensus-based, very controversial subject matter 
would likely be reserved to the Commission itself or to other processes such as 
the convening of open-ended intergovernmental expert groups. In some cases, 
the independence of a Special Rapporteur might prove a useful means of 
transferring subject-matter over which there is disagreement in the 
Commission out to an independent fact-finding process to gather evidence in 
the hope that it would eventually find consensus on that basis. 
The vast majority of Special Rapporteurs have been mandated either by the 
International Law Commission on legal and technical issues or by the 
Commission on Human Right and the replacement Committee on Human 
Rights. Special Rapporteurs are appointed and mandated by a resolution or 
decision of a political body, and report back to the body which appointed them. 
Special Representatives are appointed and mandated by the Secretary General, 
usually on the advice of one of the political bodies, and perform a wider range 
of functions, including general responsibilities to function as de facto 
ambassadors.161 All are considered members or experts of the United Nations, 
                                                 
161 The web site for the Committee on Human Rights lists a total of 44 mandates for Special 
Rapporteurs, 35 of them with thematic mandates and 9 with responsibilities for specific 
Member States. The International Law Commission lists a total of 50 mandates, all on thematic 
issues, between 1949-2011, although many of those listed have been completed and are no 
longer open. There are presently 97 SRSG positions (not all occupied), 25 with thematic 
mandates and 72 with geographical mandates. See: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/chr/special/index.htm, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/annex3.htm and http://www. 
un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/srsg/table.htm. 
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and when acting within the scope of their missions or mandates, enjoy 
immunities as such.162 All of the mandates considered here arose from one of 
the two Commissions, but there does not seem to be any reason why another 
political body, such as a body composed of States Parties to a treaty could not 
establish such a position within the scope of its authority if it chose to do so. In 
both cases, the probable reason for appointment by the Commissions is that it 
allows for a broader mandate. The Special Rapporteur on Torture, for example, 
can look at situations that arise in Member States which are not Party to the 
Convention against Torture and routinely does exhort such States to ratify or 
accede to it.163  
In the case of the ILC a further reason is the fact that many Special 
Rapporteurs have been appointed to look at areas where there is no applicable 
instrument with mandates that include both the general feasibility of 
elaborating one and considering what it might usefully contain. Special 
Rapporteurs could be financed either from the U.N. regular budget or through 
extrabudgetary resources, but the practice appears to be the former, presumably 
because a key raison d’être is some degree of independence from the 
mandating body and contingent funding would compromise this – it would 
seem inconsistent to appoint an independent Rapporteur on the one hand, but 
then make his or her work contingent on the contribution of the necessary 
resources on the other. In both Commissions, mandates have tended to extend 
for relatively long periods. At least two former Special Rapporteurs have 
highlighted a lack of both investigative resources and reporting capacity 
(limited length of reports) as significant constraints on their work.164 
This book will generally focus on Special Rapporteurs as opposed to Special 
Representatives on the assumption that Member States are more likely to 
accept and support a process that they create and oversee directly than one in 
which the official concerned is appointed by and reports to the Secretary 
General, but the latter process could be a viable option in some scenarios. One 
possibility could be work which is better carried out on a multidisciplinary 
basis, including both crime and other aspects, as the Secretary General is not 
                                                 
162 See: International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Difference Relating to 
Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 
(1999) I.C.J. Reports, p.62 (29 April, 1999), available on-line at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&k=9&case=100&code=numa&p3=4. See also Bekker, 
1999 and Wickremasinghe, 2000. 
163 See, for example the work of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, which was originally 
mandated by the Human Rights Commission (Commission Resolution 1985/33) and since 
renewed every three years by the Committee (Committee Resolution 8/8 of 18 June 2008). The 
mandate uses the language of the Convention against Torture, but beyond this only directs the 
SR to cooperate with the Committee against Torture. The various Reports refer to issues 
outside the scope of the Convention and regularly urge Member States which have not done so 
to ratify or accede to it. The work is mandated by the Committee, but transmitted to the 
General Assembly as part of one of the annual resolutions dealing with torture. See the most 
recent report (2010) A/66/208 and A/RES/65/205, paragraphs 30-33. 
164 Amor, 1998, at p. 946-47 and Tomas̆evski, 2005, at p. 210. 
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limited by the scope of the mandates of any of the specific functional bodies 
such as the Crime Commission. Special Representatives have been used to 
bring together the security, crime human rights and other aspects raised by the 
problem of terrorism, for example. Special Representatives are appointed and 
funded by the Secretary General and may serve as de facto representatives in 
the same sense as the ambassadors of Member States, or may be mandated to 
deal with specific subject-matter which could include crime prevention and 
criminal justice work. Apart from this, the same essential parameters would 
apply to the mandates of Special Representatives as to Special Rapporteurs. 
The substantive scope of what a Special Rapporteur may investigate and how 
differs from one mandate to another, but in general, the human rights 
Rapporteurs have performed an investigative and fact-finding function with a 
view to considering general concerns, specific situations, cases or scenarios, 
and the evolution of both over time. In the case of rights not precisely defined, 
particularly the economic and cultural rights (the right to education), functions 
have included not only promoting the right, but also working to define, clarify 
or circumscribe it. One described her primary function as “... the essence of 
human rights work: exposing and opposing abuses.”165 A number of human 
rights Special Rapporteurs have been mandated to look at human rights issues 
in general for specific Member State, place or situation, and some have been 
mandated to look at issues (e.g. the independence of judges and lawyers) which 
are not “human rights” per se, but are seen as linked to them by the mandating 
body. They are a receptacle for complaints or concerns, but they may also 
initiate investigations or research and reports on their own initiative, and they 
may seek out or consider sources of information other than the Member States 
themselves, such as academic experts or non-governmental organizations. 
Where an investigation arises from a complaint, the allegations or issues are 
raised with the Member State(s) concerned, and their responses would usually 
be reflected in the report. The practice appears to be that most Special 
Rapporteurs make a general report reviewing the entire subject matter (e.g., 
freedom of religion or independence of lawyers and judges) or in the case of a 
geographical mandate, all human rights issues of concern in the Member State 
or region concerned, but they may also produce specific ad hoc reports, and 
often produce interim or progress reports on ongoing issues. Reports are made 
in writing and become official documents of the U.N., but Special Rapporteurs 
also appear before the mandating Commission to present, explain and respond 
to questions.  
In general, the key function of most Special Rapporteurs in the human rights 
field appears to be one of making enquiries that would in most cases not be 
mandated if the Member State(s) concerned could prevent this, and of 
generating political pressure to take positive measures to give effect to human 
rights or end abuses of such rights by publishing and disseminating information 
that will raise awareness and focus attention on both problems of a general 
                                                 
165 Tomas̆evski, 2005, at p. 212. 
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nature and on specific cases or alleged abuses of rights. Significantly, this 
includes communicating with interests other than the mandating body and 
concerned Member State(s) and the Secretary General and International Court 
of Justice have in the past asserted/upheld the immunities of a Special 
Rapporteur from civil proceedings in respect of comments made to the mass – 
media based on the assertion that media communications was a function 
commonly-expected of Special Rapporteurs.166 In the human rights field, at 
least one Special Rapporteur has suggested that his substantive mandates were 
usually applied very broadly and that a major limit on what he could examine 
was a lack of resources, limiting the work to the examination of only a limited 
number of cases based on the importance of the issues.  
Special Rapporteurs have also played a major role in the International Law 
Commission, but also a very different role from their counterparts in the human 
rights field. They may have specific or general mandates, but the primary 
functions are to focus on law and policy as opposed to facts, and the work 
consists more of researching what the law is, gathering the views of Member 
States on what it should be, and then formulating proposals or options for 
change. Special Rapporteurs form one of three (with the Member States 
themselves and the Secretariat) basic sources of information and analysis for 
the work of the Commission. The selection and appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur is commonly done along with early planning when the Commission 
decides to take up a particular subject. Once appointed, Special Rapporteurs 
generally conduct an examination of the subject matter by whatever means 
they deem most effective, with sources of information including the use of 
questionnaires and other means of obtaining information and opinions from the 
Member States, as well as consultations with other independent experts, 
intergovernmental organizations and the Secretariat itself. Reports are expected 
to contain factual information and substantive analysis, but may also be of a 
more general or explanatory nature, and in the case of interim or progress 
reports, may draw the attention of the Commission to issues related to but 
outside the mandates. In processes where the intention or eventual outcome is 
the development of an international legal instrument, a Special Rapporteur may 
be asked to produce draft or model articles and explanatory notes, or to advise 
a drafting committee or similar body charged with producing such provisions. 
Special Rapporteurs regularly report to, attend and advise the International 
Law Commission itself and have been called upon to appear before the General 
Assembly or its Sixth (Legal Affairs) Committee when appropriate.167 
                                                 
166 See: International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Difference Relating to 
Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 
(1999) I.C.J. Reports, p. 62. (29 April 1999) and Bekker,1999. 
167 See: International Law Commission, 1979, Report of the Working Group on the Review of 
the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, A/CN.4/325 of 23 July 1979, paragraphs 35-49 
(functions and practices regarding use of Special Rapporteurs) and 98 (appearance of Special 
Rapporteur in the General Assembly), http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/ 
english/a_cn4_325.pdf.  
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While the ILC proceedings may be more legal and less factual than those of the 
human rights bodies, they are not without controversy. The Commission itself 
is intended to be an independent expert body and not an intergovernmental 
body of delegates, although its members are selected by the Member States. 
This may accord its Special Rapporteurs an additional degree of autonomy, but 
ultimately the dilemma is the question of having sufficient independence to 
obtain a result which is valid in legal and policy terms, while at the same time 
not being overly-distant from the political views of the Member States to the 
point that what is proposed will be unacceptable or unable to find consensus. 
This same issue has arisen in the International Law Commission, where it has 
been described by the editors of the American Journal of International Law 
thus:168 
“... The Commission, some argued, must therefore choose between the 
desirable and the possible since the proposals submitted, even if desirable, 
would be rejected by many states ... The problem may be seen to stem 
from the duality of the Commission's role. The Commission was 
conceived as a body of experts of "recognized competence in international 
law." Under its statute they serve in their personal capacity, not as 
government representatives ... 
As independent experts, their main task is to prepare reports and drafts 
that (in Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's words) are "accurate de lege lata and 
desirable de lege ferenda." This has been generally recognized as a task 
appropriate for an expert body. The basic objective, however, is not 
"scientific"; it is to contribute to positive international law. Therefore, the 
Commission's task envisages eventual governmental acceptance whether 
in the form of treaty or general international law. The ILC statute and 
related procedures provide for governmental comment during the 
preparatory work and for consideration of Commission drafts each year in 
the U.N. General Assembly. It is also highly relevant that the Commission 
members are nominated by their respective governments and that as a rule 
they are sensitive to the attitudes of their own governments. 
Does the ultimate goal of acceptance by governments require that the 
Commission turn down the present proposals for dispute settlement 
because some important governments are not likely to accept a treaty that 
includes them? It would be strange for an international body of elected 
independent experts to assume that its collective product, based on long 
study and debate, will not be taken seriously by governments and 
considered on its merits. To quote Lauterpacht once more, governments 
"must be credited with the capacity for being influenced by the intrinsic 
merits of drafts as finally elaborated [by the ILC]. Experience has shown 
                                                 
168 Schachter, 1994 at pp. 475-76 (1994). For the internal quotes, see Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Codification and Development of International Law, 49 American Journal of International 
Law . pp. 16, 35 (1955). 
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that governments are often less 'realistic' than pessimism or lassitude 
makes them out to be." 
The appointment of Special Rapporteurs would no doubt raise some serious 
political concerns among many of the Member States in consequence of the 
primary reason for establishing such a function in the first place: to permit 
expert-based research, fact-finding, analysis and recommendations with a 
sufficient degree of independence from the individual and collective political 
will of the Member States. Such a function clearly has substantial value in 
ensuring that analysis was scientific and evidence-based, but this same fact – 
and the fact that it would be so perceived by both the Member States and non-
governmental interests would be the source of significant public and political 
pressure. That it would press Member States and the Commission in the 
general direction of good crime prevention and criminal justice policy is 
beyond doubt, but whether Member States would be willing to provide the 
necessary mandates, financial and other support, and whether they would be 
willing to accept the results at the end of the process is another matter. 
2.2  More use of delegated expert groups and similar bodies 
The primary forum for most substantive expert participation in the Commission 
is not the Commission itself, but the many subordinate groups it mandates to 
study specific subject matter. The use of such groups and scope of the work 
that they do could be increased, and the work could be better resourced. 
Resources are needed for travel of some experts to ensure representative 
groups, as well as for Secretariat support and for the production of documents. 
Document costs include both documents for use in the meetings and the 
production of reports sent to the Commission. They may also include the 
translation of other documents used in the work, such as research 
questionnaires. Documents are essential, both for review of the work by the 
Commission and for use by the Member States and others in everything from 
academic research to the development and delivery of technical assistance. The 
actual costs of subordinate bodies vary from a few thousands to several 
millions of dollars, depending on the size of the group, how many meetings it 
has, the number of languages interpreted in meetings, and documentation 
quantities.169 
The rules that govern bodies convened by and subordinate to the functional 
commissions of the ECOSOC were drafted in the 1950s, and were intended to 
deal with all of the Commissions on the same basis. Different practices have 
developed in the different Commissions and subordinate bodies and the rules 
no longer reflect the needs of Crime Commission or the ways in which 
                                                 
169 A “meeting” is a half-day of three hours. A recent estimate for a further session of a major 
open-ended intergovernmental expert group (on cybercrime) for six meetings over three days 
was about $137,000, including documents before the meeting, production of a report (16 
pages), interpretation in the six official languages and other costs. See: E/CN.15/2011/CRP.7, 
annex XIII paragraph 3. 
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subordinate bodies are actually run. There is need for a review of the different 
types of subordinate body used by the Commission and the development of 
appropriate rules for each. That said, the wide range of subordinate bodies of 
substantive and diplomatic experts argues for a range of options and some 
discretion in applying them, both on the part of the Commission and on the part 
of the delegated bodies and their Chairmen.  
Obtaining substance expertise from developing countries is especially 
problematic. These Member States often lack not only the resources to send 
experts to Vienna, but also the existence of the sorts of experts and substantive 
information that would be needed to determine and effectively represent their 
interests. In subordinate bodies dealing with new and emerging crime issues 
such as identity-related crime, deliberations consist of consideration of 
technical subject-matter issues among the experts from developed countries, 
while attendees from developing countries, if present at all, tend to focus on 
their perceptions of crime and crime trends and on the needs of their States for 
technical assistance. In these cases part of the process is to actually develop 
expertise that has not previously existed. 
3.  Clearer understanding of the roles of the quinquennial 
 Crime Congresses and their relationships to the 
 Commission 
The 1991 convening resolution establishes Congresses as part of the Crime 
Programme and provides some guidance as to how they should be conducted,170 
but there is substantial overlap, in both prescription and practice, between the 
functions of Congresses and the Commission. The Congresses themselves are 
much older, the first having been held in Geneva in 1955,171 and their present 
nature and functions have become uncertain in some respects because the 
earlier ones included substantive and political deliberations and resolutions that 
have been made functions of the Commission since it was established. 
Congresses are convened by the General Assembly and report back to it, but 
while full reports are still generated, they are produced as Conference reports 
and only the political declaration of each Congress is actually transmitted back 
to the General Assembly itself. The practice is that this is now done not by the 
Congress itself but annexed to a resolution presented in the Crime Commission 
by the Host Member State and transmitted to the General Assembly via the 
Economic and Social Council.172  
                                                 
170 A/RES/46/152 Annex, paragraph 29. 
171 For a history of the Congresses see: Lòpez-Rey, 1978 and Clark, 1994, chapter 3 at pp. 73-
80. The Report of the 1955 Geneva Congress is A/CONF/6/1, January 1, 1956. The Congress 
reports are available at http://www.asc41.com/UN_congress/undocs.htm 
172 A/RES/56/119, paragraph 2, subparagraphs (h) and (i) call for a single declaration from 
each Congress, followed by individual resolutions by the Commission. This only extends to 
calls for action, which leaves open the possibility of unified plans of action or similar 
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Periodic efforts have been made to clarify the roles of the Congresses and 
establish a clearer and more efficient process for the elaboration of an agenda 
and preparation of supporting documents, experts and panels for workshops 
and similar preparations and for some form of clear practice regarding how 
Congresses should be followed up. The Commission called upon the 
Secretariat to develop a comprehensive Action Plan following up the 
declaration of the 2000 (Vienna) Congress,173 but this proved so cumbersome 
the question was re-visited again after the 2005 (Bangkok) Congress, in the 
form of an open-ended intergovernmental expert meeting to consider the 
preparation, conduct and follow up of Congresses in general.174 That process 
called for a consistent five-year preparatory cycle and recommended that rather 
than attempting comprehensive follow-up strategies, it should be left to the 
Member States themselves to effectively set priorities and call for specific 
actions by the Member States and/or Secretariat on an issue-by-issue basis by 
the usual practice of introducing and negotiating resolutions in the 
Commission. 
There are several reasons why the preparation, organization and follow up of 
the Congresses has been uneven in recent years. In practical terms, the fact that 
they take place at such long intervals means that most rotational diplomats only 
participate in one, and even within the Secretariat, every cycle sees a 
significant staff turnover, which makes the accumulation of institutional 
memory and the establishment of useful practices more difficult. Similar 
problems arise from the fact that each one is hosted by a different Member 
State, and it is this State’s diplomats who usually take on a substantial part of 
the work in both logistical matters and some political matters, such as chairing 
processes for the development of a draft Declaration in the months before the 
                                                                                                                                 
documents of the type used to follow up the 2000 Vienna Congress, but this now seems 
unlikely following the decisions taken after the 2005 Bangkok Congress (following note). 
173 In 2000-2001 the Commission called for plans of action to implement the Congress 
Declaration at its 9th session, held immediately following the 10th Congress in May 2000 
(A/RES/55/60, paragraph 3). Drafts were circulated to Member States and discussed briefly at 
intersessional meetings and considered at the 10th session in May 2001, but required an 
extended 10th session the following September to finalise the full texts (E/2001/30/Rev.1, Part 
II, and A/RES/56/261). I was responsible for drafting much of the text of the 2001 Action 
Plans. They were for the most part well-received, and some became the basis for a range of 
other follow-up work, but it proved difficult to engage Member States at the substantive level 
needed to finalise the content between sessions of the Commission, and the sheer size of the 
texts made it impossible for delegations to negotiate the details paragraph-by-paragraph at the 
2001 session of the Commission. One of the more difficult segments to negotiate, the plan of 
action against terrorism, was adopted with the rest of the package by the extended session of 
the Commission on Friday 7 September, 2001 and became a significant element of the U.N.’s 
response to the terrorist attacks on the United States that took place the following week. See 
Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its Tenth Session, 
E/2001/30/Rev.1, Draft Resolution II (later A/RES/56/261), Annex, Part VII. 
174 See: Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Lessons Learnt from United 
Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 15-18 August 2006, 
E/CN.15/2006/7. 
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Congress. One reason for the slow follow-up of Congresses is that issues of 
both process and substance remain open and sometimes become linked. The 
fact that there are no clear rules or practices for the preparation or follow up of 
Congresses means that Member States are always tempted to choose or press 
for procedural practices that may bring immediate tactical advantages on some 
substantive issue but set unfortunate precedents at worst, and at best may have 
little value in the search for a stable and useful process for the management of 
Congresses and the development of a relationship between Congresses and the 
Commission that make the best use of political commitment and resources of 
the two as a combined package. A recent example of this was the result of 
deliberations on cybercrime at the 2010 (Salvador) Congress, after which 
Member States wanting fast action on the subject wanted the text negotiated in 
the Congress treated as a mandate and/or transmitted directly to the General 
Assembly, while other Member States, preferring the existing practice and 
more deliberations, wanted the text reconsidered at the subsequent Commission 
session, and then on the basis of this, transmitted to the General Assembly via 
the ECOSOC in the usual way. 
Another factor is that, as above, some political functions originally performed 
by the Congresses have now been allocated to the Commission by its 
convening mandate and subsequent amendments. Congresses are much larger 
than sessions of the Commission, and usually attended by more senior officials, 
but they do not address the General Assembly directly, and actual legislative 
mandates that commit resources and direct the work of the Secretariat must still 
be introduced in and adopted by the Commission, as well as, in appropriate 
cases the ECOSOC and General Assembly. Some of this uncertainty was 
addressed by the 2006 Bangkok Congress follow up recommendations, but the 
remaining function of the Congresses and their relationship to the Commission 
is still in many respects an open question.  
A further factor is the nature of the Congresses themselves. Their size and 
importance makes them attractive as a platform, and they are usually attended 
by senior political officials from a number of Member States, which means that 
a major element of the proceedings and outputs are over-arching, high-level 
pronouncements on crime matters that can have considerable political weight 
but are usually not very detailed or substantive. At the other extreme is the fact 
that the size and duration of the Congresses attract large numbers of technical 
experts on many different issues from the Member States, the Institutes of the 
Programme Network, and other sources. The effect is that the workshops and 
other specialised meetings are often the only occasions in which truly global 
expert discussions of some issues take place, and in which experts can make 
connections among related or overlapping substantive issues. This aspect of the 
Congresses has, if anything, increased in its importance as the same sort of 
expert function has declined in the Commission itself. The result is a package 
of different outputs, all of which have value, but which may not be very well 
interconnected in thematic terms. The Declaration is usually commenced well 
before the Congress and negotiated throughout, while high-level expert 
sessions, other plenary discussions, and a series of technical workshops all 
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proceed in parallel and for the most part, in isolation. The lack of connection 
between the high-level political elements and the technical ones may mean that 
the latter, which contain valuable information, are often not well-known 
beyond those who actually participated. 
Taking into account the evolution of the Commission and Congresses and the 
2001 reconsideration of the role, function, periodicity and duration of 
Congresses, a clearer and more focused relationship between them could be 
developed. This has been suggested many times before, and the obvious 
elements are still the same ones as were considered in Bangkok in 2006. These 
include: the role of the Commission in planning Congresses and setting 
agendas; the respective roles of the Commission and Congresses in setting 
short-term and long-term priorities, including the role Congresses might play in 
setting general priorities for the Commission every five years; the relationships 
between technical work carried out by and between Commission sessions and 
at the Congresses; and the role of the Commission in following up the 
declarations and other recommendations produced by the Congresses. But the 
results of the Bangkok meeting and others like it had little real impact on the 
planning, running and follow-up to the 2010 Congress, and appear to be having 
little impact on the preparations presently underway for the 2015 Congress. 
The reasons include many of the challenges set out above, but more 
fundamentally, the fact that there is no real consensus, or even understanding 
of what the Congresses actually accomplish or are capable of accomplishing. 
What, then, are the purposes Congresses actually serve, and what purposes 
should they serve? 
A useful starting point might be to consider what distinguishes the Congresses 
from the Commission and other national, regional or global bodies and 
processes that consider crime matters as part of their work. Their most 
important attributes are their size, the diversity of participants they attract, and 
the popular, political and media attention they can generate. This clearly 
suggests that one key function of Congresses is to raise the policy and political 
profile of crime as a national and global challenge and to raise awareness of the 
work of the Commission and other bodies which respond to crime. A related, 
and in my view more important function is the role Congresses can play in 
coordination and integration. This springs from the large numbers and wide 
diversity of participants, and it includes integration of crime prevention, 
criminal justice, and interests of offenders, victims, law-enforcement, 
legislative and other interested constituencies not only with one another, but 
over time and with broader developments that influence crime and responses to 
crime or are or should be influenced by them.  
Some useful functions of Crime Congresses that should in my view be 
considered include the following.  
 As noted above, Congresses already play a role in raising the profile 
of crime and responses to crime, globally, within different Member 
States and regions, and within other expert, governance, academic or 
other constituencies for whom an understanding of the nature of 
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crime and the range and status of responses to crime are important. 
There are many ways that this role could be expanded and enhanced, 
and given that the major costs of bringing experts together are already 
being incurred, further efforts might bring much greater benefits are 
relatively modest costs. One possibility, related to the following 
paragraph, would be to include more non-crime experts and 
institutions in the proceedings with a view to making them more 
aware of the crime prevention and criminal justice landscape. Another 
could be a more coordinated and user-friendly approach to collecting 
and publishing the proceedings of Congresses, which could provide a 
valuable record of both substantive and political perspectives on 
crime issues. 
 Given the ever-increasing links between the crime prevention and 
criminal justice agenda and global work on security, rule of law, 
social and economic development, human rights and other such 
matters, the Congresses could be used for a quinquennial assessment 
of the state of crime itself and responses to it in the broader global 
and institutional context. It seems likely that the twenty-first century 
will bring with it an increasing need for strategic coordination or 
integration of crime prevention and criminal justice work with efforts 
dealing with social and economic development; global, regional and 
national peace and security; international trade and commerce; 
environmental matters; population and migration matters and other 
such global issues and processes. The Congresses, in bringing 
together a large number of experts from a wide range of fields with 
high-level policymakers, would seem an ideal forum for considering 
such issues through a crime prevention and criminal justice lens, for 
building bridges and individual and institutional relationships and for 
generally educating others about the work of crime prevention and 
criminal justice experts and vice versa. 
 One of the most fundamental problems posed by globalised crime is 
that the tradition of highly-individualised traditions and approaches to 
crime means that few senior officials understand either the different 
perspectives of other States and cultures or many of the fundamental 
interests that are shared globally and transcend such differences. The 
Congresses attract senior and political officials, who tend to appear 
and speak about policies and positions on crime on behalf of the 
governments they represent, but seldom interact with one another or 
participate in many of the more technical expert and policy 
discussions that are conducted in parallel. This suggests that a 
valuable opportunity is being lost to allow for senior officials to 
interact with one another in discussions that could provide political 
foundations for work on crime between the Congresses. Similarly, the 
potential for using the rich discussions at the technical expert level to 
raise the awareness of senior officials about new and emerging crime 
problems, global and regional trends and other such matters is not 
being realized. 
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 The preceding point is also true to some extent for technical experts. 
The size and profile of Congresses make them the only occasion on 
which very large numbers of the best experts in the world on issues 
ranging from cybercrime to crime prevention and the interests of 
victims of crime all meet at the same time and place. This has 
generated some of the most useful international deliberations on these 
issues, particularly since some of the opportunities for similar 
discussions at the annual sessions of the Crime Commission have 
been reduced since 2005. However, just as these proceedings are 
largely hidden from the senior officials who attend, they are also 
largely isolated each from all of the others. This suggests that a 
valuable opportunity to make connections between these various 
groups is also being, if not lost altogether, then at least under-utilized. 
One wonders, for example, what could be achieved by exposing to 
one another the deliberations or conclusions of groups of experts 
defined by specific thematic issues such as cybercrime or money-
laundering to the deliberations or conclusions of groups based on 
other perspectives such as crime prevention or the interests of 
offenders, victims, law-enforcement or other constituent groups. 
 High-level Congresses every five years can play a valuable role in 
assessing the evolution of crime and responses to crime over very 
long periods, and a review of their deliberations and conclusions 
might generate useful insights in the relationships between crime and 
other global developments from perspectives such as those of 
governance, communications, economics, population levels and 
movements or environmental changes. In researching this book, I did 
not delve extensively into the work or results of past Congresses, and 
like many participants, I have only been involved in four of them,175 
but the occasional glances back suggest that much could be learned 
from past perspectives on crime generated by political and strategic 
factors related to the “Cold War”, the evolution of transportation, 
communications, economic and other systems and their effects on the 
values, beliefs, aspirations and movements of populations and other 
developments which may become apparent only over time-lines based 
on decades or centuries. This suggests that Congresses should provide 
an opportunity for all of us, from technical experts and front-line 
officials to Heads of State and Government to take stock of where we 
have been, where we are, and where we are heading in the future. It 
also suggests, in my view, that the Congresses, those who run them 
                                                 
175 As a member of the Secretariat I prepared for, managed and reported on workshops on the 
Rule of Law and Cybercrime for the 2000 (Vienna) Congress, and subsequently drafted and 
amended the Plans of Action following up that Congress (“Plans of Action for the 
Implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice”, A/RES/56/261, Annex). I 
participated as a Canadian delegate or expert in the 2005 and 2010 Congresses (but did not 
attend the latter in person), and at the time of writing, December 2011, I am engaged in 
preparations for the 2015 Congress.  
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and those who take part in them all share a high obligation to 
document and preserve not just the substantive evidence they 
considered, but the beliefs, aspirations and positions they expressed 
and why. 
 With respect to the following up of Congresses, some of the functions 
described above are too general and sweeping to suggest any 
particular follow-up process. To the extent that the Congresses 
constitute an opportunity to consider the state of crime and of 
responses to crime, merely documenting the proceedings and ensuring 
that the information is disseminated to those who can make the best 
use of it and that it is preserved for the future is probably all of the 
follow-up that is needed. This also suggests a fairly ad hoc approach 
in many specific areas. As one of the authors of the Plans of Action 
intended as the follow-up mechanism for the 2000 Crime Congress, I 
believe that this option delivered more value than many Member 
States realise, and I frequently encounter references to the Plans in 
several of the specific subject areas they addressed. Such a 
comprehensive approach is clearly burdensome, but also useful in that 
it considered subject areas that would not otherwise have received 
such attention, and that it generated a greater degree of coordination 
between the specific actions proposed in different subject-areas. That 
said, the alternative approach recommended by the 2006 Bangkok 
expert meeting, in which concerned Member States would follow up 
on Congress discussions with specific resolutions seems to be the 
preferred approach, and is probably the most useful option. Apart 
from the implicit element of priority-setting, it allows Congress 
outputs which are primarily intended as political and awareness-
raising efforts to remain in the political Declaration sent to the 
General Assembly, while directing outputs which have practical, 
operational and budgetary implications back to the Commission, 
which has the expertise and institutional memory needed to ensure 
that the general political expressions of the Congresses can be 
translated into operational language and measures. 
4.  Reduce the repetitive or redundant consideration of the 
 same issues 
4.1.  Reduce substantive redundancy and “forum shopping” among 
 the Crime Commission, CND, the Conferences of States 
 Parties, and other bodies 
One of the most valuable functions of the Commission is its broad mandate to 
entertain any topic that any Member State labels as a “crime” issue, but this 
also results in redundancy when the same issues are raised in more than one 
body. The subject matter of cultural heritage property, for example, has been 
considered in the same year by UNESCO, the Crime Commission and the 
Conference of States Parties to the Palermo Convention, all in the context of 
efforts to prevent and suppress illicit trafficking in such property. To some 
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extent this may be inevitable, given the different but overlapping mandates of 
each body, but it also stems to a large degree from the fact that Member States 
who are not satisfied with results achieved or action taken by one body have a 
tendency to re-open the same issues elsewhere in the hope of achieving a better 
outcome. Some issues are seen by Member States collectively as being 
primarily crime issues, but for other issues it can be difficult to build consensus 
on whether the primary forum should be the Crime Commission or another 
body.  
At the political level, one option of reducing the duplication of effort might be 
to propose that the General Assembly allocate primary jurisdiction or designate 
one body as the primary forum. At the Secretariat level, the basic functions of 
UNODC include providing other elements of the U.N. with expertise on crime 
prevention, criminalisation, law enforcement and international cooperation, and 
this seems preferable to the establishment of parallel mandates. Ultimately, 
however, as sovereign States, the Member States are free to raise any issue 
they consider to be a “crime” matter or to have crime-prevention and criminal 
justice aspects in the Commission, and the exercise of this prerogative has 
value, in the sense that it serves to raise and identify many issues for which 
crime is one of multiple aspects or elements. Without this function, 
international law and policy development tends to encompass a wide variety of 
approaches to criminalisation and related matters developed more or less at 
random. This in turn erodes the effectiveness of international cooperation in 
criminal matters and human rights protections. The only effective way to 
respond to the concerns that lead Member States to raise the same issues in 
multiple fora is to provide the possibility of a full consideration of the issues in 
whichever forum is deemed to be the most convenient or effective one, and this 
in turn requires the application of multidisciplinary expert resources and 
financial resources in that forum once it is selected. 
4.2.  Reduce redundant review of issues over time 
As noted, the Commission serves as both a political body where the views of 
Member States are articulated in an effort to direct international attention on 
crime problems they regard as priorities, but it also serves as an oversight 
body, establishing mandates for the Secretariat and calls for action on the part 
of the Member States themselves. In most subject areas, an oversight cycle of 
two or three years is appropriate because it takes that long to obtain the 
necessary resources, data and consensus of the Member States on technical 
assistance materials, to develop and deliver projects, and then to report back to 
the Commission with the results. If interim progress reports are needed, they 
usually form only a short segment in a more general Secretariat report, and a 
similar place in the Commission’s agenda. In some cases, this conflicts with 
the political desires of Member States to increase the political profile of 
specific issues by proposing resolutions dealing with them every year, thereby 
triggering an oversight and reporting cycle far more intensive than the 
Secretariat and the mandated work can sustain. While there may be occasional 
 119
exceptions, few mandated tasks can be completed in a single year, and the 
political positions of the Member States on an issue are unlikely to change 
sufficiently in such a short space of time to the point where a proposed 
resolution which does not succeed in one session is adopted at the next session.  
The repeated re-introduction of subject-matter or proposals which are 
substantially the same year after year reflects the practice which has developed 
in the Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Council, in which annual 
resolutions are used as a means of maintaining support for specific human 
rights issues and pressure on Member States who do not subscribe to or follow 
them, and as a means of tracking the positions of various States in debates, 
sponsorship and voting from session to session over time. In the Crime 
Commission, however, it generates costs in terms of document production, 
diverts valuable time during sessions away from subject-matter which may 
actually require attention, and in areas where subject-matter specialists are 
needed, significantly increases participation costs for delegations. A rule or 
practice under which a resolution, once adopted with a two- or three- year 
reporting mandate precluded further resolutions on the same subject until the 
work was completed and reported back could greatly reduce repetitive 
deliberations and increase effectiveness. Such a practice would have to be 
carefully formulated, however, as there are circumstances in which a progress 
report on ongoing work may indicate that some adjustments to the original 
mandate are needed. From a cultural standpoint, this requires either a 
willingness on the part of Member States and their delegations to disassociate 
the fact that a resolution was adopted with the political profile of the 
substantive issues it raises, or alternatively a willingness to commit the 
resources needed for a much longer duration, to permit the same sort of 
negotiations that take place in the Human Rights Council. 
5.  Thematic focus, thematic discussions and the strategic 
 planning of issues 
More substantial progress might be made on issues if priorities were set 
strategically, progressing from one theme to another from session to session. 
This would require long-term planning of agendas supported by regional and 
inter-regional consultations and the willingness of Commission Members to set 
agendas and keep to them from session to session. One way of achieving this 
might be a three-year cycle in which each session considers and adopts the 
thematic topic for the next session, as well as follow up from the previous 
session, in addition to the thematic topic for the present session. The greater 
rigidity of thematic elements of the agenda raises the possibility that other 
priorities may emerge or issues arise that were not planned, and one option for 
dealing with such issues might be including on the agenda a specific item 
under which any Member State could raise any issue and propose that it be 
taken up in the future. This is actually one area where the practice of setting 
annual agendas has developed in a positive direction, in the sense that setting 
aside two three-hour meetings in each session for the discussion of a pre-
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determined thematic topic allows for such advance planning and preparation, 
but recent sessions have led to a pattern in which intersessional meetings 
cannot resolve the details of what will be discussed until it is too late for 
experts to prepare and in which they are selected based on regional 
representation rather than substantive expertise.  
A longer planning cycle might address some of these problems. The selection 
of multiple experts from each region would also, if there was sufficient time, 
allow for the development of a programme which met the requirements of 
coherent and organized discussion of the subject-matter both in substantive and 
regional terms. One possibility might be the setting up of two sequential 
panels, one examining various aspects of the substantive topic itself and the 
other outlining the different regional perspectives on it. A key requirement of 
the Commission is also that it must be able to consider not only well-planned 
and prepared thematic issues, but also that it be sufficiently flexible to consider 
relatively new and emerging issues for which a similar degree of planning will 
not usually be possible. One way to do this might be to create a specific agenda 
item under which the floor was open to interventions and documents raising 
new and emerging issues or any issues a Member State chose to address. 
Providing a set time for this might also reduce the tendency of Member States 
to intervene in discussions where the subject matter may be less appropriate. 
Member States wishing to raise new issues would not need to provide advance 
notification, but would have some incentive to do so, in the sense that this 
would allow other States to consider the issue in advance, to include experts or 
provide instructions, and to intervene on it if they chose. 
6.  Better use of existing resources: more use of the 
 Institutes of the Programme Network 
The Programme Network Institutes have historically played a substantial role 
in organizing expert meetings and marshalling both governmental and 
independent expert resources, especially in the Crime Congresses. This 
function had extended to the organization of side-meetings and expert briefings 
on specific issues and on the work of the Institutes themselves during annual 
sessions of the Commission, but this has been all but eliminated by the 
reduction in the duration of Commission sessions. Increasingly, there is no 
space for such meetings, and as a result of the reduction in time, national 
delegates are too busy to attend the few that are still held, and this is even more 
true for delegates from Member States who cannot afford to send large 
delegations. The Institutes comprise an extremely cost-effective means of 
obtaining a more extensive and diverse range of expert input into the 
proceedings of the Commission itself, as well as a wide range of subordinate 
and informal processes that serve to collect, filter and transmit information into 
those proceedings via the Secretariat, documentary reports and various national 
delegations. This book is an example of this function. They have also served as 
a useful means whereby Member States can direct resources into various 
Commission and UNODC processes and projects. As with other independent 
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sources, they also provide sufficient distance from governments and 
delegations to allow for diversity of expertise and policy perspectives while 
reducing the political risks and concerns for the Member States, who are free to 
disregard evidence, views, conclusions or recommendations with which they 
disagree. 
7.  Increase capacity by increasing the duration of annual 
 sessions 
The 2005 reduction from eight working days to only five has clearly reduced 
the costs to delegations to some degree, and is popular with many developing 
countries as a result, but it has also drastically reduced the capacity of the 
Commission to consider substantive subject-matter and has reduced the quality 
of its deliberations and outputs. Perhaps the greatest concern, however, is that 
it has stripped the Commission of much of its actual and potential value to the 
Member States, a development that could lead to a downward spiral in which, 
as the value of its work decreases, it attracts constantly-diminishing financial 
and intellectual resources and Member States gradually turn their attention 
more in the direction of unilateralism and of subject-specific bodies that lack 
the global, strategic and multidisciplinary dimensions that the Commission is 
capable of delivering.  
The lack of time has discouraged many substance experts from attending, and 
made it necessary for delegations to send generalists as opposed to specialists, 
in order to represent their interests in parallel discussion of several (in some 
sessions as many as 15) different draft resolutions at the same time. It has 
marginalised the personnel and work of the Programme Network Institutes, 
because delegates are now too busy negotiating resolutions to participate in the 
meetings they organise to explore new topics and engage non-governmental 
sources. It has also aggravated long-standing problems of document translation 
by reducing the time available to translate negotiated texts in-session before 
they are adopted at the end. Perhaps the greatest loss of value, however, has 
been the less-quantifiable loss of opportunities for informal discussions among 
experts who assemble only once each year.  
The present policy is to fix the duration of sessions in proportion to the agenda, 
but this is impossible on a year-to-year basis because of the long lead times 
needed to plan sessions, and the fact that any delegation which opposes a 
longer duration for any reason, whether the cost of participation or tactical 
considerations related to some specific agenda proposal, can block consensus 
on a decision to extend the duration. The expansion of subject matter before the 
Commission in recent sessions has made it clear that, at least as a general rule, 
sessions of only five working days are not sufficient. The appropriate response 
is to restore the eight day sessions originally mandated by ECOSOC in 1993, 
and to periodically review the duration to assess whether it should be increased 
further depending on demand. 
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8.  Budgetary reform options 
At present, the work of the Commission and the UNODC are funded by two 
essentially-independent processes and some form of linkage is needed. The 
regular budget (RB) process has created something in the nature of a zero-sum 
game in which RB resources for UNODC can only be increased if cuts are 
made somewhere else, and both Member States and Secretariat insiders have 
become very adept at protecting vested interests. One possible solution might 
be to link the RB allocation of various elements of the Secretariat to levels of 
extrabudgetary (XB) funding, effectively establishing an appropriate ratio of 
RB to XB resources, and then automatically increasing the RB levels needed to 
manage XB – funded activities in proportion to increases in those activities 
themselves. Another approach might be to undertake a comprehensive review 
of all posts within UNODC, designate all but project-specific and temporary or 
term-limited posts as RB posts and then re-adjust the Programme Budget 
accordingly, which would significantly increase the regular budget allocation 
and change the ratio of XB to RB – funded posts. In effect, if the Member 
States individually regard the problems of crime, drugs, corruption and 
terrorism as being of sufficient importance to warrant contributing additional 
funds to the programmes, then they should be collectively prepared to support 
parallel RB increases to maintain the infrastructure that carries out the work 
they mandate. Other reforms that have been proposed elsewhere involve 
greater integration of the crime and drug programmes, up to and including 
proposals to merge the two trust funds and the two Commissions. While those 
might achieve some modest efficiency increases, the intention behind most is 
to enhance transparency and oversight, not to increase resources overall, and 
the fact that many Member States treat these four issues differently, including 
in the calculation and evaluation of aid donations, might increase complexity 
rather than decreasing it. 
9.  Establish criteria and a practice governing the choice of 
 body to which resolutions of the Commission should be 
 addressed 
Another effect of the discrepancy between the political and technical functions 
of the Commission and the resolutions it adopts is that Member States often 
seek to address resolutions to the General Assembly in search of political 
profile for the issues addressed, when the technical mandates created by the 
resolutions do not require approval by the General Assembly. Conversely, 
resolutions which did require this approval for legal or technical reasons have 
on occasion been blocked either by Member States seeking to reduce political 
profile or in an attempt to reduce document volumes and agenda demands in 
the proceedings of ECOSOC and the General Assembly. Efficiencies could be 
accomplished with little loss of substantive value if Member States were to find 
consensus on what sorts of subject matter require the attention of ECOSOC and 
the General Assembly and then apply them to limit the unnecessary onward 
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referral of resolutions. Based on past practice, criteria for reference to the 
ECOSOC or General Assembly could include the following. 
 Whether the subject matter concerns other United Nations entities 
or is addressed to such entities. Most of the ongoing discussion of 
U.N. reforms includes the need for greater horizontality, and ensuring 
that subject-matter which raises issues within the mandates of more 
than one body is brought to the attention of any and all appropriate 
bodies. This is particularly important with subject matter such as 
human rights and crime prevention and criminal justice, which are 
cross-cutting and frequently raise such issues. In some cases 
delegations may propose resolutions which actually address other 
bodies, calling for coordinated action. In such cases, it may be 
necessary to transmit some resolutions to the ECOSOC or General 
Assembly to ensure that they are transmitted to or formally brought to 
the attention of all appropriate bodies. An additional element of such 
resolutions could be content calling on the General Assembly to 
designate a focal point or forum for consideration of an issue and then 
set out the respective roles of other political bodies and elements of 
the Secretariat. A common challenge in building consensus in such 
cases will be deciding whether an issue should be dealt with 
thematically, in mandates addressing criminal and non-criminal 
aspects together (e.g. protection of the environment), or whether it is 
sufficiently serious to be treated as a predominantly crime prevention 
and criminal justice issue (e.g., trafficking in persons). 
 Where the authority or mandate sought is outside of the authority of 
the Commission or requires consideration by the U.N. membership 
as a whole. While it is logical that the Commission itself should 
direct work specifically within the area of crime prevention and 
criminal justice, some crime-related mandates require higher 
authority and a broader consensus among the Member States of the 
U.N. as a whole. The most significant recent examples include 
A/RES/53/111 and A/RES/56/260, which mandated and convened the 
open-ended intergovernmental Ad Hoc Committees of the General 
Assembly, which negotiated the 2000 and 2003 Conventions. Those 
involved subject matter developed in the Commission, but called for 
the establishment of a negotiation process open to all Member States 
in order to produce global legal instruments. Such negotiations had to 
be conducted by the General Assembly, and it was therefore 
necessary for them also to be conducted under a mandate established 
by it.  
 Where the issues raised or action requested affected the mandate or 
functioning of the Commission itself. Arguably, such proposals 
represent a special case of the previous category, as the basic subject-
matter mandate of the Commission was established by the ECOSOC 
at the direction of the General Assembly, and under the ECOSOC 
Rules of Procedure amendments, exceptions or modifications of those 
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Rules as they apply to the Commission can only be adopted by the 
ECOSOC itself. This is also logical, since such changes can affect the 
interests of the U.N. Member States as a whole (and in some cases 
other functional Commissions) and not just those which happen to be 
Members of the Commission at the time any changes or modifications 
might be proposed. Some of the need for the referral of resolutions 
and decisions to the ECOSOC might be alleviated by the 
development of Rules specific to the Crime Commission and the 
delegation of authority to amend them to the Commission itself. The 
Rules were originally developed by the first sessions of the ECOSOC 
on the assumption that a number of similar functional Commissions 
similar to the Human Rights Commission would be established, but 
the reality has been more episodic and a range of different practices 
appears to have evolved in each commission in accordance with its 
needs. This has caused problems on occasion when delegates 
experienced in the practices of one body seek to apply them in 
another. After 20 years of experience, it may be time to consider 
modernising the rules for the Commission and its subordinate bodies, 
and to do so in collaboration with the ECOSOC, but at the level of the 
Commission itself.  
 Where there are implications for the United Nations Regular 
Budget. As noted, budgetary authority over the Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Fund now vests in the Commission itself, but any 
proposal that would draw on RB resources has implications for the 
U.N. as a whole, and given the current inability to increase the overall 
budget, entails a loss by some other U.N. agency or programme. 
General Assembly resolutions are therefore needed for changes which 
have Programme Budget Implications, to ensure review by the Fifth 
Committee of the General Assembly and its subordinate body, the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions 
(ACABQ).  
 Where the ECOSOC or General Assembly has directed the 
Commission to report back. It is always open to the General 
Assembly itself, having become seized of specific subject-matter, to 
choose to remain so, and accordingly direct subordinate bodies to 
carry out certain courses of action and report back in due course. A 
number of examples of such resolutions can be found in the recent 
past. Resolutions dealing with the quinquennial Crime Congresses, 
which are convened by the General Assembly take this form.  
 Subject matter or procedural elements affecting the UNODC as a 
whole. With the 2003 merger of the Secretariat and the establishment 
of the Conferences of States Parties, UNODC is now under the 
oversight of five separate bodies of Member States. Where subject 
matter significantly affects the mandates of more than one of these 
bodies, approval by the ECOSOC may in some circumstances be 
needed. That said, the Secretariats, and in many cases members of 
national delegations, are the same for the various bodies, and 
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coordination has gradually improved since the 2003 Secretariat 
merger and the establishment of new posts to support the two 
Conferences. The emerging practice is now to adopt coordinated or 
parallel resolutions in the two Commissions, which may make referral 
to the ECOSOC unnecessary, or where its approval is needed, the 
referral of single joint resolution. The open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on financial and budgetary questions (“Fin-Gov”) was 
established by both Commissions and current practice is to hold 
coordinated extended sessions of the Crime Commission and CND 
each December to adopt a joint budget. Coordination with the two 
treaty Conferences has been more ad hoc, but overlapping subject-
matter is commonly referred back and forth, thus far without major 
problems. This suggests that referral to ECOSOC, and in the case of 
some treaty issues, to the General Assembly, will only be needed on 
rare occasions where the different political bodies disagree. 
 The creation of new treaties or the amendment or expansion of the 
existing treaties. This is clearly a matter for the General Assembly, 
but how such proposals should be considered and referred upward 
depends on the exact nature of the proposal in each case. The 
Conferences have the authority to consider and refer proposals that 
affect or depend on the existing instruments, such as amendments, 
and in the case of the Palermo Convention, proposals for further 
protocols, but not subject matter outside of this scope. This means 
that proposals to develop new international legal instruments dealing 
with crime should be first made in the Crime Commission. If it 
determines that an instrument is needed and that it falls outside of the 
scope of the existing treaties, it would refer the matter to the General 
Assembly via the ECOSOC in the same way as was done for the two 
previous Conventions in 1999 and 2001. If the Commission decided 
that the subject matter was within the scope of a Convention, and 
hence within the mandate of its Conference, it should then refer the 
matter there, on the basis that only the existing States Parties can 
decide whether an amendment or further Protocol was needed. 
Process aside, this may also be a substantive determination. In the 
case of the Palermo Convention and Conference, for example, it 
would require the assessment that the subject-matter predominantly 
involved the activities of “organized criminal groups” within the 
scope of the Convention. The possibility exists that one of the 
Conferences could decide unilaterally to negotiate amendments, but 
this seems unlikely in any major issue of substance, as the non-Party 
States might wish to propose or consider the option of a separate 
instrument to make it possible to ratify or accede to the proposed new 
instrument without joining the existing one. In default of consensus, 
any Member State can propose the elaboration of a new instrument 
directly in the General Assembly, but this seems unlikely to succeed 
if there is no expert assessment or building of consensus first at a 
lower level. 
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10.  Greater focus on research 
The past practice of the Commission has been to measure success based on 
legislative or quasi-legislative products, ranging from the standards and norms 
and the many ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions produced over the 
years to the binding legal instruments of 2000 and 2003. This has tended to 
under-estimate the value of basic research to the Member States, who in turn 
have been reluctant to contribute resources both for general research capacity 
and for specific projects. The Commission and its Secretariat are in a unique 
position to gather and analyze data and disseminate results and 
recommendations to the Member States, particularly in the emerging areas of 
transnational crime, which are generally beyond the reach of nationally-based 
governmental and non-governmental researchers. As both crime and the 
interests it affects globalise, such research becomes increasingly essential to 
developing an accurate qualitative and quantitative evidence base at the global 
level.  
As the precedent of trafficking in narcotic drugs demonstrates, it is impossible 
for any single Member State acting alone to accurately assess any of the 
expanding forms of transnational crime, and interconnectedness makes 
attempts to study and respond to the problem at the national level ineffective at 
best, and at worst, dangerous. Examining a global crime problem requires not 
only a consideration of how the problem manifests itself in each affected 
Member State and region, but also how these are connected, and how both 
crime and the possible responses to it affect other interests. Anti-crime efforts 
focused on one State may simply displace the problem to another State, for 
example, or may be effective in suppressing the crime problem, but cause 
unacceptable or disproportionate social, security, human rights or other effects. 
Before generating pressure or providing assistance to target a specific crime 
problem, it is prudent, to say the least, to gain a solid understanding of the 
context in which the problem arises and the potential consequences of various 
actions against it.  
Crime research is sensitive in many States because it has the potential to 
contradict or undercut politically-based policies and positions, and this is 
equally true at the international level, making many delegations reluctant to 
support research mandates and resources in the Commission. Added to this is 
the problem that the value of such research is concealed and difficult to 
establish in advance, since there is often no policy justification until the 
research itself suggests a direction based on what is observed, and since some 
research is needed simply to provide a factual context against which specific 
crime problems and trends can be established geographically and/or over time. 
Further problems include the difficulty in getting an accurate assessment or 
data on crime in most developing countries, which are often the places for 
which it is most needed, and the need for the generation of data about social 
and other non-criminal factors to provide an analytical context. 
The assembly and analysis of data by UNODC under mandates from the 
Commission has substantial potential to assist Member States in developing 
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forward-looking and mutually-coherent criminal justice policies, and to better 
integrate anti-crime efforts with those intended to address narcotic drugs and 
other social problems. Targeted research also has substantial potential in many 
developing countries where domestic research capacity is limited. Proposals to 
develop a World Crime Report similar to the annual report produced on 
narcotic drugs issues have not been supported by Member States, who saw a 
comprehensive assessment of all crime as overbroad, not an effective use of 
limited resources, and a potentially enormous demand on governments, which 
would have to be the primary sources of the information needed to produce 
such a report. Clearly this will be a major undertaking, but such an effort will 
ultimately have to be undertaken as the convergence of various crime issues 
and among crime, drugs and other issues makes the policy landscape more 
complex. This may still be some time off, but in the meantime there is both a 
need and some support for more focused research in accordance with the needs 
of the Commission from session to session. The establishment of data storage, 
analysis and retrieval systems would also help to make better use of the data 
which is obtained. 
11.  Information gathering and “questionnaire fatigue” 
Member States frequently complain about the amount of work required to 
complete the research questionnaires disseminated by UNODC under 
Commission mandates, and have established a policy of requiring a formal 
mandate to provide the resources and authority to survey the Member States 
and generally limiting the number of such mandates it adopts. Given the extent 
of the information needed and the difficulty in gathering and reporting it in 
each Member State, there is probably no way to make any radical reforms 
without compromising the integrity and basic utility of the research. It may, 
however, be possible to reduce the workload by making it possible for Member 
States to respond electronically, and to make better use of the information 
provided by developing an integrated data-base so that actual responses are 
retained and not just the reports prepared based on those responses. 
Information gathered about the levels of economic crimes such as fraud might 
well prove relevant to future work on money-laundering for example. A 
software application has been developed as the primary tool for States Parties 
to the two Conventions to respond to the requests of the Conferences for 
information, and the expansion of this or the development of a similar tool for 
more general information-gathering could be considered. The consolidation of 
all information gathered into a single accessible resource would be a useful and 
substantial step forward, but would require political consensus, as some of the 
information provided pursuant to the Convention is regarded as confidential by 
the States Parties which provided it. Another possible means of reducing the 
demand on Member States, and especially those with limited information 
resources and response capacity, the use of Special Rapporteurs, is discussed 
above. While not necessarily appropriate for all issues, a short visit to a 
Member State by a Special Rapporteur with expertise on a particular issue and 
who could discuss it with appropriate officials and front-line enforcement, 
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judicial, prison or other officials could be a means of getting accurate and 
valuable information that could not otherwise be obtained at all, at a relatively 
low cost to the State in terms of effort and the diversion of personnel from their 
normal duties. Meeting with political and other high-level officials, a Special 
Rapporteur might also be able to articulate the State`s concerns, technical 
assistance needs and other critical interests far more effectively that 
questionnaires or other more generalised and less human information-gathering 
methods. 
12.  Limiting the scope of issues that can be dealt with 
 intersessionally 
As noted above, there is a need to ensure that the expert basis of the 
Commission is maintained. An essential element of substantive expertise is lost 
at the intersessional meetings, which due to their short (usually only three 
hours) duration are attended only by representatives from the permanent 
missions in Vienna. The Commission plenary should refrain from delegating 
substantive matters, such as the setting of future agendas, to the intersessional 
meetings. Similar concerns arise with respect to the recent practice of holding 
reconvened joint or serial sessions of the Commission and CND each 
December and of other proceedings which are conducted in Vienna under ad 
hoc or standing mandates, such as the Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Finance and Governance which has been meeting since 2007. These functions 
are essential to the coordination of the two Commissions and the financial and 
other oversight of the secretariat, but their nature and short duration effectively 
excludes the participation of crime experts, especially those from developing 
countries and from non-European countries due to the high proportional costs 
of travel to Vienna. For this reason their mandates should be strictly limited to 
management, oversight and similar functions, for which Member States are 
adequately represented by their resident diplomats. The Commission should 
not delegate to such bodies authority to consider substantive crime issues or to 
set substantive or thematic priorities, nor should it permit them to do so. 
13.  The advance submission and release of documents  
Informed discussion of documents at the Commission requires that Member 
States have access to them far enough in advance to determine national 
positions on any issues raised and to identify appropriate experts to attend as 
delegates. There have been frequent complaints that documents generated by 
the Secretariat, including annotated agendas and reports of the Secretary 
General on technical issues have not been produced and disseminated far 
enough in advance. Reasons for this include a lack of resources for UNOV’s 
document processing unit, which serves all of the major meetings held in 
Vienna, including those of the Commission, the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, the nuclear entities (CTBTO and IAEA) and a substantial portion of the 
work of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL, late 
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completion of drafting by Secretariat staff, and in many cases, late submission 
of information such as responses to questionnaires by the Member States 
themselves. Under ECOSOC rules, there is no requirement to submit draft 
resolutions more than 24 hours in advance, and Commission delegations often 
do not submit these until immediately before, or even during, the sessions.176 
There is no power for Chairmen or the Bureau to rule such submissions out of 
order, but the development of a practice whereby such resolutions would be 
given only a preliminary discussion and then deferred until the next session 
could be established, if sufficient numbers of States so desired. Amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure to empower Chairmen to make such rulings, where 
appropriate, are possible, but would require the adoption of the necessary rules 
by the ECOSOC. Rule 27, paragraph 1 of the ECOSOC Rules of Procedure177 
provide that, unless otherwise specified, ECOSOC’s own rules apply to 
subordinate bodies such as the Commission, and Rule 27, paragraph 2 provides 
that any further rules of procedure for subordinate bodies must be adopted by 
(but not applicable to) the ECOSOC itself. 
14.  The size of documents before the Commission 
Proposals to reduce costs by limiting the size and amount of duplication in 
documentation before U.N. bodies have been before the United Nations for a 
decade or more.178 Essentially the policy is to impose limits on texts prepared 
by the Secretariat, and guidelines suggesting limits on texts prepared by the 
Member States or intergovernmental processes. Drafting practices within the 
U.N. have tended towards extensive repetition of preceding texts in order to 
ensure that delegates considering a document are fully informed. This reflects 
the traditional paper-based U.N. document system and possibly also the high 
degree of rotation in the diplomatic services of Member States and national 
delegations. Member States also tend to attach symbolic importance to some 
content, which then becomes self-fulfilling: even where no longer particularly 
relevant or useful, the deletion of documents or specific content is seen as a 
political statement that it is no longer important or that its sponsors have 
somehow lost influence. 
                                                 
176 ECOSOC Rules of Procedure, E/5715/Rev.2, Rule 54. Until 2011, the practice was for the 
Commission to decide to close the submission of new proposals at the end of the first day’s 
proceedings. That year, it adopted a decision calling for submission a month in advance to 
allow time for translation and dissemination prior to the convening of the Plenary. This is 
expected to speed up proceedings but may reduce flexibility, and whether future Chairmen are 
successful in ruling draft resolutions submitted late “out of order” remains to be seen. See 
E/2011/30, Draft Decision 20/1, “Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice on its twentieth session, provisional agenda for its twenty-first session and organization 
of work of its future sessions.” 
177 E/5715/Rev.2, Rule 27. 
178 See A/RES/50/206C, A/RES/52/291 and subsequent resolutions, including A/RES/59/265, 
Part III, paragraph 4, as well as A/58/CRP.7. Implementing the policy with respect to UNODC 
and the Commission, see UNOV/DGB.15-ODC/EDB.15, of 6 November 2002. 
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While there is clearly significant potential to re-direct costs to more useful 
activities and produce a more limited and more focused information base for 
deliberations, serious concerns are raised by limits or reductions which affect 
the substantive content of documents, especially in the functional commissions 
and similar bodies which have the lead on considering substance. Placing 
substantive information before the Commission, including submissions by the 
Secretariat, individual delegations, expert consultants, delegated bodies such as 
expert groups, non-governmental and other sources, serves two essential 
purposes. It provides the majority of the information and evidence to support 
deliberations, and without which such deliberations would be sterile. It also 
serves to document the information itself, which is translated into all six 
official U.N. languages and recorded for later access in the U.N. Official 
Document System. This is a valuable, and perhaps under-utilized information 
resource both for policy-makers in governments and for analysts in academic 
and other non-governmental settings. 
The intended policy establishes the mandatory limits and guidelines, and in the 
case of the limits, then applies a process of waivers to make exceptions where 
required. The process is not very transparent, however, and it is not clear how 
this discretion applies or what the criteria for actually making an exception to 
the limits are. While reform of U.N. documentation is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, it is clearly essential to the basic role of the functional 
commissions that they be the primary collecting point for substantive 
information. In the case of crime prevention and criminal justice, this includes 
research and other factual evidence, analytical materials, and policy or legal 
proposals, and many of these cannot be effectively and accurately presented 
within the otherwise-applicable limits.  
It is submitted here that one key role of the Crime Commission is to receive 
and officially document such information, and then provide summaries, 
analysis and proposals to the superior bodies. If questioned later in the process, 
the factual basis of what the Commission produces should remain available on 
the official records of documents before its sessions. If the initial 
documentation is inadequate or defective, however, there can be no reliable 
historical factual basis for what comes later. This is not merely a question of 
documentary policy or cost-reduction, it goes to the fundamental validity of the 
work of the Commission. This suggests that either waivers should routinely be 
applied to new substantive information requested by the Commission, or that 
the Commission itself should consider this question when it mandates the 
gathering or analysis of factual evidence, and where appropriate, specify that 
the otherwise-applicable limits do not apply. 
15.  Can the volume of documentation be reduced?  
Given the pressures generated by the high cost of translation and other 
document costs and the limited resources available, a clear, comprehensive and 
balanced discussion among the various constituent elements of the 
Commission itself and between the Vienna- and New-York based Secretariat 
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and diplomatic interests is needed. The functions of the Commission, and the 
constituencies to which the various documents are addressed are quite 
different, and this has fundamental implications with respect to the nature, 
functions and future of the Commission and the way Member States allocate 
both RB and XB resources to the global effort to prevent and combat crime. If 
the Commission is seen as a primarily-diplomatic body, many of its reporting 
outputs could be reduced, provided that the Member States are willing to 
document only the results of a process and whether consensus was achieved 
without also documenting details of the discussions and how the consensus was 
arrived at. From the standpoint of the Commission’s legal and criminological 
functions, on the other hand, limits on the length and detail of texts reported 
represent a very real loss in value. When research on emerging issues is 
conducted, for example, the most common methodology is to send 
questionnaires to the Member States. These cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to develop and translate into languages, and require extensive time and 
resources both for the Member States themselves in gathering information and 
developing their responses, and for the Secretariat and oversight bodies that 
must assess the information gathered and report it back to the Commission. 
Detailed information about the issues under study is not only important to 
provide the evidence base for political decisions in the Commission about what 
to do next, it can also be important for Member States in deciding what should 
be done at the national level and developing approaches which are coherent 
with those of other States. In extended policy or political deliberations, 
reporting on the various arguments made and positions taken is also important 
to assist Member States in negotiating with one another, especially at the 
diplomatic level, where rotationality in foreign services makes personnel 
changes frequent.179  
Assuming that this sort of research and evidence-based policymaking is seen as 
one of the core functions of the Commission, some means of supporting it with 
adequate documentation must be found. It may be that the procedural elements 
of reports can be reduced in length, but it is difficult to see how significant 
economies could be achieved with legal and criminological reporting, given 
that the single major cost involves editing into comprehensible language and 
translation from the source language into the other five official U.N. languages. 
In searching for a solution to this problem, venue also becomes a critical issue. 
The major budgetary and management decisions governing the allocation of 
documentation and conference services are taken in New York, where 
diplomatic interests are represented but substantive ones are not. The search for 
a solution should therefore take the form of a dialogue between diplomatic, 
                                                 
179 This depends to some degree on the nature of the deliberations and an assessment of the 
costs and benefits of such reporting. In the negotiation of treaties such as the Palermo and 
Merida Conventions, detailed footnote annotations identifying the sponsors and views 
expressed on various provisions were used. In the more general reports to and from the 
Commission, the practice is to focus mostly on the issues raised and positions taken in more 
general terms without documenting which States have taken which positions unless a State 
specifically requests that its position be documented.  
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criminological and Secretariat interests from both places and it should to the 
extent possible ensure that New York-based delegations from the Member 
States represent both perspectives. 
16.  Better dissemination of Commission documents and 
 other materials produced by the Secretariat 
Most of the materials produced for the Commission, as well as its formal and 
informal outputs, contain information that, if appropriately disseminated to and 
used by Member States, would have substantial value. This is also true of other 
information gathered by the Secretariat and materials produced using that 
information. The advent of the Internet and the UNODC and Crime 
Commission websites have greatly increased the availability of these materials 
and information, but there is still a discontinuity between the intrinsic value of 
much of the information and the likelihood that Member States will actually 
access it and use it in dealing with domestic and transnational crime problems. 
This has both political and informational aspects. Politically, the perception 
that a report or resolution of the ECOSOC or General Assembly not only 
makes the sponsoring States seek to have such texts referred upward, it also 
makes it less likely that other States will take seriously and use the content of 
texts which are adopted only by the Commission. From an informational 
standpoint, many States are also more familiar with the documentation of the 
ECOSOC and General Assembly Secretariats, and may be less likely to locate 
and access information from the more specialised systems of UNODC and the 
Commission.  
The political element can be effectively addressed only by a change in 
perceptions of the Commission and its relationships with the Council and 
Assembly. The informational aspect, however, is more easily addressed. 
Indeed, it is already being addressed, as the UNODC and Commission websites 
are easily accessible and often turn up automatically when the relevant subject 
matter is searched on-line. Ease of access is being steadily increased by the 
tendency for specific elements of the Secretariat (both within UNODC and 
other elements of the U.N.) to cluster documents and information thematically, 
assembling information on specific subject matter such as terrorism and 
corruption for example. Thus far this has tended to proceed in a fairly ad hoc 
manner, following the 2003 re-organization of UNODC, as specific units have 
assembled and posted the documents and information for which they were 
responsible. Organizing and structuring this process to cover all of the subject 
matter covered by UNODC in a comprehensive manner could bring substantial 
benefits, but information-management is an area which is not very attractive to 
donors. A system which clustered all of the information thematically and which 
gave ready access to all of the relevant documents, ranging from historical 
reports to the Commission, resolutions of the Commission and other subject-
specific materials, as well as links to relevant portions of broader documents, 
such as reports of the Commission, Congresses and other bodies, would 
increase use of and reliance on the information. Over time, it might also 
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reassure delegations that subject-matter they consider important would receive 
appropriate attention at the level of the Commission and UNODC alone. 
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CONCLUSION 
This examination of the Commission on Crime Prevention, tracing its origins 
through the successive Crime Committees from the founding of the U.N. itself 
to the 1989-91 process that led to the establishment of the Commission itself, 
and then the evolution and work of the Commission during its first two decades 
reveal fundamental and continuing differences among experts and Member 
States as to the nature of crime and the range of appropriate responses to it. 
Many of the underlying stresses that can be seen in the early Crime Congresses 
are still evident, albeit in different forms, today. The Soviet view that criminal 
justice and the rule of law were local matters and inappropriate for the global 
forum of the U.N. may have gradually faded with the globalisation of human 
rights standards and the demise of Communism and socialist legalism itself, 
but the fundamental tension between the need to deal with crime at the regional 
and global level as an international economic and security issue and the 
resistance of many domestic politicians and governments to intrusion on what 
they regard as purely domestic political issues is still very much a factor in 
sessions of the Commission.  
The tension between substantive criminological expertise and diplomatic or 
political expertise and between approaches to crime prevention and control that 
are essentially political or essentially scientific also remains. The paradox 
encountered by those who founded the Commission remains unresolved in its 
proceedings has not been resolved: the development of viable responses to 
crime depends on the very sort of objective and independent scientific data-
gathering and analysis that political interests resist. Any work in which the 
process is manipulated and the outcomes are pre-determined is by its nature 
unlikely to come up with realistic understandings of the problems of crime or 
responses which actually prevent and reduce it. At the same time, 
criminological answers require political consensus and support at both the 
national and international level to convert theory into practice, ensure that 
policies developed based on criminology are actually implemented in law and 
public administration, and increasingly, to ensure that what is done in one 
country is not undermined by the failure of others to act. Member States 
seeking to control the deliberations too closely by excluding independent 
substantive expertise eventually find them sterile and devoid of value, while 
those who advocate greater reliance on independent substantive experts still 
face the possibility that Member States will prevent this if they can, and ignore 
the results if they cannot. 
The situation is not stable, however. The past two decades have seen a 
relentless trend towards the globalisation of the essential economic, social and 
political infrastructures which require protection from crime, accompanied by a 
corresponding globalisation of crime itself. These have created greater demand 
than ever before for coordinated global actions to prevent and suppress crime, 
greater potential benefits in security and prosperity if such actions can be 
developed and implemented, and greater risks if they are misconceived, 
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incomplete or badly-implemented. At the same time, the politicisation of 
criminal justice policy that has always existed at the domestic level has become 
steadily more evident and more problematic at the international level. The 
original evolution from a small ad hoc committee of academic experts in the 
1950s and 1960s in the direction of experts which represent the political will of 
the Member States and not independent social science and legal perspectives, 
and towards the use of diplomatic personnel as a conduit for the views of the 
Member States as opposed to interactive debates among crime experts, has 
continued since the Commission was established.  
While the calibre and size of the Secretariat and its oversight by the 
Commission have expanded, the capacity of the Commission to develop and 
disseminate new criminological information and analysis has deteriorated. The 
reduction of the duration of Commission sessions from 8 working days to 5 
days in 2005 has reduced both the number of substantive experts who attend 
and the opportunities for them to meet and discuss substantive issues. Expert 
meetings organized and run by Institutes of the Programme Network have 
become rare, and when one is held, most delegates are too busy to attend and 
report on it. The expansion and globalisation of crime had resulted in steady 
increases in the documentation sent to and produced by the Commission in its 
first decade, but the current (2009-12) budgetary crisis has led to a drastic 
reduction in the capacity to produce documents, many of them of substantial 
value to Member States which require reliable data and analysis but lack the 
capacity to produce it for themselves or face transnational crime problems that 
require input from outside of their territorial capacities. 
Underlying this is the fact that there is still no consensus on what the 
Commission is for, on what work should be done as a greater or lesser priority, 
on how it should be done or on who should do it. Sessions of the Commission 
have also become increasingly turbulent, in part, because it serves as a forum 
in which three different constituent groups – substance experts, 
diplomatic/political experts, and the Secretariat – interact. Each of these has 
different images of what the Commission is for and how it should work, and 
their assessments of its value and effectiveness are frequently tainted by the 
failure of each group to recognise the value delivered by the Commission and 
its proceedings to other groups. Allowing for factors such as the effects of 
globalisation and the resulting changes in crime and diplomatic practice and 
the gradual accumulation and dissemination of knowledge about the social, 
economic, political and psychological aspects of crime, the underlying debates 
about what the Commission should do and how are really not very different 
from those of the 1950s. Speaking in 1961 of the Second U.N. Crime Congress 
(London, 1960), one English criminologist observed:180 
                                                 
180 Hall-Williams, J.E. “Two International Congresses” (1961) 1 British Journal of 
Criminology, pp. 254-61 at 260-61. Prof. Williams goes on to suggest many of the same 
reforms that have been repeatedly raised over the years, notably more substantive presentations 
and small, focused discussions of specific issues by experts.  
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... The overall impression of the Congress was one of confusion of aims 
and dispersion of energies which could have been used to better effect. 
One cannot attend one of these vast international jamborees without 
wondering who is benefiting from the experience, and what contribution is 
being made in the debates (and outside) towards a deeper knowledge and 
understanding of the subject. Admirable as were the preliminary papers, 
excellent as were the rapporteurs, distinguished as were many of the 
participants, one felt a sense of dissatisfaction at the level of debate and 
the impossibility of getting anywhere through listening to them. Surely it 
is not beyond the wit of man to devise a scheme for an international 
convention where some really intelligent discussion could be assured to 
those who attend and by those who take part. Much of the time in London 
was occupied in dreary accounts by government delegates of the situation 
in their respective countries, and what was being achieved. Much of the 
rest of the time went in banal remarks and puerile arguments unworthy of 
such a distinguished gathering. Something must be done to avoid a 
repetition of this experience. 
Those observations could equally have been made in respect of any of the more 
recent (2000 and 2005) Congresses I have attended, and many of them apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to every session of the Crime Commission. That there is no 
unifying theme, no consensus on strategic (or any) priorities, and endless 
tension between those who bring to the Commission diplomatic, political, 
social, human rights, security, criminological, legal, development or other 
perspectives, is not necessarily fatal to the work of the Commission or its value 
as an institution, a forum and a process, however. Just as crime is what it is, the 
same is true of the Commission and its participants, and its value lies as much 
in its inherent tensions and inconsistencies as in any of its various substantive 
or procedural outputs. Much could be improved, given the commitment of the 
necessary will and resources, but those who attack the Commission and other 
bodies like it because of what it does not produce in terms of deliverable 
substantive texts and decisions are in my view missing the point.  
The Commission on Crime Prevention represents an investment, both in the 
present and the future, and given the intangible and long-term nature of the 
dividends it generates, something of a leap of faith. To participate with a sense 
of commitment as individuals requires faith in the value of our ideas, 
experience and expertise, and in our ability to communicate with and persuade 
others. It also requires an appreciation that the ideas of others have value to us 
as experts and to the Member States whose people we represent, and a 
fundamental sense of optimism that the ultimate value of the work of the 
Commission is greater than the sum of the ideas expressed, and that this value 
can be realized and expressed in tangible forms. As with any international 
process, the investment in time, effort and resources can seem substantial and 
difficult to justify, because the dividends tend to be abstract and difficult to 
quantify and compare to those generated in domestic policy and governance 
environments. Seen on a global and long term scale, however, the investments 
are small, when compared either with the global economic and other costs of 
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crime, or with the far-less efficient scenarios in which responses to crime are 
based on the more ad hoc and reactive measures that result when each Member 
State reacts unilaterally based only on its perceptions of the facts and in its own 
national interests. 
With bodies and processes such as the Commission, much of the value lies not 
in the destination but in the journey, and in their use as a sort of ongoing, open-
ended negotiation. This is equally true, in my view, whether one participates as 
a diplomat or as a criminologist. The sessions provide diplomats with a regular, 
annual opportunity to monitor the political positions of various States on 
various issues, and given some degree of continuity of knowledge and the 
institutional memory provided by the Secretariat, to trace the evolution of 
positions and gradual consensus as it develops over time. From a 
criminological standpoint, the Commission should, and if properly mandated 
and equipped, will provide a similar forum for the development, exchange and 
evolution of scientific assessments of crime and evidence-based responses to it. 
That this is seen as much as a threat as an opportunity by the Member States is 
unfortunate and the resulting erosion of the criminological functions of the 
Commission is lamentable. To be effective, political and legislative responses 
to crime must ultimately be based on scientific evidence and analysis, and the 
globalisation of recent decades has made recognition of this harsh reality in the 
Crime Commission and other international fora more critical than ever before. 
The very essence of science, whether physical, natural or social, lies in asking 
open-ended questions to which the answers are not known and cannot be pre-
determined, in the conjectural construction of theories, and in the gathering of 
factual evidence to test and revise them. This represents a threat or risk only to 
strategies which entail using misperceptions or the misunderstanding of crime 
for other purposes, not to the efforts of the Member States to understand crime, 
to prevent and reduce crime, and to deal with its perpetrators and victims. If an 
appropriate, non-threatening multilateral balance between social science and 
politics can be found, the greatest value of the Commission would be not only 
in tracing the evolution of crime, scientific evidence and understanding of it, 
and political positions on what should be done about it, but in bringing these 
diverse threads together.  
More can be done, and future generations will in my view pay a price if it is 
not, but while the Commission may not be ideal from the perspective of any 
single constituent group, or any Member State or constituent group of Member 
States, it is my view that, when a holistic perspective is taken, the Commission 
meets a serious and growing need generated by the relentless process of 
globalisation. Moreover, it does so, on the whole, very effectively given the 
lack of resources and support with which it is expected to function. The 
Commission performs a great many specific tasks, and in examining these, 
many possible reforms and enhancements are possible, provided that the 
Member States are prepared to provide the necessary political support and 
resources to make them work. There are many unfulfilled needs, and these, too, 
could be addressed if the Member States are prepared to provide the necessary 
support.  
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This book has sought to examine these and to set out in as much detail as 
possible the challenges that exist and the options for addressing them. In the 
final analysis, however, the fundamental function of the Commission lies not in 
the specific resolutions, mandates and reports that it produces, but in the forum 
it provides for the exchange of political perspectives and substantive expertise 
and the development of consensus-based responses to crime which enjoy both 
substantive validity and political legitimacy. These are critical elements in the 
search for global values which support peace, security and prosperity from the 
largest Member States down to the smallest villages, of which we have great 
and ever-increasing need. In that context the Commission and other bodies like 
it must be seen not only in terms of the search for solutions to problems, but in 
terms of building the will and the capacity to search. The Commission itself 
lies at the tectonic boundary of substantive and political perspectives on crime 
and of the interests of developed and developing countries increasingly thrown 
together by globalised technological, social and economic structures. In such a 
place, we should not be surprised at the occasional earthquake, because in such 
places, mountains are built. 
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